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Introduction
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Over a decade has passed since the last grand financial crisis 2008 and banking regulation has
changed significantly. Since then, the Basel 3 framework provides in particular new and more
restrictive capital and liquidity requirements for banks. The core of the reforms was the attempt
to increase the stability of banks and the banking system. This was a consequence of the crisis
showing that banks were individually not resistant enough and their interdependencies led to
systemic effects destabilising even solid institutions. With regard to capital requirements, both
quality and quantity of eligible means have been increased, in particular for so-called “systemic”
institutions. Strict capital requirements might lead to more resilience in times of financial
distress. However, aside from times of financial distress, they are associated with higher costs of
capital for the institutions, making banks less profitable. Indeed, ever since the crisis, banking
sectors in developed countries around the world are struggling with extraordinarily low profita-
bility (Detragiache et al. (2018), Deutsche Bank (2019)). Low profitability of banks, however,
increases again their vulnerability and leads to higher default risks. Another consequence of the
financial crisis was the criticism of banks’ risk governance mechanisms. Myopic remuneration
practices and insufficient risk control mechanisms were manifold deemed inadequate (see Peni
& Va¨ha¨maa (2012) among many others). Since then, corporate social responsibility became
increasingly relevant to banks. Throughout the last years, the debate on responsibility focused
in particular on a co-responsibility for fighting climate change. The term “climate risks” evolved
as a new type of risk relevant for financial institutions, which had not been on the agenda
before. Quantifying these risks is, however, difficult, which complicates the evaluation whether
responsible business policies lead to a risk-reduction.
The central aim of this cumulative dissertation is to shed light on issues of post-crisis banking
regulation and bank management studying their effects on bank risk and profitability. Common
to all three essays is the approach to evaluate specific policy measures concerning their effect
on the banking sector based on empirical data. In this way, all three studies are conducted
with econometric methodology and bank specific panel datasets. The intention is to study the
consequences of selected measures on bank risk and profitability, in order to provide guidance
to bank regulators and bank management based on reliable data.
The first two essays of this cumulative dissertation concern the empirical evaluation of one
particular type of hybrid capital which was proposed after the financial crisis 2008, the so-called
“contingent convertible bonds” or “CoCo-bonds”. CoCo-bonds were developed to provide loss
absorbing going concern capital to financial institutions if and only if the capital is needed.
They promise to combine the best of equity and debt, the quality to absorb losses, without the
necessity of issuing supposedly costly equity. Though the idea of CoCo-bonds dates back to
well before the crisis (Raviv (2004), Flannery (2005)), their relevance for the banking industry
grew particularly after Basel 3 came into force in 2013–2014. Basel 3 allows the eligibility of
CoCo-bonds as either additional tier 1-capital or as tier 2-capital, depending on their specific
design. Predestined, however, is the eligibility as additional tier 1, because CoCo-bonds are the
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only remaining hybrid capital instrument other than common equity which remains eligible as
tier 1-capital. The reason for the introduction of CoCo-bonds as additional tier 1-instruments
was the aim to increase the resilience of banks (Squam-Lake-Working-Group (2009)) compared
to hybrid capital instruments used before the crisis, without requiring banks to issue additional
equity. After some years of experience with these new instruments, in principal there is now
sufficient data to evaluate the effects on risk and profitability of this aspect of capital regulation.
The quality of existing data on CoCo-bonds and their features as reported by data providers
is, however, suboptimal. Therefore, for the preparation of the first two studies, extensive
hand-collection of data was necessary.
Chapter 2 comprises my first and single authored essay entitled “Increasing Profitability through
Contingent Convertible Capital. Empirical Evidence from European Banks” (Petras (2018)).
This study investigates the consequences of the usage of CoCo-bonds on bank profitability. It is
motivated by the fact that the usage of CoCo-bonds instead of equity offers a tax-shield and
positive risk-taking incentives. I empirically analyse a panel dataset of 231 banks from EEA-
countries as well as Switzerland from 2014 to 2018 as provided by Thomson Reuters’ Eikon. The
analysis is focussed on those CoCo-bonds which are eligible as additional tier 1-capital, because
only for these there is an obvious substitution relationship with equity. My analysis is conducted
in two consecutive steps. The first part of the study analyses the determinants of the usage of
CoCo-bonds. It shows, among others, that the potential tax-shield of CoCo-bonds is a relevant
determinant. Subsequently, I analyse the implications for profitability of using CoCo-bonds as
a substitute for common equity tier 1-capital. I find that the usage of CoCo-bonds instead of
equity as additional tier 1-capital has significant and positive effects on bank profitability.
Chapter 3 comprises an essay entitled “Can CoCo-bonds Mitigate Systemic Risk? Evidence for
the SRISK Measure”, which is based on a collaborative study with Arndt-Gerrit Kund (Kund
& Petras (2019)). This essay is also concerned with the usage of CoCo-bonds, studying their
implications for the vulnerability of banks towards systemic risk. After the 2008 financial crises,
the idea of contingent convertible capital was manifold proposed as a means to stabilise individual
banks, and hence the entire banking system. The purpose of this study is to empirically test
whether CoCo-bonds indeed improve the stability of the banking system and reduce systemic
risk. Our panel dataset comprises the entire universe of banks using CoCo-bonds as provided
by Thomson Reuters’ Eikon and covers the years from 2012 to 2018. Using the broadly applied
SRISK metric, we obtain contradicting results, based on the classification of the CoCo-bond as
debt or equity. We remedy this short-coming by proposing an adjustment to the original SRISK
formula that correctly accounts for CoCo-bonds. Using empirical tests, we show that the undue
disparity has been solved by our adjustment, and that CoCo-bonds reduce systemic risk. As
part of this cooperative work with Arndt-Gerrit Kund, I was involved in all parts of the work,
in particular the conceptualisation, design, implementation, calculation, interpretation of the
results, and writing. The work was particularly fruitful because Arndt-Gerrit Kund shared his
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expertise on systemic risk measures, while I contributed mine on hybrid capital instruments.
Aside from the capital resources to cope with materialised risk, a bank’s riskiness is determined
by the exposure on the asset side. While the management of conventional types of risk is already
highly regulated, new risk dimensions like climate change induced risks have recently come
to the fore. The management of climate risks can be seen as part of the social responsibility
of banks as well as as forward looking risk governance in the interest of the bank. The term
“sustainable banking” is used to capture the responsibility towards environmental, social, and
governance aspects. Sustainable banking, be it voluntary or in compliance with regulatory
requirements, affects the aggregated risk structure of banks. Therefore, my third essay in chapter
4 considers the implications of corporate social and in particular environmental responsibility
for the idiosyncratic bank risk.
Chapter 4 comprises the essay entitled “Corporate Social Responsibility and Bank Risk”, which
is the result of a collaborative study with Florian Neitzert (Neitzert & Petras (2019)). Extant
literature on sustainability finds that corporate social responsibility does not necessarily decrease
profitability but reduces idiosyncratic firm risk. However, it remains unclear whether the
risk-reduction stems from the environmental, social, or governance pillar. We investigate the
origins and effect drivers, by analysing a sample of 2,452 banks from 115 countries over the
period from 2002 to 2018. The worldwide dataset provided by Thomson Reuters comprises
bank characteristics and, in particular, data on their environmental, social, and governance
performance. As a result, we identify the environmental pillar and its sub-components as the
significant determinants. Our analysis yields that the three dimensions of corporate social
responsibility do not affect bank risk to the same degree. Instead, the environmental dimension,
i.e. sustainability in a narrow sense, is identified as the most relevant aspect of responsibility
for bank risk. As part of this cooperative work with Florian Neitzert, I was involved in all parts
of the work, in particular the conceptualisation, implementation, interpretation of the results,
and writing. I am responsible for the empirical design and the calculations. On the theoretical
level, I contributed my expertise on empirical banking and idiosyncratic risk.
The studies included in this dissertation all provide insights into the effects of regulated bank
policies on risk and profitability. In this way, I give guidance on the implications of bank
management decisions and bank regulation requiring or enabling these actions. I provide evi-
dence that the usage of CoCo-bonds increases bank profitability and decreases banks’ systemic
vulnerability. These are good reasons for bank management to make use of these instruments.
For regulators, the increase in profitability and the reduction of systemic risk associated with
these instruments additionally confirm that these instruments do indeed strengthen the banking
sector. Finding that corporate social responsibility in the form of environmental engagement
reduces idiosyncratic bank risk serves as additional motivation for bank managers to commit
to sustainable banking. For regulators, it provides insights into the roots of the risk-reduction
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 5
associated with corporate social responsibility, as well as justification for requirements to sus-
tainable banking in the environmental sense.
The results presented in the three studies of this dissertation contribute and enhance the state
of scientific banking research. However, the perspective on bank risk and profitability based on
empirical data is always past-oriented. The results illustrate some of the consequences of policies
adopted and proposed after the last grand crisis, consequences of lessons supposedly learned
after the financial crisis in 2008. However, banks are already faced with new risks like climate
risks, cyber risks, or the risk of public health crises, new types of risks that share a high degree
of unpredictability and severe systemic consequences. The future will eventually show if the
lessons learned from the last crisis serve as a good preparation for future times of financial distress.

Chapter 2
Increasing Profitability through
Contingent Convertible Capital.
Empirical Evidence from European
Banks1
1This paper received a best paper award at the 17th International Finance and Banking Conference (Bucharest,
2019) and a best paper award at the 26th Annual Global Finance Conference (Zagreb, 2019). For helpful comments
on this particular study, I thank the discussants at the 17th International Finance and Banking Conference
(Bucharest, 2019), the Annual Conference of the British Accounting & Finance Association (Birmingham, 2019),
the 26th Annual Global Finance Conference (Zagreb, 2019), the Infiniti Conference on International Finance
(Glasgow, 2019), the 23rd European Conference of the Financial Management Association (Glasgow, 2019), the
36th Annual Conference of the French Finance Association (Que´bec City, 2019), and the 27th Annual Meeting
of the Spanish Finance Association (Madrid, 2019).
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CHAPTER 2. INCREASING PROFITABILITY THROUGH CONTINGENT
CONVERTIBLE CAPITAL. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN BANKS
2.1 Introduction
Since Basel III, the requirements for the eligibility of capital instruments as regulatory capital
have been tightened. Aside from common equity tier 1 (CET1) which necessarily has to be
equity capital, only additional tier 1-capital (AT1) – in the form of contingent convertible (CoCo)
capital – will henceforth be eligible as tier 1-capital. Tier 1-capital is the relevant amount
with regard to the calculation of the risk-sensitive tier 1-ratio as well as the risk-insensitive
regulatory leverage ratio. In order to allow banks to adopt smoothly to the new tightened
capital requirements, European regulation grants a phase-in period until 2021, during which
the eligible amounts of old AT1-instruments – those which do not fulfil the new requirements –
are gradually reduced, respectively phased-out. After the regulatory phase-in period, merely
CRR-compliant2 CoCo-bonds will be eligible as AT1-capital (AT1CoCos). Legally, AT1CoCos
are debt obligations with a contractual quasi-automatic conversion mechanism. In case of
a breach of a pre-defined trigger threshold, the instrument is either converted into CET1-
instruments (C2E) or the principal amount is written down (PWD). The trigger must be based
on regulatory CET1-capital and amount to at least 5.125 %. Other design features concerning
the conversion price or ratio, permanent or temporary write down, or the possibility of a write
up of the principal amount are left to contractual freedom. The idea of AT1-capital is to provide
additional going concern capital exactly if the bank is in a state of financial distress. On the
one hand, AT1CoCos provide loss absorbing capital and reduce costs of bankruptcy, similar to
CET1-capital. On the other hand, AT1-capital instruments have several advantages as compared
to CET1-capital. In particular, the use of AT1CoCos has the potential to mitigate adverse
incentives for value reducing risk-shifting and to improve efficiency. Moreover, depending on
the specific design, these capital instruments can yield a tax-shield, due to the deductibility of
coupon payments. Hence, AT1CoCos combine the best of two worlds, on the one hand the loss
absorption qualities of equity, and on the other hand the tax deductibility of debt. Particularly
to the extent of regulatory eligibility, European capital regulation offers the discretion to use
AT1CoCos as a substitute for CET1-equity for capitalisation purposes. From a theoretical point
of view, such a substitution should be beneficial and promise regulatory arbitrage.
Until now, literature has predominantly been focussed on design features of CoCo-bonds, pricing
methods, financial stability implications, and potential risk-shifting incentives as such. Empirical
literature on CoCo-bonds, their usage, and their financial implications, on the other hand,
is still rare. So far, Goncharenko & Rauf (2016), Avdjiev et al. (2017), and B. Williams et
al. (2018) study determinants of the issuance of CoCo-bonds. They do, however, not study
AT1CoCos as a capital component subject to a substitution relationship with CET1-capital.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no literature on the determinants of the extent to which
2CRR-compliant relates to those instruments fulfilling the requirements of Art. 52 of the Capital Requirements
Regulation (i.e. Regulation 575/2013(EU)). Such instruments necessarily must be characterised by in essence
equity features like perpetual duration, cancellation of distribution does not constitute an event of default,
distributions only out of distributable items.
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banks make use of AT1CoCos, compared to other components of regulatory capital. Building
on that, financial implications and interdependencies of the usage of AT1CoCos are for the most
part still undiscovered. As one of very few, Avdjiev et al. (2015) and Avdjiev et al. (2017) study
the implications of issues of CoCo-bonds for the costs of capital, focussing on their impact on
CDS-spreads of subordinated debt.
This study aims to close some parts of the gap in the empirical literature. The purpose of the
study is twofold. First, the study aims to analyse the use of AT1CoCos as a source of tier
1-capital and to identify the main determinants explaining the use of AT1CoCos by European
banks. Second, I study the impact of the usage of AT1CoCos instead of CET1-capital on the
profitability of banks. To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to examine the impact of
bank specific CoCo-AT1-ratios on bank profitability.
As results of the study, I conclude that banks make increasingly use of AT1CoCos, while still a
substantial part of the banking industry does not exploit its potential benefits. I find that the
average earnings intensity is a significant determinant of the use of AT1CoCos, implying that
banks exploit the associated tax-shield potential. Though, the tax rate does not significantly
determine their use. Moreover, I conclude that the use of AT1CoCos instead of CET1-capital
increases the profitability of banks significantly. This result is valid for profitability after taxes
as well as before taxes, indicating that the tax-shield of CoCo-bonds is not the only reason to
explain the increase in profitability.
2.2 Literature on CoCo-Bonds
The intellectual foundation of CoCo-bonds as going concern capital can be attributed to the
proposal of a “reverse convertible debenture” by Flannery (2005). These bonds automatically
convert into common stock if a bank violates a pre-defined capital ratio. In opposition to a
capital ratio trigger, Raviv (2004) proposes ”debt-for-equity-swaps”, which are triggered if a bank
reaches a pre-specified asset value threshold. The proposal of a “capital insurance” by Kashyap
et al. (2008) aims to recapitalise banks if the banking sector on aggregate reaches a situation
of financial distress. In the wake of the global financial crisis, the interest by policy makers
and the intensity of the theoretical debate on CoCo-bonds increased drastically. Specifically
designed CoCo-bonds were designated as the only remaining source of AT1-capital by the Basel
III accord. If CoCo-bonds do not fulfil these design requirements, they might still be eligible
as tier 2-capital. Cahn & Kenadjian (2014) provide a general overview of the regulation of
CoCo-bonds according to Basel III and the European implementation through CRR and CRD
IV. Most of the existing literature is of theoretical nature and can roughly be classified as either
literature on design features of CoCo-bonds, on pricing issues, on financial stability implications,
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or on risk-taking incentives. A comprehensive literature review is provided by Flannery (2014).
Throughout this study, I build on two clusters of literature on CoCo-capital in particular:
First, theoretical literature on incentive effects and other potential benefits for banks using
CoCo-bonds and, second, empirical literature on the dissemination of CoCo-capital.
Starting point and motivation of my paper is the theory that the usage of CoCo-bonds instead
of CET1-capital offers potential benefits for banks, because of the inherent tax-shield and
positive incentive effects. Albul et al. (2010) demonstrate that CoCo-bonds increase a bank’s
value by increasing the tax-shield and decreasing the bankruptcy costs, particularly as regards
over-leveraged banks. Ceteris paribus, a direct consequence is an increase of after tax profits
and a reduction in the cost of capital. Zeng (2014) shows that CoCo-bonds should be part of the
optimal capital structure, as they improve the efficiency of banks and maximise shareholder value
in face of regulatory capital requirements. Hilscher & Raviv (2014) posit that the appropriate
choice of the parameters of CoCo-bonds can entirely eliminate any incentives to inefficiently shift
risk, compared to alternative capital structures employing either additional equity or additional
subordinated debt. The central parameter is the bond’s conversion ratio. In case of conversion,
shareholders benefit from the cancellation of the converting debt, but suffer from the dilution
of their shares. The conversion ratio determines the extent of dilution. In particular, a high
conversion ratio and the threat of large-scale dilution make an additional unit of risk in the
bank’s portfolio more costly. Therefore, shareholders are motivated to vote for a less risky
business and to issue additional equity voluntarily before CoCo-bonds are triggered (Huertas
(2010), Calomiris & Herring (2013)). At an appropriate level for the conversion ratio, the costs
and benefits for shareholders cancel each other. This conversion ratio eliminates any incentives
to shift risk either inefficiently high or inefficiently low and enforces profit maximising decision
making. Martynova & Perotti (2018) find that the threat of conversion reduces risk-shifting
incentives in particular in banks with high leverage. Incentive effects, however, might not be the
same for different forms of CoCo-bonds, but rather depend on the specific design. Himmelberg
& Tsyplakov (2014), Berg & Kaserer (2015), and Chan & van Wijnbergen (2017) argue that
other than dilutive C2E-CoCos, PWD-CoCos and non-dilutive C2E-CoCos do not yield the
described positive incentives. However, the specific incentive effects may depend on a multitude
of design features, making it difficult to account for each of them. In general, literature provides
the theoretical foundation to expect positive incentive effects. Because of the potential bene-
fits through incentive effects and the tax-shield, I assume that the usage of CoCo-bonds has
positive financial implications for banks and test whether these effects are measurable empirically.
Empirical literature concerning CoCo-bonds is still sparse. Avdjiev et al. (2015) and Boermans
& van Wijnbergen (2018) investigate the investor base of CoCo-capital instruments. Hesse
(2018) empirically extends the theoretical literature on incentives, showing that CoCo-investors
require a yield premium for PWD-CoCos as compared to C2E-CoCos. He interprets that
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investors, thereby, anticipate elevated risk-taking incentives if PWD-CoCos are issued. Avdjiev
et al. (2017) perform an analysis of determinants for European banks to issue CoCo-bonds
using duration analysis. B. Williams et al. (2018) perform logit regressions to test which
determinants contribute to the issuance of CoCo-bonds. Their study, however, is not restricted
to AT1CoCos, reducing comparability with other studies. They find evidence that systemically
risky banks are more likely to issue CoCo-bonds. Avdjiev et al. (2015) and Avdjiev et al.
(2017) additionally investigate the consequences of issuances of CoCo-bonds for CDS-spreads
of subordinated debt of the respective banks. They find that issuing CoCo-bonds leads to a
reduction of CDS-spreads. This finding, however, must not be misinterpreted as a reduction of
financing costs. The reduction is at least partially compensated by higher interest payments on
the respective CoCo-bonds. Nevertheless, tax-shield and efficiency gains do promise a potential
reduction of financing costs. Closest to my study comes a working paper by Goncharenko &
Rauf (2016). They perform a determinant analysis as regards the use of AT1CoCos based on
information from CoCo-bond issuances for banks with listed equity. As a measure, they use
CoCo-bonds outstanding over assets. They find that highly levered banks, those with capital
constraints, are more likely to issue CoCo-bonds and issue higher amounts. They interpret, that
bank managers are optimising their return on equity (ROE) through the use of CoCo-bonds, in
order to increase their salaries. This, however, is an unfounded assumption. The authors do not
empirically evaluate ROE. Indeed, there might not only be incentives for managers, but also
adverse incentives for shareholders to adverse risk-shifting at the expense of CoCo-investors. At
the same time, ROE as a measure is, of course, problematic, because it remains unclear if the
CoCo-bonds considered are accounted for as equity or as debt.
The theory on potential benefits motivates the two parts of the present empirical study. First, if
CoCo-bonds yield a potential tax-shield, the contributing factors of the tax-shield - i.e. earnings
and the tax rate - should be determinants of the usage of CoCo-bonds. Studying the determinants
of the use of CoCo-bonds, I extend existing determinant analysis using detailed information on
capital components from banks’ Pillar 3 reports. I measure the use of AT1CoCos as a share
of tier 1-capital in order to interpret AT1CoCos as a substitute for CET1-capital. Second, I
investigate whether the potential benefits can be realised. To the best of my knowledge, there
is no literature concerning the empirical implications of the usage of CoCo-capital for profits
and profitability, bank value, efficiency, or total funding cost measures of European banks. The
present paper intends to fill this gap, evaluating the impact on bank profitability measures.
2.3 Sample, data, and variable of interest
The sample analysed is generated from Thomson Reuters’ Eikon. The initial sample consists
of 291 banks from 32 EEA-countries plus Switzerland. Thereof, I select banks on a fully
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consolidated basis, on which the Basel Accord applies, and eliminate those banks which are
consolidated as part of another bank in the sample. Further, I eliminate those banks that are
not subject to a supervisory institution from the EEA or Switzerland as well as those banks
for which no capital adequacy data can be found. What remains is a sample comprising 231
banks from 33 countries. The data analysed is annual fundamental and capital adequacy data
from 2014 to 2018. Reason for the cut-off before 2014 is the fundamental change in the capital
regulation regime from Basel II to Basel III after the implementation of the CRR in 2014.
Capital adequacy data from years before 2014 cannot be considered as comparable, at least
not without making unwarranted adjustments. Data concerning capital adequacy is entirely
hand-collected from banks’ Pillar 3 reports, because it is not available from data providers in
the detail necessary. Banks in the EEA (and in Switzerland in comparable form) are required
by Art. 437 CRR to provide data on capital adequacy either in a separate Pillar 3 report, risk
report, or as part of the annual report.3 ITS 1423/2013(EU) provides a standardised template
to comply with the reporting requirements. The data collection is based on the structure
of the standardised template. The result of the hand-collected capital adequacy data is a
dataset of unique detail for the capital components. Fundamental data is provided by Thomson
Reuters. Data on macroeconomic variables like inflation rate, gross domestic product (GDP), or
the level of corruption is retrieved from the WorldBank-database and Transparency International.
COCOS =
AT1CoCos
T ier1− capital (in %) (2.1)
Table 2.1: COCOS per FY
The table below shows information on the dissemination of AT1CoCos over the years considered.
Illustrated are the share of banks using AT1-CoCos in the respective year, the mean value of COCOS
in general (in %), and the mean value of COCOS restricted to positive values of COCOS (in %).
FY 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Overall
Share of banks using CoCos 0.357 0.454 0.443 0.461 0.502 0.443
Mean COCOS 4.004 4.403 4.531 4.581 4.754 4.454
Mean COCOS if > 0 11.200 9.703 10.230 9.926 9.465 10.044
The variable of interest in both empirical parts of this study is the extent to which banks make
use of AT1CoCos for capitalisation purposes. In this way, COCOS is measured as the share of
AT1CoCos of tier 1-capital. Hence, COCOS is a relative measure, i.e. fully-loaded AT1-capital
relative to tier 1-capital. The advantage of this measurement approach is that it formalises the
substitution relationship of AT1-capital instruments and CET1-capital instruments in order
to fulfil the capital requirements with regard to tier 1-capital. It does directly reflect the
premise that the substitution of CET1 by fully-loaded AT1-capital might be beneficial. It does
3It should be mentioned in this context that the quality of pillar 3 reporting varies significantly between the
countries considered. Moreover, the information provided is regularly unaudited.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of COCOS over the Years Considered
The five graphs show the distributions of COCOS for the respective years. COCOS is the percentage
share of AT1CoCos per tier 1-capital. Kernel density lines are painted green. Normal density lines are
painted red.
not depend on the amount of risk-weighted assets and does not simply reflect higher total
capital ratios. Other specifications are considered in section (2.6). Over the years 2014-2018,
44 % of the banks were characterised by positive amounts of AT1CoCos, i.e. made use of
AT1CoCos for capitalisation purposes. The share of banks using AT1CoCos increased steadily
since 2014 up to 50 % in 2018. The mean of COCOS amounts to 4.5 %, increasing from 4.0
% in 2014 to 4.8 % in 2018. If only strictly positive values of COCOS are considered, the
mean amounts to 10.0 %. The increase in COCOS can be explained by two reasons. First,
banks adopt to the new capital regulation of Basel III and issue new CRR-compliant instru-
ments. Second, according to the phase-out rules in Art. 484 (4) and 486 (3) & (5) CRR for
old AT1-instruments which are not CRR-compliant, the eligible AT1-capital decreases from
year to year. Insofar, as the total tier 1-capital decreases and AT1-CoCos remain unchanged,
the variable COCOS should increase. Therefore, to some extent the coefficients do not reflect
management action, but simply reflect the phase-in and phase-out effects of the transition period.
In order to evaluate the values for COCOS, the question to start with is what size one may
expect for COCOS. Because the absolute minimum requirement for tier 1-capital amounts to
6 %, whereof 4.5 % must be CET1, the highest possible share of eligible AT1-capital would be 25
% of tier 1. Since banks are also subject to further requirements because of buffer-requirements
and SREP-requirements4, the rate of eligible AT1-capital of tier 1-capital will be lower, possibly
4Based on the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP), supervisory institutions can set i.a.
additional bank-specific capital requirements. Such requirements theoretically do not necessarily need to be
CET1-requirements. In practice, however, they nearly always are.
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as low as 10 % or less. Consequently, it is not possible to find a universal level of eligible COCOS.
Empirical ratios of AT1CoCos to tier 1-capital, though, will vary additionally to the extent
that banks make use of CET1 or AT1-capital instruments for economic or practical reasons.
Assuming that AT1CoCos offer going concern capital comparable to CET1, but is otherwise
beneficial, it is reasonable to cover these voluntary buffers with AT1CoCos. Despite potential
benefits and eligibility as tier 1-capital, about half of the banks does not yet use AT1CoCos. As
a first result, I conclude that banks indeed make increasingly use of AT1CoCos – which are still
a very young category of instruments. Though, a substantial part of the banking industry does
not yet exploit the benefits of AT1CoCos. Another finding is that the use of AT1CoCos depends
on the geographic region. While rare in Eastern Europe, about two thirds of the banks in
Northern Europe make use of AT1CoCos. A series of simple two sample t-tests reveals that while
banks from the north have significantly higher, banks from the east and south have significantly
lower levels of COCOS. Banks from Switzerland, even though not member of the EEA, do not
statistically significantly deviate from the others. Considering the Euro-zone, banks reporting
in EUR have significantly less COCOS than others. The reason for that is the extraordinarily
high COCOS of Scandinavian banks reporting in their local currencies. Figure (2.1) and Table
(2.1) illustrate the development of COCOS from 2014 to 2018. Figures (2.3)–(2.4) and Tables
(2.6)–(2.8) in the appendix provide additional results of the descriptive analysis.
Two limitations restrict the quality of the data. First, it would be interesting to evaluate
the share of AT1CoCos accounted for as equity, respectively as debt. Even though banks are
required to report this characteristic as part of the information of the template of Annex 4
of ITS 1423/2013(EU), this information is often neglected. The second limitation concerns a
distinction between C2E- and PWD-bonds. In principle, this information is also required to be
disclosed by European banks, following Annex 2 of ITS 1423/2013(EU). Because for this sample
information on accounting treatment as well as on trigger mechanisms is also only available to a
limited extent, I refrain from analysing these characteristics.
2.4 Determinant analysis
2.4.1 Variable selection
The first empirical part of the present study is dedicated to the analysis of the usage of CoCo-
bonds eligible as AT1-capital among banks from the EEA and Switzerland. Based on the panel
dataset described above, I analyse to what extent banks make use of these instruments in order
to fulfil relevant capital requirements. Moreover, I use a multiple linear panel regression model
to identify significant determinants of an elevated use of CoCo-AT1-instruments as part of the
regulatory capital structure. The dependent variable is COCOS, as defined in section (2.3). The
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variables considered as determinants in the regression model are motivated as follows: I build on
the insights of Goncharenko & Rauf (2016), Avdjiev et al. (2017), and B. Williams et al. (2018)
about determinants of the issuance of CoCo-bonds. To some extent, one can also borrow insights
from capital structure literature. Caution is, however, required, because unlike most studies on
determinants of capital structure, it cannot be assumed with certainty whether AT1CoCos are
accounted for as debt or as equity. AT1-CoCos are hybrid capital instruments and as such it
depends essentially on the specific contractual properties as well as on the applicable accounting
standards.
Bank size is a frequently tested variable in the literature on capital structure and also an intuitive
possible determinant for COCOS. Goncharenko & Rauf (2016) find a significant positive effect
for AT1CoCos outstanding. B. Williams et al. (2018) find that larger banks are more likely
to issue CoCo-bonds and Avdjiev et al. (2017) find that larger banks are earlier adopting to
CoCo-capital and are more frequently issuing CoCo-bonds. In tendency, larger banks have
a more professional capital management and better access to capital markets. Issuances of
CoCo-bonds regularly require a certain volume to justify the associated fixed costs. Large
institutions are predestined to issue these large and cost efficient volumes, while they might
be over-dimensioned for smaller banks. In this way, the argument of Titman & Wessels (1988)
that small firms have higher per unit equity issue costs could just as well be transferred to the
issuance of CoCo-bonds. In accordance with the literature, the present study considers size as
log total assets (SIZE). Assuming that large banks are more likely to use AT1CoCos at all and,
therefore, have higher AT1-capital ratios, I expect ex-ante a positive effect of SIZE on COCOS.
On the other hand, if very large banks are considered ”too-big-to-fail”, they might benefit from
lower bankruptcy risk. Hence, for the largest banks, there might be no additional increasing effect.
The equity ratio (CAR) is widely used as a measure of balance sheet capital adequacy. It is
measured as the proportion of total equity to total assets. It serves as an indicator of the
reliance of the bank on equity or debt financing. The expectation is that CAR has a negative
impact on COCOS. The equity in the nominator of the ratio meets the requirements of CET1.
Because AT1 and CET1 are substitutes for eligibility as tier 1-capital, an increase in equity
should lead to a proportional increase in CET1 and decrease in the relative share of AT1CoCos
to total tier 1-capital. Goncharenko & Rauf (2016) find a negative and significant effect on
AT1CoCos outstanding. B. Williams et al. (2018) find a negative and significant effect on
CoCo-bond issuance. Because CoCo-bonds can be accounted for as either debt or equity and
it is factually impossible to eliminate the CoCo-bonds from the total amounts provided on
the balance sheet, there may be a risk of reverse causality. However, the accounting treat-
ment, wherever empirically available, does not indicate a predominance of treatment as equity
or as debt. Moreover, this effect would be at any rate negligibly small, because compared
to the balance sheet amounts of debt and equity the share of regulatory AT1-capital is very small.
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The total capital ratio (TCR) indicates the capital adequacy ratio of total own funds over
risk-weighted assets. I have no clear expectation as regards the effect of TCR because the
composition of tier 1-capital should be prima facie independent of the total capital adequacy.
Analogous to CAR, however, it could indicate lower bankruptcy costs. Avdjiev et al. (2017)
find that higher capital ratios measured by tier 1-ratios increase the likelihood of banks issuing
CoCo-bonds. This might indicate a tendency of better capitalised banks to be more likely to
use CoCo-capital.
Earnings intensity (EBTAA) serves as a pre-tax measure of earnings in relation to average
assets. It represents the intensity with which a bank earns taxable income. Because interest
payments on AT1CoCos are tax deductible independent of their treatment as equity or debt,
earnings intensive banks have enhanced incentives and potentials to materialise tax-shields by
substituting CET1-capital by AT1-capital. This argument is analogous to Ooi (1999) who points
out that trade-off theory shows that more profitable firms employ more debt since they are
more likely to have a high tax burden and low bankruptcy risk. Therefore, I expect a positive
impact of EBTAA on COCOS. On the other hand, if earnings are not paid out but accumulated,
they would be eligible as CET1 and thereby reduce COCOS.
Income diversification (INDIV) refers to the share of total income which is non-interest income.
It measures the extent of diversification of income sources, while high ratios indicate a higher
degree of diversification through fee and commission income and lower reliance on interest
income. It is not clear what effect ex-ante should be expected by this variable. If anything, it
could be argued that highly diversified banks are more sophisticated and, therefore, in tendency
more likely to use AT1CoCos.
Risk-density (RISK) is a measure of the amount of risk-weighted assets relative to total assets.
RISK, hence, measures the riskiness of the business of banks. To properly reflect the actual
riskiness, it depends on the accuracy of the risk-weights allocated to the items on the balance
sheet. Because of higher agency and bankruptcy costs, banks with higher risks will be expected
to rather use CET1- than AT1-capital instruments, because of the higher loss absorption
quality.5 Using asset volatility, yearly stock volatility, and probability of default as measures
of risk, Goncharenko & Rauf (2016) find that less risky banks are more likely to issue CoCo-bonds.
Loan loss provisions (LLP) are adjustments of the gross loan amount made in order to account
for potential losses. High amounts of loan loss reserves indicate bad loan portfolios. At the same
time, loan loss provisions reduce the equity of a bank, and thereby the CET1. As a consequence,
the relative share of AT1 to total tier 1 increases. Therefore, I expect a positive relationship
5For CRR Art. 52 compliant instruments, though, the qualitative difference is only marginal. Both serve as
going concern capital.
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with COCOS. B. Williams et al. (2018) find a positive effect on the issuance of CoCo-bonds for
the share of loan loss reserves to gross loans.
Phase-out AT1-capital (OLDAT1) is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the bank
(still) has AT1-capital instruments outstanding which will not be eligible after the expiration of
the transitional period under the fully-loaded capital requirements regime. The potential effect
can be twofold. On the one hand, the fact that a bank makes and made use of such hybrid
capital instruments in the past could indicate a general tendency of using hybrid instruments.
This would make it more likely that such a bank will also use AT1CoCos. On the other hand,
old instruments subject to phase-out rules and new fully-loaded instruments are subject to a
substitution relationship. The fact that a bank still has old instruments could simply indicate
that it has not yet adapted to the new regulation. Therefore, the effect on COCOS could also
be negative.
Figure 2.2: Generic Business Models
This figure illustrates the classification of the four generic business models used in the determinants
analysis of COCOS. The relevant criteria for the classification are whether or not banks’ deposits per
assets, respectively their loans per assets exceed the sample median.
The business model is regarded for exploratory reasons. Similar to Ayadi et al. (2016), I
distinguish four generic business models (illustrated in Figure 2.2) in dependence on the extent
to which banks make use of deposits and are exposed to loans. Banks with loans per assets
and deposits per assets exceeding the sample median are classified as retail banks. Banks
below the respective medians are classified as investment banks. Banks with only deposits
per assets exceeding the median are classified as diversified retail banks, those with loans per
assets exceeding the median as wholesale banks. The classes are identified by dummies for high
loans per assets (LOAN), high deposits per assets (DEPO), and their interaction (DEPxLOA).
The effect of business models is generally unclear. LOAN, though, can also be interpreted as
liquidity risk. B. Williams et al. (2018) find that higher loans per assets increase the likelihood
for the issuance of CoCo-bonds. Goncharenko & Rauf (2016) also find a positive effect of loans
on AT1CoCos outstanding. For deposits they find positive but insignificant effects.
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As regards the macroeconomic variables, the average corporate tax rate (ATAX) should have a
positive effect on COCOS. The higher the tax rate, the higher the potential tax-shield, which
poses an incentive to use AT1CoCos. For international capital structure differences, though,
Mayer (1990) states that taxes have no explanatory power.
Moreover, the following macro variables are added as control variables: Inflation (INFL), consid-
ered as the annual difference of the GDP-deflator in percent; GDP-growth (GDPG) in percent;
corruption, measured by the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International (CPI);
and the rating of the countries, specified by Credit Quality Steps (CQS) as defined by the
European Banking Authority. I further consider dummies for financial years (FY) to control
for the general increase in COCOS (as illustrated in Table 2.1) as part of the phase-in of these
instruments in the new capital framework and the simultaneous phase-out of old instruments.
Table (2.9) in the appendix provides an overview of the variables used and their expected effects.
Tables (2.10) and (2.11) in the appendix provide additional information on the distributions
and pairwise correlations of the variables.
2.4.2 Method and model specification
I apply a linear OLS-model with bank and time fixed effects on the above defined panel data
set. The model is specified as follows:
COCOSit = αi + β ∗Xit + γ ∗ Yjt + μt + it, (2.2)
while X comprises the bank specific variables and Y comprises the macroeconomic variables,
the indices indicate: i = bank; j = country; t = financial year.
The regression model is specified with bank and time fixed effects, to account for unobserved
heterogeneity that may be correlated with the explanatory variables. The Hausman-Test sug-
gests that coefficient estimates in fixed and random effects model are not alike and, therefore,
suggests rejection of random effects.
A modified Wald-Test for group-wise heteroscedasticity in the residuals of the regression models,
following Greene (2000), rejects the homoscedasticity assumption. As a remedy, robust Huber-
White-sandwich estimates of variance (following Froot (1989) and R. L. Williams (2000)) are
used for the statistical analysis.
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Table 2.2: Bank Specific and External Determinants of CoCo-AT1 Usage
The table below depicts the results of a panel regression model with bank and time fixed effects,
analysing the determinants of COCOS. COCOS is the dependent variable. Model (1) illustrates the
results using bank specific variables only. Model (2) adds control variables for financial years. Model
(3) considers a broader set of bank specific covariates. Model (4) adds macroeconomic covariates. The
variables used are described in Table (2.9). Standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance is denoted
at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), and 1% (∗∗∗) significance level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bank Bank+FY Bank+FY Macro
SIZE 0.3895 -0.4570 -0.5769 0.0768
(0.82) (0.82) (1.05) (1.16)
CAR 0.0069 -0.0133 -0.2199 -0.2051
(0.03) (0.03) (0.15) (0.16)
LLP 0.2414∗ 0.2507∗ 0.2658∗ 0.2899∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
EBTAA 0.3440∗∗ 0.3453∗∗ 0.5046∗∗ 0.5091∗∗
(0.16) (0.16) (0.23) (0.22)
DEPO 1.7039∗∗ 1.3366∗∗ 1.5700∗∗ 1.3603∗
(0.68) (0.66) (0.71) (0.75)
LOAN 1.3303 1.0907 1.7896∗∗ 1.7161∗∗
(0.81) (0.79) (0.73) (0.76)
DEPxLOA -2.2418∗∗ -1.9920∗∗ -2.8221∗∗∗ -2.9103∗∗∗
(0.96) (0.93) (0.94) (0.96)
INDIV -0.0525∗∗ -0.0560∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
RISK 0.0131 0.0311
(0.04) (0.04)
OLDAT1 -1.8350∗∗ -2.0794∗∗∗
(0.71) (0.73)
TCR 0.0232 0.0611
(0.07) (0.07)
ATAX -0.0461
(0.10)
INFL -0.1272
(0.13)
CPI 0.1407
(0.09)
GDPG 0.0313
(0.07)
CQS -1.7502∗∗
(0.77)
Const. -4.2149 9.1993 14.0648 -3.7157
(13.40) (13.24) (17.35) (20.97)
FY Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
N 1024 1024 869 848
adj. R2 0.0926 0.1030 0.1440 0.1644
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2.4.3 Evidence from determinants analysis
Table (2.2) summarises the results of four variations of the regression model. They differ by the
number of regressors considered, whereas Model (1) serves as the baseline model. As regards
bank specific determinants of COCOS, I find statistically significant positive coefficients in
Models (1)–(4) of Table (2.2) for EBTAA, LLP, LOAN, and DEPO. The coefficients for EBTAA
are in line with ex-ante expectation. EBTAA has a statistically significant and positive impact
on COCOS (the share of AT1CoCos to tier 1). This implies that banks with strong earnings
make use of their tax-shield potential by using tax deductible AT1CoCos, be they accounted
for as equity or as debt, rather than CET1-capital. LLP also shows a significantly positive
coefficient indicating that adjustments for bad loans and the associated reduction of equity
increase the relative share of AT1CoCos in tier 1-capital. Interestingly, all the business model
coefficients have significant coefficients. High deposits and high loans have statistically signifi-
cant positive coefficients. At the same time, the combined effect impacts COCOS statistically
significant negative in all four models. This implies that banks with one-sided diversification, i.e.
diversified retail banks and wholesale banks make use of AT1CoCos to a larger extent, compared
to investment banks. This, on the other hand, does not hold for pure retail banks which have
high deposits and high loans at the same time. The combined effect of loans and deposits is
negatively related to COCOS. While the result for retail banks seems intuitive, as retail banks
can be assumed to be less capital market oriented, investment banks, on the other hand, are
supposedly characterised by a high degree of market orientation and should be predestined to
use sophisticated hybrid capital instruments like CoCo-bonds. The opposite is found, however.
The coefficients for asset size and capital adequacy are both not statistically significant. This is
inconsistent with ex-ante expectation. Consequently, I cannot infer that the usage of AT1CoCos
of large banks differs significantly from small banks.
Model (2) additionally controls for financial year dummies. The results remain robust and
nearly unchanged. Models (3) and (4) additionally consider income diversification, phaseout-
AT1-capital, risk density, and regulatory total capital as additional bank specific variables. The
effect of phaseout-AT1-capital is statistically significant negative. This indicates that the use
of AT1-capital underscoring the phase-out rules is associated with lower COCOS. Therefore, I
conclude that the negative effect from the substitution relationship with AT1CoCos overcompen-
sates a potential tendency for all kinds of hybrid instruments of the respective banks. Income
diversification is associated with lower COCOS. This result can be seen as evidence against the
assumption that highly diversified banks are more sophisticated and, therefore, in tendency more
likely to use AT1CoCos. Risk density and the total capital ratio have insignificant coefficients in
Model (3) and (4). Therefore, the expectation that riskier banks refrain from using AT1CoCos
cannot be confirmed with statistical significance. However, controlling for risk density leads to
significance of LOAN, the variable for loan intensive business, which is characterised by high
liquidity risk.
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Adding macroeconomic variables in Model (4) slightly improves the explanatory power of
the model. The inclusion does not tangibly impact the bank specific coefficients. Of the
macroeconomic variables included, only CQS has a statistically significant effect. The credit
ratings of the country the banks are headquartered in has a significantly negative impact.
This is in line with expectation, as a higher absolute CQS indicates lower ratings and higher
credit risk of the respective countries. The rating of the country is also relevant for the rating
of the bank and the credit risk of the country is also related to the credit risk of the bank.
Weaker banks will find it more difficult and more expensive to issue AT1CoCos. This, in
effect, weakens the incentives to use AT1CoCos. Other potential determinants like GDP-
growth, inflation, or corruption are not statistically significant. Even the average corporate
tax rate is not significant. It was expected that higher tax rates increase the incentive to use
AT1CoCos, because they increase the potential to save taxes. However, I cannot find evidence
that corporate tax rates determine the extent to which banks exploit their potential to save taxes.
2.5 Impact on profitability
2.5.1 Variable selection
The second empirical part of this study is concerned with the potential impact of elevated use
of AT1CoCos on the profitability of banks. I argue that theoretically those banks which make
use of AT1CoCos to a higher extent should be more profitable. Reasons are at least twofold:
First, the use of AT1CoCos potentially eliminates adverse risk-shifting incentives and increases
efficiency (Hilscher & Raviv (2014), Zeng (2014)). Second, the use of AT1CoCos as compared
to CET1-capital yields the advantage to deduct interest payments paid on CoCo-bonds from
the taxable income. Thereby, a tax-shield can be materialised, which should be reflected in a
comparably higher return on assets (ROA) after taxes. Therefore, I apply a multiple linear
panel regression model, testing whether the use of AT1CoCos leads to significantly higher ROA
after taxes.
As dependent variable, I consider different specifications of profitability measures. ROE and
ROA in their multitude of possible specifications are two of the most prominent measures for
profitability. ROE, though, is not a suitable profitability measure, as it is not independent
from the source of capital. It can easily be inflated by increasing leverage. Further, ROE
depends substantially on the classification of CoCo-bonds as equity or debt, which is by no
means clear.6 Therefore, I focus my analysis on on-assets measures. In particular, I consider
6Goncharenko & Rauf (2016) and B. Williams et al. (2018) assume that CoCo-bonds are always considered
as debt, calculating ROE.
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ROA, calculated as return on average assets, and return on risk-weighted assets (RORWA) as
dependent variables. Both measures are specified both before taxes and after taxes respectively.
This is crucial to identify a potential tax-shield of AT1CoCos. The on-assets calculation of
profitability requires a before-interest expenses income measure. As the business of banks
consists of lending and borrowing money, the calculation of earnings before interest expenses is
far from trivial, because it is nearly impossible to distinguish debt financing expenses from daily
business related expenses. Therefore, I use an intuitive gross measure as a proxy for earnings
before and after taxes. In this way, earnings are defined as the sum of net income (before or
after taxes) and gross interest expenses. In Section (2.6), I additionally test a different proxy of
earnings based on standardised values for EBIT provided by Thomson Reuters for robustness.
The variable of interest of the present study is COCOS. It is measured – as before – as the share
of fully-loaded AT1-capital to total tier 1-capital. I expect to find a positive impact because
of the implied tax-shield and positive incentive effects. In addition, I control for several bank
specific and macroeconomic determinants of bank profitability based on extant literature.7
OLDAT1R is the ratio of old AT1-capital subject to phase-out rules to risk-weighted assets.
Unlike AT1CoCos, phaseout-AT1-capital is not as homogeneous as regards eligible instruments.
It might include a variety of hybrid capital instruments and it cannot be distinguished for
sure if payments on such instruments are tax deductible or not and what specific incentives
might result. Because these instruments are subject to phase-out rules, they are generally less
interesting. If anything a positive effect might be expected for the same reasons as for AT1CoCos.
ASIZE represents the average log assets. Literature has found different results on the effect of
size on profitability. Among others, Menicucci & Paolucci (2016) find a positive relationship
between size and ROA or ROE, which can be explained by economies of scale e.g. due to cost
efficiencies, or by implied subsidies – in particular if banks are considered “too-big-to-fail”.
J. H. Boyd & Runkle (1993) and Pasiouras & Kosmidou (2007) find inverse relationships,
representing some kind of diseconomies of scale.
LIQR is included in line with the literature as a measure of liquidity risk and represents the
fraction of net loans to total assets. Because much literature found positive effects of liquidity
risk on profitability (Molyneux & Thornton (1992), Pasiouras & Kosmidou (2007)), I expect
a positive relationship as well. The argument is that rather illiquid loans – regardless of the
implied credit risk – produce higher revenues than more liquid assets. According to the liquidity
preference theory, investors require a premium as compensation for the associated liquidity risk.
7Relevant studies focussing on determinants of European banks comprise, i.a, Short (1979), Molyneux &
Thornton (1992), Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt & Huizinga (1999), Abreu & Mendes (2002), Staikouras & Wood (2004),
Athanasoglou et al. (2006), and Pasiouras & Kosmidou (2007).
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The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) represents the capital structure, respectively the accounting
capital adequacy. It is specified as the percentage share of total equity to total assets. Motivated
by the tax-shield, one could argue that banks with higher leverage, respectively lower capital
adequacy ratios should be characterised by higher profitability. Empirical literature, however,
assumes that well capitalised banks have lower insolvency risk and lower costs of financial
distress, and finds that higher capital adequacy ratios lead to higher profitability (among
others Molyneux & Thornton (1992), Berger (1995), Abreu & Mendes (2002), and Pasiouras &
Kosmidou (2007)).
LLP represents the quality of the asset portfolio. It is the percentage share of loan loss reserves
to total gross loans. Menicucci & Paolucci (2016) find significant negative relationships with
profitability. This is in line with intuition, as loan loss provisions represent the materialisation
of credit risk. Because loan loss provisions immediately reduce bank income, the expected effect
should be negative.
RISK is included to account for the riskiness of the business. Again, it is approximated by the
risk density, i.e. risk-weighted assets over total assets. According to the risk return hypothesis,
higher risk should be compensated by higher returns. Therefore, a positive relationship should
be expected.
INDIV measures the diversification of income. It is specified as the share of total income which
is non-interest income. Non-interest income sources comprise in particular fee and commission
income, fiduciary income, service charge, as well as trading income. Stiroh (2004) finds no
significant relationship of non-interest income and ROE. Landi & Venturelli (2001) find a
positive impact of diversification of income by an increase of fee and commission based income
on profitability. Therefore, I expect a positive effect on profitability.
As macroeconomic variables, the average corporate tax rate (ATAX), inflation (INFL), GDP-
growth (GDPG), corruption (CPI), and country-wise credit ratings (CQS) are considered.
Further, I control for the financial period FY. I expect a negative effect of the average tax
rate on the profitability measures calculated after taxes. GDP-growth might be expected to
increase profitability, as Neely & Wheelock (1997) and Pasiouras & Kosmidou (2007) find that
the change in per capita income has a positive effect on bank profitability. As regards inflation,
literature finds mixed results (compare among others Abreu & Mendes (2002), Athanasoglou et
al. (2006), Pasiouras & Kosmidou (2007)).
Table (2.12) in the appendix provides an overview of the variables used and their expected effects.
Tables (2.10) and (2.13) in the appendix provide additional information on the distributions
and pairwise correlations of the variables.
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2.5.2 Methodology and model specification
Central hypothesis is that those banks, which make use of AT1CoCos instead of CET1 should
be characterised, ceteris paribus, by a higher profitability. Due to better incentives, before taxes
measures should already be elevated. In particular, though, after taxes measures for profitability
should be higher, because they additionally include the implied tax-shield of AT1CoCos as
opposed to CET1-capital. In order to test the impact of COCOS on profitability, I specify a
linear panel data model with fixed effects. Short (1979, p. 212) concluded that “linear functions
produced as good results as any other functional form”. In this way, the model specified is the
following:
Profitabilityit = αi + δ1 ∗ COCOSit + β ∗Xit + γ ∗ Yjt + μt + it, (2.3)
while COCOS is the variable of interest. X comprises the bank specific and Y the macroe-
conomic variables.  is the residual. Again the indices indicate: i = bank; j = country;
t = financial year.
The model is specified as a bank and time fixed effects model following the rejection of random
effects by the Hausman-Test. A modified Wald-Test for group-wise heteroscedasticity in the
residuals of the regression model, following Greene (2000, p. 598), rejects the homoscedasticity
assumption. As a remedy, I account for clustered standard errors on the bank level using robust
Huber-White-sandwich estimates of variance (following Froot (1989) and R. L. Williams (2000))
for the statistical analysis.
2.5.3 Results
Table (2.3) summarises the results. Models (1) and (2) illustrate the results of the regressions
of ROA before taxes, while Models (3) and (4) show the results of regressions of ROA after
taxes. Models (5) and (6) depict the results of RORWA after taxes, as an immediate robustness
check. Prima facie, the results have a great degree of similarity. The variable of interest
COCOS has positive coefficients and statistical significance at least on the 5 % level in all
Models (1-4) reporting results for risk-insensitive profitability measures. For the risk-sensitive
measure RORWA after taxes, Model (5) reveals weak significance on the 10 % level. If controls
for macroeconomic determinants are considered in Model (6), COCOS is again significant at
the 5 %-level. Hence, the results confirm the ex-ante expectation that the use of AT1CoCos
significantly increases bank profitability, measured by different specifications. This insight is
of particular importance for a banks’ financing department, making decisions about sources
of capital. It means that banks which chose AT1CoCos instead of CET1-capital benefit from
higher profitability numbers. This should constitute an incentive to substitute real equity
CET1-capital by AT1CoCos. The coefficients for COCOS in Table (2.3) – reporting the results
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Table 2.3: Robust FE Models Regressing ROAbt, ROAat, and RORWAat
This table depicts the results of a panel regression model with bank and time fixed effects regressing
profitability on COCOS and other covariates. Models (1-2) illustrate the results for ROA before
taxes as dependent variable. Models (3-4) show the results for ROA after taxes as dependent variable.
Models (5-6) depict the results for RORWA after taxes as dependent variable. The variables used are
described in Table (2.12). Data is non-winsorised. The variable of interest COCOS has positive and
statistically significant coefficients in Models (1-4) and weak significance in Model (6). This indicates
that banks can significantly increase their profitability through the use of AT1CoCos. Standard errors
are in parenthesis. Significance is denoted at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), and 1% (∗∗∗) significance level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ROAbt ROAbt ROAat ROAat RORWAat RORWAat
COCOS 0.0800∗∗ 0.07911∗∗ 0.0610∗∗ 0.0618∗∗ 0.0628∗ 0.0658∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
INDIV 0.0229∗∗ 0.0241∗∗ 0.02229∗∗ 0.0233∗∗ 0.0388∗ 0.0409∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
CAR 0.2811∗ 0.2871∗ 0.2057∗∗ 0.2106∗∗ 0.2626∗∗ 0.2711∗∗
(0.14) (0.15) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12)
LLP -0.1584∗∗ -0.1574∗∗ -0.1212∗∗∗ -0.1203∗∗∗ -0.2555∗∗∗ -0.2553∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
OLDAT1R 0.1389 0.2191 0.0668 0.1339 -0.0845 0.0051
(0.28) (0.26) (0.20) (0.18) (0.28) (0.27)
RISK 0.0132 0.0156 0.0065 0.0083
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
LIQR -0.0361 -0.0374 -0.0192 -0.0202 -0.0157 -0.0174
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ASIZE -0.4659 -0.3909 -0.1897 -0.1283 -0.0370 0.0312
(0.70) (0.70) (0.51) (0.50) (0.99) (1.02)
2015.FY -0.3889∗∗∗ -0.4454∗∗∗ -0.3246∗∗∗ -0.3618∗∗∗ -0.5643∗∗∗ -0.6420∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.13) (0.08) (0.09) (0.15) (0.17)
2016.FY -0.4480∗∗∗ -0.5109∗∗∗ -0.5036∗∗∗ -0.5550∗∗∗ -0.9267∗∗∗ -1.0374∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.16) (0.11) (0.12) (0.19) (0.20)
2017.FY -0.6266∗∗∗ -0.6876∗∗∗ -0.6860∗∗∗ -0.7218∗∗∗ -1.2226∗∗∗ -1.3525∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.20) (0.14) (0.15) (0.24) (0.29)
2018.FY -0.6204∗∗∗ -0.6652∗∗∗ -0.6679∗∗∗ -0.6962∗∗∗ -1.2140∗∗∗ -1.3072∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.20) (0.14) (0.15) (0.27) (0.32)
TaxRate -0.0142 -0.0110 -0.0363
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05)
GDPG 0.0338 0.0160 0.0350
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
INFL -0.0245 -0.0235 -0.0313
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
CPI 0.0126 0.0061 0.0075
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
CQS 0.0883 0.0470 0.2765
(0.31) (0.23) (0.40)
Const. 8.2248 6.1545 3.5170 2.1759 2.6472 1.3820
(11.96) (12.26) (8.66) (8.94) (16.56) (18.09)
N 872 851 872 851 872 851
adj. R2 0.4520 0.4565 0.4592 0.4654 0.4103 0.4157
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calculated without winsorising – amount to about .08 in Models (1-2), and .06 in Models (3-6).
These coefficients are high. E.g. it can be interpreted that on average a 1 %-point increase in
COCOS leads to a .08 %-point increase in ROA before taxes and to a .06 %-point increase in
ROA after taxes. In section (2.6), I show that calculating with winsorised data yields lower but
still economically very relevant and statistically significant coefficients.
Significant differences between coefficients for before and after taxes profitability (compare
Models (1-2) with Models (3-4)) cannot be detected. The coefficients for ROA after taxes are
of course somewhat smaller, accounting for the taxes paid. Statistical significance is slightly
better with p-values of 1-2 %, compared to 3-4 % for ROA before taxes. Still, it is difficult to
argue that the positive effect of COCOS on profitability can be attributed to the tax-shield of
AT1CoCos. Rather, it is evident from the before taxes measure of profitability that COCOS
have a significantly positive effect on profitability, irrespective of the tax-load. Apart from the
tax-shield, literature motivates potential benefits of CoCo-bonds primarily by positive incentive
effects. The dependence on incentives, though, might also mean that the effect on profitability
depends on certain characteristics and features of the instruments. In this way, it would be
an interesting undertaking to differentiate between PWD- and C2E-bonds, as the literature
indicates that because of the threat of dilution the incentives of C2E-bonds might be particularly
advantageous. For the time being, I refrain from such a differentiation, because of a lack of
available data on these characteristics. For the average instrument, though, it can be concluded
that banks can optimise their profitability by using AT1CoCos.
As regards other bank specific control variables, the expected significantly negative effect of
loan loss provisions is confirmed by all depicted models. Increasing loan loss reserves decrease
profitability. Also in line with expectation are the coefficients for the balance sheet capital
adequacy ratio. The coefficients are positive and significant in all models depicted. Income
diversification – reflecting higher shares of non-interest income – has significant and positive
coefficients. Taking into account the current low-interest environment, however, this effect could
be the result of the current difficulties for banks to generate earnings under these circumstances.
The coefficients of liquidity risk, risk density, old AT1-capital, and size are not significant. In
this way, I cannot find evidence for economies of scale.
As concerns macroeconomic control variables, I cannot find any significant relationships with
profitability. Indeed surprising seems the fact that the coefficients for the corporate tax rate
are not significant, not even for the after taxes measures of profitability. At the same time,
significant inter-temporal differences in profitability can be detected. As compared to the base
year 2014, the following years are associated with significantly lower bank profitability.
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2.6 Robustness
In Section (2.5), I already tested the impact of COCOS and other covariates on different
measures of profitability. While ROA serves as a holistic but risk-insensitive measure of pro-
fitability, RORWA takes into account the risk associated with the business of the bank. In
a consecutive step, as an alternative proxy of earnings for the calculation of profitability, I
calculate an alternative earnings before and after taxes measure based on standardised values
for EBIT provided by Thomson Reuters. Because the calculation of EBIT respectively EBI for
banks is not as straight forward as for non-financial firms, this measure is not as intuitive but
provides an additional test for robustness. The results are depicted in Table (2.4). The effects
of the bank specific variables, in particular the variable of interest COCOS, are confirmed. In
particular, the impact of COCOS is statistically significant in all six models. In Model (5) and
(6) – reporting results for RORWA after taxes – COCOS is now even statistically significant at
the 5 % level. Hence, I conclude that the effects are not dependent on a certain measurement
approach of earnings. Visible changes concern the inter-temporal dependence of profitability and
the impact of GDP-growth. Evidence for time dependencies can only be found for the year 2017.
At the same time, GDP growth gains a statistically significant and positive effect on profitability.
In addition, I test whether different specifications of the variable COCOS determine the effect
of the coefficient and its significance. Standardising with risk-weighted assets is intuitive as it is
in line with the risk-sensitive measurement of risk-weighted capital ratios. Though, it does not
account for the substitution relationship between CET1 and AT1-capital. Standardising with
the total capital ratio takes into account the substitution relationship, but also includes tier
2-capital which might also provide a tax-shield, but certainly different incentive effects. There-
fore, this specification is not as intuitive. Consequently, COCOS was specified as AT1CoCos
per tier 1-capital. However, I find, that using risk-weighted assets or the total capital ratio for
standardisation of the CoCo-measure yields comparable results to those presented in the main
part. Hence, the results are robust as regards different specifications of the measure.
In order to test whether the effect of COCOS on profitability is size dependent, I perform an
analysis of subsamples of large versus small banks measured by asset size. In particular, it
might be expected that larger banks are predestined to exploit benefits of COCOS because
they are more capable to actively manage and efficiently use hybrid capital sources. The
subsample analysis, though, shows the opposite. In the small bank sample, coefficients of
COCOS are higher in magnitude as well as in significance. They are significant on the 1 %
level for risk-insensitive measures of profitability and significant on the 5 % level for return
on risk-weighted assets. Considering the coefficients of COCOS in the subsample of larger
banks, magnitude and significance are lower. Here, only risk-insensitive measures have weakly
significant positive effects. Coefficients for risk-sensitive measures are not significant any more.
Therefore, I conclude that COCOS have positive effects on profitability for all banks, small and
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Table 2.4: Robust FE Models Regressing ROAbt, ROAat, and RORWAat, Using an
Alternative Earnings Definition
This table is equivalent to Table (2.3), except for the definition of earnings used in the calculation
of profitability. It depicts the results of a panel regression model with bank and time fixed effects
regressing profitability on COCOS and other covariates. Instead of the gross definition of earnings
used in Table (2.3), standardised EBIT values from Thomson Reuters are used. Models (1-2) illustrate
the results for ROA before taxes as dependent variable. Models (3-4) show the results for ROA after
taxes as dependent variable. Models (5-6) depict the results for RORWA after taxes as dependent
variable. The variables used are described in Table (2.12). Data is non-winsorised. The variable of
interest COCOS has positive and statistically significant coefficients in all Models (1-6). This provides
even stronger evidence that banks can significantly increase their profitability through the use of
AT1CoCos. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance is denoted at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), and
1% (∗∗∗) significance level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ROAbt ROAbt ROAat ROAat RORWAat RORWAat
COCOS 0.0743∗ 0.0744∗ 0.0592∗∗ 0.0589∗∗ 0.0904∗∗ 0.0919∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
INDIV 0.0286∗∗ 0.0283∗∗ 0.0287∗∗∗ 0.0281∗∗∗ 0.0598∗∗∗ 0.0601∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
CAR 0.2966∗∗ 0.2989∗∗ 0.2278∗∗ 0.2303∗∗ 0.3313∗∗ 0.3316∗∗
(0.14) (0.15) (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.14)
LLP -0.1482∗∗ -0.1469∗∗ -0.1146∗∗ -0.1133∗∗ -0.2135∗∗∗ -0.2126∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08)
OLDAT1R 0.3488 0.3342 0.2812 0.2561 0.4072 0.3531
(0.29) (0.28) (0.21) (0.20) (0.31) (0.32)
RISK 0.0167 0.0187 0.0081 0.0094
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
LIQR -0.0329 -0.0349 -0.0145 -0.0162 -0.0042 -0.0073
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
ASIZE -0.5230 -0.4990 -0.1219 -0.1022 -0.0495 -0.0781
(0.67) (0.66) (0.47) (0.47) (0.82) (0.83)
2015.FY -0.1340 -0.1891 -0.0504 -0.0911 -0.0538 -0.1203
(0.10) (0.13) (0.07) (0.09) (0.13) (0.15)
2016.FY -0.0386 -0.0911 -0.0932 -0.1342 -0.2147 -0.2986
(0.14) (0.16) (0.10) (0.11) (0.18) (0.20)
2017.FY -0.1939 -0.2991 -0.2617∗ -0.3375∗∗ -0.5741∗∗ -0.7857∗∗
(0.18) (0.20) (0.14) (0.15) (0.27) (0.33)
2018.FY -0.1082 -0.2146 -0.1817 -0.2647∗ -0.4102 -0.6317∗
(0.19) (0.19) (0.14) (0.15) (0.30) (0.36)
TaxRate -0.0364 -0.0298 -0.0673
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05)
GDPG 0.0503∗∗ 0.0388∗∗ 0.0522∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
INFL -0.0151 -0.0176 0.0072
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05)
CPI -0.0070 -0.0125 -0.0151
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
CQS -0.0083 -0.0472 0.0021
(0.30) (0.22) (0.39)
Const. 7.5142 8.5308 0.7093 2.1284 -1.2163 2.1533
(11.47) (11.63) (8.06) (8.32) (14.24) (14.80)
N 869 848 863 842 863 842
adj. R2 0.4655 0.4670 0.4769 0.4793 0.3954 0.3988
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Table 2.5: Robust FE Models with Winsorising on the 1st and the 99th Percentile
This table is equivalent to Table (2.3), except that data is winsorised on the 1st and the 99th percentile.
Depicted are the results of a panel regression model with bank and time fixed effects regressing
profitability on COCOS and other covariates. Models (1-2) illustrate the results for ROA before
taxes as dependent variable. Models (3-4) show the results for ROA after taxes as dependent variable.
Models (5-6) depict the results for RORWA after taxes as dependent variable. The variables used are
described in Table (2.12). The variable of interest COCOS has positive and statistically significant
coefficients in Models (1-4). This confirms that banks can significantly increase their profitability
(defined as ROA) through the use of AT1CoCos. Coefficients for COCOS of about .03 imply that
banks can increase ROA by .3 %-points through an increase in COCOS of 10 %-points. For RORWA,
the effect is not significant any more. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance is denoted at the
10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), and 1% (∗∗∗) significance level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ROAbt ROAbt ROAat ROAat RORWAat RORWAat
COCOS 0.0242∗∗ 0.0297∗∗ 0.0205∗∗ 0.0241∗∗ 0.0186 0.0250
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
INDIV 0.0209∗ 0.0223∗∗ 0.0199∗∗ 0.0208∗∗ 0.0421∗∗ 0.0444∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
CAR 0.0421 0.0359 0.0425 0.0419 0.0701 0.0767
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
LLP -0.1760∗∗∗ -0.1823∗∗∗ -0.1312∗∗∗ -0.1346∗∗∗ -0.2694∗∗∗ -0.2783∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
OLDAT1R 0.0047 0.1096 -0.0621 0.0171 -0.2111 -0.0934
(0.19) (0.17) (0.15) (0.13) (0.24) (0.24)
RISK 0.0066 0.0074 0.0023 0.0032
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
LIQR -0.0234 -0.0240 -0.0103 -0.01090 -0.0036 -0.0053
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
ASIZE -1.2589 -1.3291 -0.6724 -0.6902 -0.1871 -0.1864
(1.25) (1.26) (0.79) (0.80) (1.12) (1.13)
2015.FY -0.3084∗∗∗ -0.3042∗∗∗ -0.2830∗∗∗ -0.2859∗∗∗ -0.4944∗∗∗ -0.5368∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13)
2016.FY -0.2089 -0.2229 -0.3457∗∗∗ -0.3685∗∗∗ -0.7777∗∗∗ -0.8611∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.12) (0.11) (0.20) (0.20)
2017.FY -0.3606∗ -0.4127∗∗ -0.5050∗∗∗ -0.5392∗∗∗ -1.044∗∗∗ -1.1695∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.18) (0.15) (0.14) (0.25) (0.28)
2018.FY -0.4056∗ -0.4310∗∗ -0.5297∗∗∗ -0.5487∗∗∗ -1.1031∗∗∗ -1.1761∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.20) (0.14) (0.15) (0.27) (0.31)
TaxRate -0.0170 -0.01244 -0.0360
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
GDPG 0.0272 0.0145 0.0357
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
INFL 0.0098 -0.00411 -0.0153
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
CPI -0.0110 -0.0081 -0.0068
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
CQS 0.3450 0.1779 0.4706
(0.32) (0.22) (0.39)
Const. 23.1672 24.9000 12.7926 13.6239 6.1254 6.6292
(21.78) (21.77) (13.79) (13.95) (19.35) (19.73)
N 872 851 872 851 872 851
adj. R2 0.2103 0.2135 0.2244 0.2283 0.1987 0.2060
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big, magnitude and significance, though, are higher for smaller banks. This insight is to some
extent surprising and deserves further attention.
Winsorising is a frequently used method in finance to reduce the influence of potential outliers.
Therefore, I re-run my analysis with winsorised data, using the widespread 1st and 99th percentile
as thresholds for severe outliers. Results are provided in Table (2.5) and confirm the statistically
significant positive impact of COCOS on the risk-insensitive measures of bank profitability, i.e.
ROA before taxes and ROA after taxes. For RORWA after taxes, the positive impact is not any
more statistically significant. The coefficients of COCOS are lower in Table (2.5), compared
to those for non-winsorised data in Table (2.3). This indicates that the magnitude, but not
the statistical significance of COCOS was to some extent driven by outliers in Table (2.3).
Coefficients of .02 to .03 in Models (1-4) of Table (2.5) are, however, still not only statistically
significant, but also economically very relevant. Increasing COCOS by 10 %-points, implies
an increase of the respective profitability measures by .2 to .3 %-points. This is still a very
substantial increase, considering mean values of 1.6 % for ROA before taxes and 1.5 % for ROA
after taxes throughout the sample.
In previous analyses, I used Huber-White-sandwich estimates of variance to account for het-
eroscedasticity. Using bootstrapped standard errors instead, though, confirms the results. The
bootstrapped standard errors do not significantly differ from the robust standard errors used
before.
2.7 Conclusions
The present study contributes to the empirical literature on CoCo-bonds in two ways. First,
I analyse the extent and the determinants of the use of AT1CoCos by European banks using
a unique panel dataset of components of regulatory capital. The advantage of this approach
is the ability to analyse the use of AT1CoCos on a level basis and its development over the
years. Moreover, I study the use of AT1CoCos in relation to the amount of CET1-capital. This
enables an interpretation as part of the substitution relationship with CET1-capital as tier
1-capital. Second, I am the first to analyse the implications of the usage of AT1CoCos for bank
profitability. I hypothesise that due to the implied tax-shield and positive incentives to reduce
inefficient risk-shifting, AT1CoCos increases the overall profitability of banks.
The descriptive analysis shows that during the first years after the adoption of Basel III through
the CRD IV package in Europe, the share of banks using AT1CoCos rose steadily to up to
50 % in 2018. At the same time, a substantial share of banks does still not exploit the potential
benefits of AT1CoCos. Moreover, I find significant regional differences in the usage of AT1CoCos.
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While banks from the north of Europe use significantly more AT1CoCos, banks from the south
and east use significantly less AT1CoCos. Banks from Switzerland do not behave significantly
different as regards the use of AT1CoCos.
The determinants analysis based on a panel regression with firm and time fixed effects shows
that banks with higher earnings per assets and higher loan loss provisions make significantly
more use of AT1CoCos. The former implies that banks make use of their tax-shield potential,
even though the tax rate itself has no significant effect. Moreover, as compared to banks with
low shares of deposits and loans on the balance sheet (indicating investment banks), one sided
diversified banks, i.e. banks with high shares of either loans or deposits, make significantly
more use of AT1CoCos. The joined effect of high loans and high deposits (indicating pure retail
banks) decreases the share of AT1CoCos used. Therefore, I conclude that the business model of
banks is an important determinant of using AT1CoCos.
The analysis of the implications of AT1CoCos for bank profitability reveals that using AT1CoCos
instead of CET1-capital increases bank profitability with statistical significance. This result
holds for risk-insensitive measures like ROA as well as for risk-sensitive measures like RORWA. It
does also hold for before taxes measures as well as for after taxes measures. Therefore, I conclude
that using AT1CoCos increases bank profitability significantly. Though, I cannot undoubtedly
attribute this effect to the tax-shield of CoCo-bonds alone. Apart from the tax-shield, theory
motivates potential benefits of CoCo-bonds by positive incentive effects, which enforce efficient
risk-taking. Even though serving as a possible explanation, the exact dependency deserves
further consideration. Surprisingly, the effect on profitability is higher both in magnitude as
well as in significance for smaller banks, as compared to larger banks. The significantly positive
effect of AT1CoCos on bank profitability is robust to different definitions of earnings, different
specifications of AT1CoCos, winsorising on the 1st and 99th percentile, and the application of
bootstrapped standard errors.
My results have important implications for a banks’ financing decision making. If banks who
chose AT1CoCos instead of CET1-capital benefit from higher profitability, this should constitute
an incentive to substitute real equity CET1-capital by AT1CoCos. At the same time, the
potential to increase profitability is large. Results on winsorised data show that by an increase
of COCOS of 10 %-points, banks can increase measures like ROA after taxes by about .2
%-points, which is equivalent to an increase of 12.5 % on average. Particularly banks which
currently do not make any use of AT1CoCos must scrutinise whether these benefits should
remain unexploited. To regulators and bank supervisors, my results prove that the eligibility of
AT1CoCos as regulatory capital is advantageous as well. The increase in profitability stabilises
the European banking system, making banks more resilient. However, regulators should be
concerned with the regional disparities in terms of usage of AT1CoCos.
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Building on the results of the present study, further research could focus on the following ques-
tions. First, closer attention should be paid to the channels through which AT1CoCos increase
profitability. It is still not clear what share of the increase in profitability can be attributed to
the tax-shield channel, respectively to the incentives channel. Second, a follow-up study should
further differentiate between the impact of C2E-, compared to PWD-bonds on profitability in
order to account for possible dependencies of incentive effects on bond design features. Third,
analysis could further elaborate on the finding that magnitude and significance of the effect
of COCOS on profitability are higher for smaller than for larger banks. This result appears
surprising and might veil additional structural characteristics determining the different effects.
Forth, further research could be dedicated to the regional differences in the use of AT1CoCos
observed. Building on the observation that in some regions banks make significantly more use
of AT1CoCos, it should be studied whether this depends on differing market structures, bank
characteristics, or potential benefits of AT1CoCos. In particular incentive effects may vary be-
tween regions, bank market structures, legal systems and traditions. Therefore, it might only be
natural that such effects are not uniform across a heterogeneous banking market as the European.
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2.8 Appendix
Figure 2.3: Bank Origin
This figure shows the absolute number of banks headquartered in the respective European countries.
The total number of banks is 231.
Figure 2.4: Reporting Currencies
This figure shows the absolute number of banks reporting in the respective currencies. The total
number of banks is 231.
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Table 2.6: Definition of Regions
The table below illustrates the definition of four generic geographical regions. It shows a break-down
of the countries assigned to the regions.
Region West North East South
Countries: Austria Denmark Bulgaria Cyprus
Belgium Faroe Islands Croatia Greece
France Finland Czech Republic Italy
Germany Greenland Estonia Malta
Ireland Norway Hungary Portugal
Liechtenstein Sweden Latvia Spain
Luxembourg Lithuania
Netherlands Poland
Switzerland Romania
United Kingdom Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Table 2.7: COCOS per Region
The table below shows information on the dissemination of AT1CoCos throughout four generic regions
in Europe. The regions were defined in Table (2.6). Illustrated are the share of banks using AT1-CoCos,
the mean value of COCOS in general (in %), the mean value of COCOS restricted to positive values of
COCOS (in %), and the number of banks headquartered in the respective regions.
Region West North East South Overall
Share of banks using CoCos 0.400 0.674 0.037 0.425 0.443
Mean COCOS 4.789 7.382 0.762 1.988 4.454
Mean COCOS if > 0 11.957 10.957 20.410 4.677 10.044
No. of Banks 82 68 30 51 231
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Table 2.8: Two Sample t-Tests for Structural Differences in COCOS
The table below shows the results of two sample t-tests with unequal variances for structural differences
in COCOS between regions and currencies used. Each group is compared to the respective rest of
the sample. West, North, South, and East relate to the regions defined in Table (2.6). Switzerland is
treated separately, as it is not part of the EEA. EUR-currency identifies the 95 banks which use the
Euro as reporting currency. Significant regional differences for North, East, and South can be detected.
Banks from Switzerland do not differ significantly. Banks reporting in Euro have significantly less
COCOS.
simple t-test ranksum test
Group Difference t-value p-value z-value p-value
West 0.524 1.070 0.285 -1.114 0.266
North 4.166 8.763 0.000 11.024 0.000
East -4.197 -10.141 0.000 -9.200 0.000
South -3.168 -8.300 0.000 -3.635 0.000
Switzerland -1.187 -1.618 0.107 -5.093 0.000
EUR-currency -2.558 -6.074 0.000 -3.862 0.000
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Table 2.9: Potential Determinants of COCOS and Expected Impact
The table below summarises the dependent variable COCOS, the bank specific independent variables,
and the macroeconomic independent variables used in the determinants analysis. For each variable, I
provide a description, information on the measurement, and the ex-ante expected effect on COCOS.
Variable Description Measure Expected
Effect (+/-)
Dependent
variable
COCOS AT1CoCos AT1CoCos/
Tier 1-capital (in %)
Independent
variables
Bank-specific:
SIZE Bank Size (linear) Log Total Assets (+)
CAR Equity Ratio Total Equity/ Total Assets (-)
LLP Loan Loss Provisions Loan Loss Reserves/ (+)
Gross Loans (in %)
EBTAA Earnings Intensity Income before taxes / (+)
Av. Assets (in %)
INDIV Income Diversification NII/(NII + II) (in %) (+/-)
RISK Risk Density Risk-weighted Assets/ (-)
Assets (in %)
OLDAT1 Phase-out AT1-capital Dummy=1 if amount >0 (+/-)
DEPO Deposits Dummy=1 if >Median (+/-)
LOAN Loans Dummy=1 if >Median (+/-)
DEPxLOA Interaction of DEPO Dummy=1 if DEPO (+/-)
and LOAN & LOAN = 1
TCR Total Capital Ratio Own Funds/ (+/-)
Risk-weighted Assets (in %)
Independent
variables
Macroeconomic:
ATAX Average Statutory Mean of Corporate Tax Rate (+)
Corporate Tax Rate over last 2 years (in %)
FY Financial Year Financial Reporting Period (+)
INFL Inflation Rate Inflation Rate (in %) (+/-)
CPI Corruption Perception Index CPI Score (-)
GDPG GDP Growth Change from t-1 to t (in %) (+/-)
CQS Credit Quality Steps/Rating From 1 (AA- or better) (-)
to 6 (CCC+ or worse)
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Table 2.10: Summary Statistics of Variables Included
This table provides summary statistics on the variables considered in the determinants analysis of
COCOS as well as those used in the regression of profitability on COCOS and other covariates.
Variables N Min 1% 50% Mean 99% Max SD
COCOS 1,107 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 4.4544 32.8340 71.5615 7.3340
SIZE 1,374 7.5820 11.7591 15.6319 15.8854 21.2590 21.5377 2.4302
CAR 1,374 -6.8428 2.7590 8.2033 9.4116 26.5222 104.2723 6.8899
LLP 1,114 0.0000 0.0000 2.4104 4.8224 26.3732 94.5094 7.1144
EBTAA 1,138 -21.9561 -3.4789 0.6580 0.7294 4.9371 24.9991 1.9222
INDIV 1,118 -2.4564 2.7517 34.0857 35.3189 95.2165 99.8594 17.7157
RISK 1,117 0.0000 17.0729 53.1373 53.1156 96.1061 189.4297 19.4006
OLDAT1 1,105 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2072 1.0000 1.0000 0.4055
OLDAT1R 1,105 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1716 2.0983 6.9691 0.5229
TCR 1,115 4.8782 10.3280 17.2427 17.8543 31.7629 68.2777 4.5763
DEPO 1,316 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 0.5000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5002
LOAN 1,307 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4996 1.0000 1.0000 0.5002
DEPxLOA 1,304 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2132 1.0000 1.0000 0.4097
LIQR 1,307 0.9590 13.6806 65.5583 63.4130 90.0293 91.8598 17.9710
TaxRate 1,386 9.0000 10.0000 24.0000 23.4672 35.0000 35.0000 5.5737
CQS 1,374 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.7576 6.0000 6.0000 1.1400
CPI 1,362 40.0000 41.0000 81.0000 72.0286 92.0000 92.0000 16.7724
INFL 1,373 -2.8218 -2.8218 0.8882 1.0084 5.4707 7.2800 1.4858
GDPG 1,369 -5.7150 -2.8608 1.0342 1.2884 6.4973 24.3765 1.8969
ROAat 1,093 -16.0303 -1.6091 1.3541 1.4997 5.5124 16.2393 1.5003
ROAbt 1,093 -21.8761 -2.3751 1.4847 1.6487 6.6066 25.0042 1.9659
RORWAat 1,071 -28.4083 -3.2234 2.6044 3.0049 12.3701 29.4359 2.9354
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Table 2.12: Potential Determinants of Profitability and Expected Impact
The table below summarises the dependent variables, the bank specific independent variables, and
the macroeconomic independent variables used in the regression of profitability. For each variable, I
provide a description, information on the measurement, and the ex-ante expected effect on profitability.
Variable Description Measure Expected
Effect (+/-)
Dependent Proxies for profitability:
variables:
ROA a.t. Return on Average Assets EBI/Average Assets (in %)
ROA b.t. Return on Average Assets EBIT/Average Assets (in %)
RORWA a.t. Return on Risk-Weighted Assets EBI/RWA (in %)
Independent
variables
Bank-specific:
COCOS AT1CoCos AT1CoCos/ (+)
Tier 1-capital (in %)
ASIZE Av. Bank Size (linear) Log Total Assets (+/-)
CAR Equity Ratio Total Equity/ Total Assets (+)
LLP Loan Loss Provisions Loan Loss Reserves/ (-)
Gross Loans (in %)
RISK Risk Density Risk-weighted Assets/ (+/-)
Assets (in %)
LIQR Liquidity Risk Net Loans/ (+)
Total Assets (in %)
INDIV Income Diversification NII/(NII+II) (in %) (+)
OLDAT1R Phase-out AT1-capital Phase-out AT1-capital/ (+)
RWA
Independent
variables
Macroeconomic:
TaxRate Corporate Tax Rate Statutory Tax Rate (in %) (-)
FY Financial Year Financial Reporting (+/-)
Period
INFL Inflation Rate Inflation Rate (in %) (+/-)
CPI Corruption Perception Index CPI Score (+/-)
GDPG GDP Growth Change from t-1 to t (in %) (+/-)
CQS Credit Quality Steps/Rating From 1 (AA- or better) (-)
to 6 (CCC+ or worse)
40
CHAPTER 2. INCREASING PROFITABILITY THROUGH CONTINGENT
CONVERTIBLE CAPITAL. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN BANKS
T
ab
le
2.
13
:
C
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
s
o
f
R
e
g
re
ss
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
R
e
g
re
ss
o
rs
II
T
h
e
ta
b
le
b
el
ow
sh
ow
s
p
ai
rw
is
e
co
rr
el
at
io
n
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
of
th
e
re
gr
es
so
rs
an
d
th
e
re
gr
es
sa
n
d
s
u
se
d
in
S
ec
ti
on
(2
.5
),
an
al
y
si
n
g
th
e
p
ro
fi
ta
b
il
it
y
im
p
li
ca
ti
on
s
of
C
O
C
O
S
.
It
ca
n
b
e
se
en
th
a
t
th
e
va
ri
a
b
le
o
f
in
te
re
st
C
O
C
O
S
h
a
s
p
os
it
iv
e
co
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
s
w
it
h
th
e
p
ro
fi
ta
b
il
it
y
m
ea
su
re
s
R
O
A
b
t,
R
O
A
a
t,
a
n
d
R
O
R
W
A
a
t.
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
R
O
A
a
t
R
O
A
b
t
R
O
R
W
A
a
t
C
O
C
O
S
IN
D
IV
C
A
R
L
L
P
R
IS
K
O
L
D
A
T
1
R
L
IQ
R
A
S
IZ
E
T
a
x
R
a
te
G
D
P
G
In
fl
a
ti
o
n
C
P
I
C
Q
S
R
O
A
a
t
1
.0
0
0
0
R
O
A
b
t
0
.9
8
1
4
1
.0
0
0
0
R
O
R
W
A
a
t
0
.6
8
8
4
0
.6
2
9
4
1
.0
0
0
0
C
O
C
O
S
0
.0
6
9
2
0
.0
6
5
4
0
.0
7
6
5
1
.0
0
0
0
IN
D
IV
-0
.1
4
9
5
-0
.0
8
5
0
-0
.1
7
9
2
-0
.0
2
0
8
1
.0
0
0
0
C
A
R
0
.1
4
7
0
0
.1
7
2
3
-0
.1
2
2
7
-0
.1
2
1
7
0
.1
6
4
7
1
.0
0
0
0
L
L
P
-0
.2
6
3
9
-0
.2
6
6
2
-0
.4
4
6
2
-0
.0
0
2
5
0
.0
9
5
0
0
.2
7
8
2
1
.0
0
0
0
R
IS
K
0
.1
9
7
6
0
.2
0
0
5
-0
.2
8
6
9
-0
.1
0
6
2
-0
.1
5
9
7
0
.6
4
9
3
0
.3
2
5
6
1
.0
0
0
0
O
L
D
A
T
1
R
-0
.0
5
5
3
-0
.0
5
1
3
0
.0
6
3
7
0
.0
9
1
6
0
.0
1
5
9
-0
.1
3
8
8
0
.0
3
0
9
-0
.1
4
1
3
1
.0
0
0
0
L
IQ
R
0
.1
1
9
4
0
.0
9
6
5
0
.0
3
4
1
-0
.0
0
3
5
-0
.6
1
1
7
-0
.0
5
9
0
-0
.2
1
7
2
0
.1
4
0
6
-0
.1
2
6
6
1
.0
0
0
0
A
S
IZ
E
-0
.0
7
8
1
-0
.0
8
2
7
0
.1
8
6
5
0
.0
5
8
8
0
.0
6
7
3
-0
.3
6
1
2
-0
.0
9
6
0
-0
.4
9
0
6
0
.2
5
2
2
-0
.1
8
4
5
1
.0
0
0
0
T
a
x
R
a
te
0
.0
4
6
2
0
.0
2
3
6
0
.1
0
6
5
0
.0
1
2
7
0
.0
4
1
3
-0
.0
5
5
1
0
.0
5
0
9
-0
.0
3
6
8
0
.1
0
9
4
-0
.1
0
3
2
0
.1
8
7
8
1
.0
0
0
0
G
D
P
G
0
.0
1
3
2
0
.0
1
5
1
0
.0
0
4
7
-0
.1
0
0
7
0
.0
0
2
2
0
.0
1
0
0
0
.1
0
6
0
0
.0
3
0
5
-0
.0
7
0
0
-0
.1
5
2
2
0
.0
3
0
2
-0
.3
2
9
9
1
.0
0
0
0
In
fl
a
ti
o
n
0
.1
0
7
9
0
.1
1
5
3
0
.1
0
8
7
0
.0
3
0
8
-0
.0
1
1
0
-0
.0
1
7
2
-0
.0
6
1
0
0
.0
0
5
0
-0
.0
0
3
2
-0
.0
8
5
9
0
.0
1
4
9
0
.0
1
8
6
0
.2
4
5
3
1
.0
0
0
0
C
P
I
0
.1
3
7
3
0
.1
4
2
8
0
.2
0
6
6
0
.2
9
8
3
-0
.1
2
9
1
-0
.0
0
4
7
-0
.4
1
9
5
-0
.0
8
9
2
0
.1
4
5
2
0
.2
5
4
9
-0
.1
1
2
9
-0
.1
6
1
7
-0
.1
2
2
7
-0
.0
1
8
2
1
.0
0
0
0
C
Q
S
-0
.1
7
4
3
-0
.1
9
0
0
-0
.2
5
2
0
-0
.2
5
5
2
0
.0
2
8
8
0
.0
2
8
1
0
.5
4
0
6
0
.1
6
1
4
-0
.1
4
7
4
-0
.1
6
5
4
0
.0
5
5
6
0
.0
5
2
5
0
.1
0
9
8
-0
.1
0
9
5
-0
.8
6
1
4
1
.0
0
0
0
Chapter 3
Can CoCo-bonds Mitigate Systemic
Risk? Evidence for the SRISK
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3.1 Introduction
Contingent convertible bonds (CoCo-bonds) gained particular recognition of bank regulators in
the wake of the latest global financial crisis in 2008. It exposed the vulnerability of banking
systems, and the need to increase their resilience by higher quality and quantity of capital
(Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al. (2013)). CoCo-bonds as hybrid capital instruments are predestined
to serve as one contribution to this end, combining the respective advantages of debt and
equity. They are characterised as de jure debt obligations with a contractual or statutory
feature to quasi-automatically convert into equity under certain conditions. The conversion into
real equity instruments can be considered as the main advantage, compared to other hybrid
instruments, which were predominantly used before the crisis. They turned out not being able
to provide capital when most needed. In a joint working paper, leading academics on financial
regulation, such as Douglas W. Diamond, and Nobel laureate Robert J. Shiller, proposed a
hybrid security to address this short-coming (Squam-Lake-Working-Group (2009)). Just as in
CoCo-bonds, they envisioned a financial instrument, which strengthens individual banks by
automatically providing additional going concern capital during financial distress. Doing so in-
creases the resilience of the weakest link, and hence makes the entire financial system more stable.
The relevance to study the effects of hybrid capital becomes evident, considering the growing
relevance of hybrid capital instruments, as illustrated in Figure (3.1). It is obvious to the
eye that hybrid capital has seen a steep rise in interest and dissemination across the financial
sector since the advent of the global financial crisis. 2010 marked the transition from Basel II
to Basel III, which only temporarily slowed the growth in hybrid capital, due to regulatory
uncertainty regarding capital eligibility under the novel Basel Accord. It has continued its
unprecedented growth after Basel III was finalised, and henceforth grew at an annualised rate
of almost 20 %. The new Basel accord (i.e. Basel III) and the European Capital Requirements
Regulation (CRR), respectively Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) allowed banks to cover
parts of their core capital requirements by CoCo-bonds, and hence further fueled their growth.
However, despite this stellar growth, it is not undisputed, whether CoCo-bonds actually increase
the resilience of banking systems. While Coffee Jr. (2011) and Avdjiev et al. (2013) find stability
enhancing effects, Maes & Schoutens (2012) and Chan & Van Wijnbergen (2014) generate
opposing results.
We intend to shed new light on this discussion and to clarify, whether the usage of CoCo-bonds
increases financial stability. Financial stability itself is only defined very broadly, as in the
work of e.g. Gadanecz & Jayaram (2009) and Hakkio & Keeton (2009). For the purpose of
this paper, we follow the definition of Brownlees & Engle (2016) and use SRISK in order to
measure a banks’ contribution to systemic instability. Our contribution is threefold: First,
we show that the original formula for SRISK is not able to capture the stability enhancing
effect of the issuance of CoCo-bonds correctly. Second, we show that the ability to capture
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Figure 3.1: Annual Issuance of Hybrid Capital
The figure above shows the development of the volume of annual issuance of hybrid capital over time.
the positive contribution of CoCo-bonds to financial stability as measured by SRISK crucially
depends on the treatment as debt or equity on the balance sheet. Third, we adjust the SRISK
formula in order to remedy this short-coming, and to correctly account for CoCo-bonds. Using
the assumption of a fictitious conversion of the CoCo-bonds directly at issuance, we eliminate
the disparities induced by differences in accounting. As a result, we can draw an unbiased
picture on systemic risk, and hence financial stability. Doing so allows us to make informed
recommendations for policy makers and regulators alike.
Taken together, we show that SRISK needs to be adjusted in order to ensure a consistent
treatment of CoCo-bonds. Doing so allows us to provide unambiguous empirical evidence that
the usage of CoCo-bonds reduces systemic risk. The identified transmission channel focuses on
the increased loss absorbing capacity of a bank, which originates from the issuance of CoCo-bonds.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section (3.2) provides the theoretical background
and the relevant literature about CoCo-bonds and systemic risk. We derive our research
question and hypotheses in Section (3.3). Section (3.4) summarises our data and methodology,
while Section (3.5) comprises the main results. Additional robustness tests can be found in
Section (3.6), with a conclusion and an outlook given in Section (3.7).
3.2 Theoretical Background
3.2.1 CoCo-bonds
CoCo-bonds are a true subset of hybrid capital instruments. While hybrids comprise every kind
of financial instrument combining features of debt and equity, not every hybrid instrument is
also a CoCo-bond. Figure (3.1) illustrates the trend towards the issuance of hybrid capital
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instruments even before the financial crisis of 2008. Acharya et al. (2011) show that throughout
the crisis a significant share of new capital issues has been in the form of hybrids, instead of
common equity. Back then, Basel II allowed various different instruments to be eligible as
additional Tier 1 (AT1) and Tier 2 (T2) capital, depending on the specific national regulation.
Throughout these early years, hybrids comprise preferred shares, silent participations, and of
course various kinds of subordinated bonds broadly summarised as “innovative” hybrid capital
instruments. Retrospectively, the lacking quality of some of these types of hybrids was identified
as a weak-spot of the capital regulation under Basel II. Particularly, it can be argued that
non-perpetual instruments or those including call options and call incentives for the issuer,
interest step-up clauses, or dividend pusher clauses cannot reasonably serve as going concern
Tier 1 (T1) capital. In this way, Benczur et al. (2017) note that under Basel II the true amount
of bank’s loss absorbing capital was much lower than the officially reported values. Basel III
raised the required quality of the financial instruments and restricts eligibility as AT1-capital to
CoCo-bonds. CoCo-bonds are those hybrids, which imply a quasi-automatic conversion feature.
In contrast to simple convertible bonds, CoCo-bonds do neither imply an option for the issuer,
nor the investor to convert into equity. Rather, conversion becomes mandatory if one or more
contractual threshold is reached, or if the regulator considers the bank to be at the point of
non-viability (PONV-trigger).
The design of CoCo-bonds varies significantly in practice with two generic types of CoCo-bonds
being prevalent depending on their respective loss absorption mechanism. In case of a breach
of a pre-defined trigger threshold, the principal amount is either written down (PWD) or the
financial instrument is converted into equity (C2E). More specifically, the conversion yields
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1), and hence addresses previous short-comings under Basel II,
which provided capital with questionable quality. In this way, they are predestined to provide
going concern capital to a bank under financial distress. The conversion mechanism is of
importance, but not exclusively decisive in determining whether the financial instrument is
accounted for as debt or equity. Balance sheet treatment, however, depends critically on the
accounting standards, and on the specific design of the instrument. Design features concerning
the conversion price or ratio, permanent or temporary write down, or the possibility of a write
up of the principal amount are left to contractual freedom. However, for regulatory eligibility as
AT1, CoCo-bonds must fulfil several criteria regarding their quality to serve as going-concern
capital determined by Basel III. Inter alia, the trigger must be based on the bank’s regulatory
CET1-capital, and amount to at least 5.125 % of the total risk-weighted assets (RWA). Because
under the new Basel III accord CoCo-bonds are the only remaining type of capital, which is
eligible as AT1-capital, they are predestined to be designed in accordance with the requirements
for AT1. However, if one or more of these criteria are not met, CoCo-bonds might still be
eligible as T2-capital. Cahn & Kenadjian (2014) provide a general overview of the regulation of
CoCo-bonds according to Basel III and the European implementation through CRR and CRD IV.
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The existing literature on CoCo-bonds can roughly be classified as either literature on the design,
pricing, or risk-taking incentives of CoCo-bonds, respectively their implications for financial
stability. The conceptualisation of CoCo-bonds as going concern capital goes back to the seminal
work of Flannery (2005). He calls his proposal of a CoCo-bond “reverse convertible debenture”.
These bonds automatically convert into common stock if a bank violates a pre-defined capital
ratio, which is not based on regulatory, but book equity. In opposition to this capital ratio
trigger, Raviv (2004) proposes “debt-for-equity-swaps”, which are triggered if a pre-specified
asset value threshold is reached. Rather than considering bank-specific trigger mechanisms,
Kashyap et al. (2008) propose a “capital insurance”, ensuring that banks are recapitalised if the
banking sector on aggregate reaches a situation of financial distress. A comprehensive literature
review on CoCo-bonds is provided by Flannery (2014).
Although the idea of CoCo-bonds precedes the subprime financial crisis, interest in it grew
manifoldly from 2008 on, in a quest for tools to strengthen the stability of the banking system.
CoCo-bonds provide two channels through which bank stability can be increased. First, the
coupon retention, where interest payments are deferred in order to stabilise the bank capital base
and ease the liquidity drain. Second, the conversion, through which the de jure debt instrument
becomes equity, and increases the loss-absorbing capacity. Whether, and how such a conversion
affects a banks’ balance sheet equity and debt, depends on the conversion mechanism, and on
the accounting treatment. Exemplary, if a C2E-CoCo accounted for as debt is triggered, it
decreases debt and increases book equity. At the same time, the triggering of a PWD-CoCo
accounted for as equity, decreases equity, but simultaneously yields the bank an extraordinary
gain equal to the amount that was initially written down.
Considering the effects of CoCo-bonds on the financial health of individual banks, Avdjiev et al.
(2015, 2017) empirically investigate the implications of CoCo-issuances on individual bank stabil-
ity. They consider how the issuance of CoCo-bonds affects CDS-spreads of subordinated debt of
the respective bank and find that issuing CoCo-bonds leads to a reduction of CDS-spreads. This
finding implies a decrease of the risk for ordinary bond holders, and a reduction of default risk for
banks in general. In contrast to this bank-individual view, our study contributes to the literature
on financial stability from a systemic perspective. In this way, we investigate the implications
of CoCo-bonds for systemic risk and proneness to financial distress of banking systems as a whole.
Extant theoretical literature provides multiple perspectives on the relationship between the
usage of CoCo-bonds and systemic risk. Avdjiev et al. (2013) postulate that the potential of
CoCo-bonds to strengthen the resilience of the banking system depends in particular on their
capacity to reduce systemic risk. Coffee Jr. (2011) considers contingent capital converting into
equity as an effective response to systemic risk complementing regulatory supervision. Proposing
a dilutive conversion of CoCo-bonds into senior shares, however, could incentivise banks to
sell-off certain illiquid assets during financial crises, which would be detrimental to financial
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stability. Maes & Schoutens (2012) remark that CoCo-bonds could increase systemic risk, if
massive investments of insurance companies in CoCo-bonds create a contagion channel from the
banking to the insurance sector. In a similar way, Chan & Van Wijnbergen (2014) argue that
although the conversion of CoCo-bonds strengthens the capital base of a bank, it may increase
the probability of a bank run, and hence elevate systemic risk. They reason that conversion is a
negative signal to the bank’s depositors as well as a negative externality on other banks with
correlated asset returns (particularly if banks hold each others CoCo-bonds). Koziol & Lawrenz
(2012) theoretically investigate the impact of CoCo-bonds on the risk-taking of owner-managers
under incomplete contracts. They conclude that if owner-managers have discretion over the
bank’s business risk, CoCo-bonds bear averse risk-taking incentives, increasing the idiosyncratic
risk. In this way, CoCo-bonds rather fuel systemic instability. Chan & Van Wijnbergen
(2016) postulate that the wide spread use of CoCo-bonds increases systemic fragility because in
particular PWD-CoCos and non-dilutive C2E-CoCos mean wealth transfers from debt holders
to equity holders leading to incentives to inefficiently increase risk. Based on these ambiguous
views on the effect on systemic risk, we empirically investigate this complex relationship. The
following section elaborates on relevant measures for systemic risk and provides an overview of
literature related to CoCo-bonds.
3.2.2 Systemic Risk
Systemic risk can be understood in many different ways, and the plurality of existing definitions
highlights the still ongoing debate, about which understanding is correct. To the European
Central Bank (ECB), systemic risk is “[...] the risk that financial instability becomes so
widespread that it impairs the functioning of a financial system to the point where economic
growth and welfare suffer materially.” (ECB (2010)). Contrarily, Schwarcz (2008) understands
it as the risk that a local shock results in global repercussions because of interdependencies,
respectively interconnections or external effects. The number of definitions is not bound to these
two exemplary given, but illustrates the necessity of a classification of the literature. Notable
attempts have been made by De Bandt & Hartmann (2000), FSB et al. (2009), and Bisias et al.
(2012), respectively Benoit et al. (2017) most recently.
One approach brought forward by the ECB (2010) is the systemic risk cube. It relates each
dimension of the cube to an aspect of systemic risk. As such, it differentiates between the
causes of systemic risk, its origin, and lastly manifestation. Regarding the causes, the systemic
risk cube distinguishes exogenous and endogenous factors that trigger the systemic event, and
hence lead to system-wide financial instability. They can either originate from a single bank
(idiosyncratically) or from developments within the entire system (systemically). When they
manifest, their impact can be sequential in the form of feedback loops, as described by Dan´ıelsson
et al. (2013), or simultaneous as prevalent in the literature on network effects (see Segoviano &
Goodhart (2009), or Billio et al. (2012)).
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Other definitions in the literature follow a less granular approach. Simply put, they differentiate
between micro- and macro-level measures, which either assess the impact that systemic events
have on individual banks, or the financial system as a whole. Notable contributions regarding the
bank level assessment through microlevel measures are ΔCoVaR from Adrian & Brunnermeier
(2016), respectively MES from Acharya et al. (2017), which has found its influence into SRISK
by Brownlees & Engle (2016). At the other end, measures like CATFIN, as postulated by
Allen et al. (2012), are noteworthy contributions to assessing the system-wide systemic risk.
Irrespective of the applied definition, all systemic risk measures have individual strengths and
weaknesses, depending on the dimension of systemic risk that is to be grasped. In the context
of quantifying how CoCo-bonds contribute to systemic risk, these nuances make the difference
in obtaining correct inference from the risk measures.
Gupta et al. (2018) use a Monte Carlo Simulation of banks’ balance sheets in order to calculate
ΔCoVaR in a network model in which all CoCo-bonds are issued as debt. Their results indicate
a strong reduction in ΔCoVaR along with less bank failures during the stress scenarios. These
observations are especially true for so called “dual” trigger CoCo-bonds, where the conversion
to equity, respectively the write down of the issued debt is not only dependent on a single
criterion, e.g. the share price falling below a certain threshold, but the conjunction of the share
price falling below this threshold, and exemplary profits falling below a certain threshold as
well. A detailed discussion of this design feature can be found in the report of the Squam-
Lake-Working-Group (2009), McDonald (2013), and Allen & Tang (2016). While the findings
of Gupta et al. (2018) appear desirable, they are subject to noteworthy critique. They make
substantial oversimplifications, by not accounting for the different mechanics, if CoCo-bonds
are issued as debt or equity. Hence, they draw a biased picture of how CoCo-bonds function.
Furthermore, their argumentation that CoCo-bonds add additional liquidity is flawed, as the
regulator requires CoCo-bond capital to be fully paid in at issuance. Lastly, it is difficult to
theorise a transmission channel between CoCo-bonds and ΔCoVaR, which consists of seven
unrelated measures, such as the weekly returns of the real estate sector. Thus, the validity of
employing this measure may be questionable in the first place.
Our reservations towards ΔCoVaR in light of the aforementioned short-comings are affirmed
by the literature. Kund (2018) empirically tests the predictive power of different systemic risk
measures, and finds ΔCoVaR to be the worst performing of all. He generates evidence that
substantiates the usage of SRISK by Brownlees & Engle (2016) for measuring systemic risk at
the bank-level. We thus employ their definition of systemic risk, as an undercapitalisation in
the financial sector, which hence can no longer provide credit to the real economy. In order
to measure this funding gap, Brownlees and Engle have devised the systemic risk measure
SRISK. Positive values indicate the presence of a funding gap, whereas negative values can
be interpreted as resilience towards such adversities. The occurrence of the funding gap can
be related to an extended market downturn, which is referred to as the Long Run Marginal
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Expected Shortfall (LRMES). It is calculated as the expected capital shortfall of the bank
conditional on the occurrence of a systemic event (c), which is equal to a decline in asset prices
of 10 % over the course of a month in the original paper. As such, SRISK can be understood, as
an extension of the expected shortfall, as it relates the idiosyncratic returns of the bank to the
returns of the market, and hence creates a systemic risk measure. In order to address structural
differences between the banks, LRMES is adjusted for individual risk through β, as well as time
through
√
h. Formally, we can write the LRMES as:
LRMESi,t = −
√
hβiE(ri,t+1|rm,t+1 < c) (3.1)
After obtaining the LRMES, it is incorporated in the calculation of SRISK by multiplying one
minus LRMES times the adjusted equity (Ei,t) accounting for the regulatory capital fraction k.
In accordance with Brownlees & Engle (2016) it was set to 8 % as approximated from the Basel
accords. Pursuant, the term is deducted from the product of book valued debt (Di,t) and the
regulatory capital fraction. We thus obtain:
SRISKi,t = kDi,t − (1− k)Ei,t(1− LRMESi,t) (3.2)
This original definition though is problematic, if one is to assess the impact of hybrid capital,
respectively CoCo-bonds on systemic risk. As discussed in Section (3.2.1) the accounting as
debt or equity is tangent to the two balance sheet variables that are necessary in order to
calculate SRISK, and hence pivotal to a correct calculation. Under the current formula, hybrid
capital, such as CoCo-bonds, is not taken into account, which is why we propose an extension
to Equation (3.2). Using the indicator function, we will show in the following section, how our
proposed extension allows for CoCo-bonds to mimic their omitted contribution to narrowing
the height, respectively presence of a funding gap. From there, we derive testable hypotheses
and describe and interpret their results in the subsequent sections.
3.3 Hypotheses
Throughout the existing literature on CoCo-bonds and systemic bank risk different measures
for systemic risk – as described above – are used. Fajardo & Mendes (2018) make an initial
attempt to study implications for SRISK. First, they estimate SRISK for banks with and
without CoCo-bonds and compare the number of defaulted banks in a stress scenario. Second,
they study the market reactions of the announcement and the issuance of CoCo-bonds. Their
study, though, has fundamental flaws. In particular, the authors falsely assume a generalised
accounting treatment of CoCo-bonds as debt. In reality a substantial amount of CoCo-bonds
is accounted for as equity, as illustrated in Tables (3.6) to (3.8) in the appendix. Moreover,
differentiation between C2E- and PWD-CoCos is neglected. This distinction is, however, vital,
as both have very different effects on SRISK.
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The starting point of our analysis is the understanding that the original SRISK formula depends
on a strict classification as debt or equity and does, therefore, not properly account for hybrid
capital instruments. If CoCo-bonds are not unanimously classified as debt or equity like in
our sample, we expect contradicting results from their issuance. The effect of CoCo-bonds on
systemic risk will crucially depend on the treatment on the balance sheet. CoCo-bonds are
hybrid instruments, which can be treated very differently, depending on their specific design
and the applicable accounting standards. If the CoCo-bond is accounted for as equity, SRISK
decreases directly at emission. This effect stems from the immediate reduction of the potential
funding gap due to the availability of additional equity. On the other hand, if CoCo-bonds
are accounted for as debt, SRISK will increase at issuance. Even though CoCo-bonds are
supposed to add additional loss absorbing capacity, the treatment as debt increases or even
invokes potential funding gaps at emission. Only upon conversion, such CoCo-bonds are properly
reflected in the SRISK formula. At conversion, debt is reduced, and at the same time equity is
added to the bank. The resulting net effect after conversion is the same as the effect of the usage
of a CoCo-bond accounted for as equity. If a CoCo-bond is initially accounted for as equity,
there is no additional effect on equity at conversion, if it occurs at par. Figure (3.2) illustrates
the different effects of CoCo-bonds on SRISK, depending on their treatment on the balance sheet.
Equity Debt
At emission
SRISK
↓
SRISK
↑
At conversion
SRISK
→
SRISK
↓↓
Net effect
SRISK
↓
SRISK
↓
Figure 3.2: Expected Implications of CoCo-Bonds for SRISK
The figure above shows the ex-ante theoretically expected effects of CoCo-bonds for SRISK.
As a consequence of the differences identified, we cannot make an unambiguous or generalised
statement on the effects of CoCo-bonds on SRISK. The balance sheet treatment yields the
counterintuitive effect that until conversion, CoCo-bonds, which are accounted for as debt
increase SRISK. Such a treatment contradicts the economic intuition, and implies an unjustified
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differentiation between otherwise comparable bonds, only because of their formal accounting
treatment. In this way, SRISK discriminates against the usage of CoCo-bonds that are accounted
for as debt. The correct treatment of CoCo-bonds in the SRISK formula is, however, relevant,
as SRISK is manifold seen as a viable alternative to stress testing, and is frequently used
by regulatory institutions to consider systemic stability (Pagano et al., 2014; Steffen, 2014;
Constaˆncio, 2016). In a worst case, the regulator wrongfully acts on a sound bank, due to
misleading information about its contribution to systemic risk. Building on the original SRISK
formula, we therefore differentiate between debt and equity, in order to aid the regulatory triage.
We hence postulate the following related hypotheses:
Lemma 1. SRISK is highly sensitive to the accounting treatment of CoCo-bonds, and thus does
not correctly measure systemic risk for issuing banks.
Hypothesis 1a. If CoCo-bonds are accounted for as debt, SRISK increases at emission all else
being equal.
Hypothesis 1b. If CoCo-bonds are accounted for as equity, SRISK decreases at emission all
else being equal.
From a regulatory point of view, the treatment on the balance sheet does not have any
consequences for the eligibility as regulatory AT1 or T2-capital. Therefore, from an economic
and risk perspective, CoCo-bonds should not be treated differently. In particular, if we assume
two otherwise identical bonds have the same capital quality, a CoCo-bond accounted for as debt
should not increase SRISK, while a bond accounted for as equity reduces SRISK. Accordingly,
we make the following adjustments to the original SRISK formula in order to account for the
issuance of CoCo-bonds properly. First, we use the hypothetical trigger-assumption that the
issued CoCo-bonds are converted instantly at issuance. In this way, CoCo-bonds either convert
into real equity instruments, thereby providing equity, irrespective of their accounting treatment
prior to conversion. Alternatively, for PWD-CoCos, the principle amount is written down.
Doing so reduces the previous amount on the balance sheet and adds equity in the form of
extraordinary earnings. Either way, CoCo-bonds are equally treated as loss absorbing equity,
irrespective of their balance sheet treatment. Second, we adjust the original SRISK formula as
shown in Equation (3.3) to account for the insensitivity of CoCo-capital to LRMES. CoCo-bonds
offer additional loss absorbing capital in times of financial distress. Due to the trigger design, the
capital is only provided in times of crisis and not ex-ante. Consequently, the distributed capital
is not depleted by the LRMES factor, which is why we have added it as a dedicated summand.
Only once the CoCo-bonds have been converted into non-hybrid equity, the resulting equity
becomes sensitive to LRMES. Taken together, we suggest for our adjusted SRISK formula:
SRISKi,t =k
(
Di,t −DebtCoCosi,t1(Triggered)
)
−(1− k)
((
Ei,t − EquityCoCosi,t1(Triggered)
)
(1− LRMESi,t)
+DebtCoCosi,t1(Triggered) + EquityCoCosi,t1(Triggered)
)
(3.3)
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Hypothesis 2. If CoCo-bonds are properly incorporated in the SRISK formula, the usage of
CoCo-bonds decreases SRISK, irrespective of their balance sheet treatment.
Our study contributes to the literature on CoCo-bonds and systemic risk by investigating how
the issuance of CoCo-bonds affects systemic risk. In particular, we show that the original SRISK
formula fails to capture the specifics of CoCo-bonds in the context of systemic risk. As a result,
we propose an adjustment to the SRISK formula to account for the differences in accounting
treatment, remedying the inherent bias of the original SRISK formula. Doing so allows us to
analyse the true impact of CoCo-bonds on systemic risk, irrespective of potential biases from
the balance sheet treatment.
3.4 Data and Model
Our initial dataset consists of 1,514 CoCo-issuances from 2010 until 2019 and depicts the entire
universe as reported by Thomson Reuters Eikon. We narrow our sample down, by restricting it
to the years after 2011, because CoCo-issuance prior to that is scarce, and might be biased due
to the transition from Basel II to Basel III as shown in Figure (3.1). In spite of 110 issuances in
2019, we had to drop this year, due to missing accounting information, which are required in
the calculation of SRISK. After adjusting for missings, we obtain a sample of 533 CoCo-bonds,
which were emitted by 126 banks from 33 countries around the world. The majority of 365
(68.48 %) CoCo-bonds are accounted for as debt, 168 (31.52 %) are accounted for as equity.
Because this feature is not readily available from data providers, we hand-collected information
about the balance sheet treatment of the CoCo-bonds and provide the largest overview of this
characteristic available so far. Considering the relevant accounting standards, 140 (26.27 %)
issuances are subject to local GAAP, while 393 (73.73 %) are in accordance with IFRS principles.
The considered CoCo-bonds are equally eligible as AT1 and T2-capital. In detail, 275 (51.59 %)
CoCo-bonds serve as AT1-capital, and 258 (48.41 %) as T2-capital. It is important to note
that the T2-CoCo-bonds are classified exclusively as debt on the balance sheet. The general
distribution between AT1 and T2 is in line with earlier research by Avdjiev et al. (2017), who
analyse a sample of 731 CoCo-bonds from Bloomberg and Dealogic and find that 55 % of them
are classified as AT1. Furthermore, they show that the volume weighted amount of CoCo-bond
issuances was slightly dominated by PWD-bonds. In our sample, 203 (38.09 %) CoCo-bonds
are designed with a C2E-mechanism, meaning that the bonds become common stock in case the
bond is triggered. The majority of 330 (61.91 %) cases, is designed with a PWD-mechanism.
Tables (3.6) - (3.8) in the appendix illustrate the aforementioned information. None of the
CoCo-issuances has been called or triggered over the duration of our sample. Thus, we have a
continuous sample free of a potential bias from converted CoCo-bonds.
Our sample contains 45,864 bank-week observations from 2012 to 2018. We use weekly LRMES
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in order to account for sufficient fluctuation in the stock and market returns. Doing so prevents
the estimated SRISK measure from being stale. However, for the regression analysis, we only
incorporate the values reported in the first calender week for two reasons. First, only then,
the accounting information used for the calculation of SRISK can change. Second, due to the
stationarity, the regression results would be biased by large numbers of almost identical values.
As a result, our sample consists of 882 bank-year observations.
We test our hypotheses empirically by employing a panel regression model with bank and time
fixed-effects as depicted by α, respectively μ in Equation (3.4). Our regressands are specifications
of SRISK. Our variables of interest are the nominal amounts of debt-CoCos (CoCoDebt) and
equity-CoCos (CoCoEquity). We subsequently control for well established bank specific and
macro economic factors. On the bank level, we control for bank size using the logarithm of total
assets. The capital structure is represented by the leverage ratio (LR), while profitability is
measured using the return on assets (ROA). We follow Laeven & Levine (2007) in measuring
the income diversification using their ROID, which relates interest and non-interest income. On
the country level we control for the level of non-inflated GDP (GDPUSD), annual GDP-growth
(GDPGrowth), annual inflation (CPI), and exuberant credit growth as measured by the credit
to GDP ratio (C2GDP ). We denote the coefficient for bank controls with β and the macro
controls with γ to ease legibility. Subscript i refers to the individual bank, while t refers to time.
An overview over the variables and their sources can be found in Table (3.10) in the appendix.
Summary statistics and correlation metrics are provided in Tables (3.11) and (3.12) respectively.
SRISKi,t+1 =β1CoCo
Debt
i,t + β2CoCo
Equity
i,t + β3ln(Assets)i,t + β4LRi,t
+β5ROAi,t + β6ROIDi,t + γ1GDP
USD
c,t + γ2GDP
Growth
c,t
+γ3CPIi,t + γ4C2GDPc,t + αi + μt + i,t
(3.4)
We use the Wald test to generate evidence against autocorrelation. Likewise, heteroskedasticity
can be rejected based on the results of the modified Wald test. Furthermore, we apply two
treatments in order to address potential endogeneity. First, we address simultaneity and reverse
causality concerns by using lagged values for the regressors in our analysis. Doing so reduces our
sample to 756 observations from the initial 882, as 126 observations are used as lagged variables
for the model calibration. A second source of endogeneity in our model might stem from the
managerial leeway in structuring the CoCo-bond, such that it is either accounted for as equity or
debt. This might be the case, if for example, highly leveraged or profitable banks systematically
favor equity over debt CoCo-bonds. Hence, we apply the probit model from Equation (3.5)
to verify the independence between the accounting of CoCo-bonds on the balance sheet and
bank characteristics. The binary dependent variable y of the model assumes the value of one,
when the CoCo-bond is accounted for as equity, respectively zero, if it is accounted for as debt.
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Φ denotes the standard inverse Gaussian link function in the probit model.
P(yi,t = 1|X = xi,t) = Φ
(
β1ln(Assets)i,t + β2LRi,t + β3ROAi,t + β4ROIDi,t + i,t
)
(3.5)
Table 3.1: Probit Model with Binary Dependent Variable to Test for Accounting on
the Balance Sheet
The table below shows the coefficient and in parenthesis the p-values of probit regressions of the
accounting treatment of a bond on relevant bank characteristics. The binary dependent variable
assumes the value one if the bond is accounted for as equity, zero if it is presented as debt. Because
we investigate whether or not a bank has issued CoCo-bonds, instead of the number of CoCo-bond
issuances, the number of observations is lower compared to following tables. The bank specific variables
considered are summarised in Table (3.10). Model (5) uses a dummy variable that measures profitability.
It is one, when the net income is positive, and zero otherwise. Significant determinants cannot be
identified from this analysis. As a consequence, endogeneity concerns regarding the balance sheet
treatment of the CoCo-bonds can be dispersed. p-values: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
Size 0.0493 0.0615 0.0853 0.0419 0.0620
(0.7140) (0.6496) (0.6369) (0.8006) (0.6597)
LR -0.0199 0.0059 -0.0076 -0.0052 -0.0071
(0.6625) (0.8971) (0.8684) (0.9107) (0.8781)
ROID 0.0105 -0.0007 0.0303 0.0968 0.0664
(0.9875) (0.9992) (0.9659) (0.8904) (0.9232)
ROA -0.3604
(0.1373)
ROE -0.0206
(0.1945)
EBIT -0.0000
(0.8358)
Net Income 0.0000
(0.8213)
Profitability 0.0024
(0.9985)
N 509 509 509 509 509
BIC 510.7688 511.2992 512.9126 512.9052 512.9562
We generate evidence against the theorised source of endogeneity in Table (3.1). Our results hold
for different measures of profitability and hence give credit to the transmission channels we have
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described in Section (3.3). We thus proceed with our actual analysis in the following section.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Hypothesis 1
Table (3.2) depicts the test results of our first hypothesis that the original SRISK formula
does not correctly account for the use of CoCo-bonds. The dependent variable is SRISK as
computed by the original SRISK formula. The variables of interest are the nominal amount of
debt-CoCos and the nominal amount of equity-CoCos. Model (1) provides statistical evidence
that the effect of CoCo-bond issuances is highly sensitive to the accounting treatment. While
CoCo-bonds accounted for as equity reduce SRISK at issuance with high statistical significance,
the issuance of CoCo-bonds accounted for as debt is notably insignificant, which is surprising,
given the mechanics of the SRISK formula. If two otherwise comparable CoCo-bonds provide
additional loss absorbing capacity and regulatory capital to banks, the original SRISK formula
hence yields contradicting results, which depend exclusively on the accounting treatment. As a
result, the regulator might wrongfully act on a sound bank, due to inconsistent results from
the original SRISK formula. At the same time, the results confirm that the additional loss
absorbing capital provided by CoCo-bonds does indeed reduce SRISK if properly treated on
the balance sheet. This result is intuitive but not trivial because indirect effects between the
issuance of CoCo-bonds and the LRMES factor cannot be ruled out ex-ante. Also, the absent
negative significance of the debt-CoCos underlines that there is more to the effect on SRISK
than just the change in leverage. Therefore, our results confirm that the relationship between
the usage of hybrid capital like CoCo-bonds and SRISK is more than just a mechanical linkage
and deserves closer investigation.
Model (2) adds bank specific covariates. In doing so, evidence against an omitted variable bias
is generated. The previously significant intercept α becomes insignificant, as explanatory power
is shifted towards the LR. It strongly contributes to explaining the riskiness of a bank from a
systemic perspective. This observation is unsurprising, given that SRISK in essence is a measure
of a funding gap, which occurs, if the equity cannot support the total debt and liabilities, which
are used synonymously in the work of Brownlees & Engle (2016). Given that both capital types
constitute the LR, our results are in line with theory.
Model (3) additionally considers macro-economic control variables, but fails to improve the model,
which attests to Model (2) being the correct specification to describe the underlying mechanics.
Both models reinstate the previous results. The effect of the nominal amount of equity-CoCos
remains negative and highly statistically significant. The effect of the nominal amount of debt-
CoCos remains ambiguous, and statistically insignificant.
CHAPTER 3. CAN COCO-BONDS MITIGATE SYSTEMIC RISK? EVIDENCE FOR THE
SRISK MEASURE 55
Table 3.2: SRISK: Original Formula
The Table below shows the coefficients and p-values (in parenthesis) of regressions with bank and time
fixed effects. The dependent variable is SRISK measuring systemic risk, calculated by the original
formula. The variables of interest are CoCoDebt and CoCoEquity, indicating the nominal amounts of
CoCo-bonds accounted for as debt, respectively as equity. All independent variables are one year
lagged in order to disperse simultaneity concerns. p-values in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001.
Model Model Model
(1) (2) (3)
CoCoDebt -0.0074 0.0193 -0.0057
(0.6664) (0.2678) (0.8311)
CoCoEquity -0.4848∗∗∗ -0.3970∗∗∗ -0.4157∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Size 984.2471 579.4413
(0.2427) (0.5938)
LR 793.4360∗∗∗ 780.2408∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
ROA -161.4964 -111.7667
(0.6378) (0.7635)
ROID 2,777.3289 3,060.4407
(0.1282) (0.1251)
GDPUSD -0.1011
(0.3290)
GDPGrowth 153.9534
(0.1436)
Inflation 17.9572
(0.7339)
C2GDP 17.0252
(0.2092)
Constant 6,603.8238∗∗∗ -16,636.2333 -11,553.7127
(0.0000) (0.0815) (0.2709)
N 756 696 637
R2w 0.1259 0.2471 0.2548
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Table 3.3: SRISK: Adjusted Formula
The Table below shows the coefficients and p-values (in parenthesis) of regressions with bank and time
fixed effects. The dependent variable is SRISK measuring systemic risk, calculated by the adjusted
formula. The variables of interest are CoCoDebt and CoCoEquity, indicating the nominal amounts of
CoCo-bonds accounted for as debt, respectively as equity. All independent variables are one year
lagged in order to disperse simultaneity concerns. p-values in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001.
Model Model Model
(1) (2) (3)
CoCoDebt -1.0076∗∗∗ -0.9806∗∗∗ -1.0054∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
CoCoEquity -0.4788∗∗∗ -0.3906∗∗∗ -0.4095∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Size 980.5157 601.8429
(0.2408) (0.5766)
LR 798.2166∗∗∗ 785.1944∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
ROA -159.9226 -112.4378
(0.6385) (0.7603)
ROID 2,828.4129 3,107.2904
(0.1184) (0.1166)
GDPUSD -0.1019
(0.3213)
GDPGrowth 154.3166
(0.1395)
Inflation 17.6509
(0.7363)
C2GDP 16.4165
(0.2222)
Constant 6,608.2400∗∗∗ -16,689.4299 -11,769.9067
(0.0000) (0.0782) (0.2583)
N 756 696 637
R2w 0.8518 0.8735 0.7950
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3.5.2 Hypothesis 2
Table (3.3) illustrates the test results of our second hypothesis, where we suggest that after
proper adjustments for the accounting treatment of the CoCo-bonds, the usage of CoCo-bonds
decreases SRISK independent of the accounting treatment. The dependent variable is SRISK
computed by the adjusted SRISK formula as in Equation (3.3). The variables of interest are the
nominal amount of debt-CoCos and the nominal amount of equity-CoCos. Model (1) provides
statistical evidence that after the adjustment, both CoCo-bonds accounted for as equity and
those accounted for as debt decrease SRISK. Both coefficients of the variables of interest are
negative and highly statistically significant at the 99.9 % confidence-level. Therefore, our
adjustments are adequate to eliminate the perverse disparities of the original SRISK formula.
Now, for two otherwise equal CoCo-bonds, whose only difference is their accounting treatment,
the true economic effect is revealed. The usage of both types of CoCo-bonds reduces SRISK by
providing additional loss absorbing capacity. Previous findings from Section (3.5.1) can mostly
be reinstated for Models (2) and (3). The addition of bank-specific covariates in Model (2)
shifts explanatory power from the intercept to the LR. At the same time, it moderates the size
of the effect of the respective capital types. As before, there is no complementary influence
from macro-economic control variables in Model (3). The robustness of the previous models is
hence reinforced. Both variables of interest remain negative and highly statistically significant.
Furthermore, we can observe significant gains in the explanatory power of the models. A possible
explanation can be related to the information conveyed in Tables (3.6) to (3.8) in the appendix:
the majority of CoCo-bonds (68.48 %) is accounted for as debt, which omits their stability
enhancing effect in the previous regressions.
Figures (3.3) and (3.4) provide additional graphical evidence of our results, and highlight the
practical implications of our findings. It can be seen in the upper row of the panel, that using
the original SRISK formula leads to almost unchanged levels of SRISK, in spite of CoCo-bond
issuance, which de facto increases the loss absorbing capacity of the banks. It is only under
our proposed adjustments in the lower row of the panel that one observes the true effect of
CoCo-issuance. In line with economic theory, we can now show that higher levels of capitalisation
reduce systemic riskiness. Furthermore, we find that our adjustments indicate the absence
of a funding gap, as they fall below zero from 2015 forth. This observation is of paramount
importance, as it suggests that the regulator might wrongfully take action against banks, if the
SRISK measure is employed in its current definition, which suggests a funding gap, where the
opposite is true. Taken together, we show that the issuance of CoCo-bonds reduces systemic
risk, if measured correctly.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of SRISK with Simple and Logarithmic Returns at the 99th
Percentile
The Figure above shows the difference between simple and logarithmic returns in a column-wise
comparison. It is obvious to the eye, that the differences between the two return measures are marginal,
and hence do not drive our results. The most interesting insight can be obtained from a row-wise
comparison of the figure. While the top row contains the average level of SRISK under the old
calculation, as depicted in Equation (3.2), the bottom row contains it with our adjustment as proposed
in Equation (3.3). One directly realises the striking difference that occurs as time progresses. Crucially,
the original SRISK measure remains almost static despite the on-going issuance of additional loss
absorbing capital in the form of CoCo-bonds, and hence illustrates the problem this paper addresses.
Our correction in the lower row clearly highlights that the issuance of CoCo-bonds, irrespective of
their accounting treatment, reduces systemic risk. What is more, one can observe that under the new
metric, SRISK on average becomes negative, which is especially interesting, given that it indicates the
absence of a funding gap, whereas the top row indicates a capital shortfall. In light of this observation,
the figure clearly illustrates the problem with the old SRISK measure, which provides a biased signal
for the regulator, as it omits the loss absorbing capacity of hybrid capital. As shown in this figure, we
have remedied this short-coming with our proposition.
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of SRISK with Simple and Logarithmic Returns at the 95th
Percentile
The Figure above reinstates our findings from Figure (3.3) for a less severe market disturbance,
considering the average over the worst five percent returns, instead of the worst one percent. Again,
it can be seen that our adjusted SRISK formula performs significantly better at capturing systemic
risk, compared to the original formula, as we correctly capture the reduction in systemic risk that can
be attributed to the issuance of additional loss absorbing capacity in the form of CoCo-bonds. The
difference between both formulas is substantial, as our adjustment generates evidence against a funding
gap, illustrated by a negative SRISK from the end of 2015 forth. At the same time though, the original
formula suggests that the systemic riskiness remains almost unchanged from its starting point in 2012.
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3.6 Robustness
We assess the robustness of our results through a plurality of additional tests. The underlying
principle we employ relates to the sensitivity of the parameters of the adjusted SRISK model.
As such, we start by investigating the influence of different return measures on LRMES and
hence SRISK. Our initial results are depicted using simple returns, and remain unchanged
when using logarithmic returns, as shown in Figures (3.3). Figure (3.5) in the appendix
shows both types of returns, and illustrates their similarities. Table (3.9) in the appendix
corroborates this characteristic by elaborating on the descriptive statistics of both return mea-
sures. While the means appear to be reasonably comparable, we have verified this numerically,
applying the Wilcoxon test statistic, which indicates no differences between the two distributions.
Another driver of our results might stem from the choice of the severity of the market downturn
that is used to calculate the LRMES. We have employed the most conservative estimate in our
baseline results, by investigating the impact of the 99th percentile of the loss distribution, and
hence the most extreme values. Our results remain unchanged, when employing more broader
definitions, such as the 95th percentile, as illustrated in Figure (3.4).
Furthermore, we winsorise the variables of our regression at the 1st and 99th percentile as a means
of robustness check. Tables (3.4) and (3.5) reiterate our results, as discussed in Section (3.5),
and hence disperses concerns that our results might be driven by severe outliers. While the
influence of bank size becomes significant in the winsorised model, the underlying dynamics
remain the same. The direction of the variables is unchanged, while their economic significance
grows relative to the unrestricted models in Tables (3.2) and (3.3).
Although the results of the modified Wald test suggest homoscedasticity, we have assessed
the influence of different clusters for our reported standard errors. We found no differences
compared to the results in Tables (3.2) and (3.3).
The choice to set k to 8.00 % in the original SRISK formula, as used in Equation (3.2) and
thenceforth, originates from the Pillar I requirements of Basel II. We have reapplied it to
demonstrate the differences between the original SRISK formula and our methodology. In order
to assess the robustness of our results, we have furthermore adjusted k to more accurately
reflect the capital requirements in line with Basel III. In doing so, we accounted for two central
short-comings, compared to the work of Brownlees & Engle (2016). First, their approach uses
k to relate debt to equity. However, under the cited Basel II Accord, this threshold was used
to relate equity to RWA. Second, the last financial crisis has yielded substantial changes to
the regulatory framework. Generally, equity requirements have risen from the cited 8.00 % of
RWA to up to 16.50 % of RWA for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). Taking these
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Table 3.4: SRISK: Original Formula with Winsorisation
The Table below shows the coefficients and p-values (in parenthesis) of regressions with bank and time
fixed effects. The dependent variable is SRISK measuring systemic risk, calculated by the original
formula. The variables of interest are CoCoDebt and CoCoEquity, indicating the nominal amounts of
CoCo-bonds accounted for as debt, respectively as equity. All independent variables are one year
lagged in order to disperse simultaneity concerns. Our regressors are winsorised at the 1st and 99th
percentile. p-values in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Model Model Model
(1) (2) (3)
CoCoDebt -0.0347 -0.0172 -0.0122
(0.0807) (0.3964) (0.5556)
CoCoEquity -0.8270∗∗∗ -0.7594∗∗∗ -0.7533∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Size 1,726.4195∗∗ 2,383.6811∗∗∗
(0.0101) (0.0016)
LR 434.4730∗∗∗ 407.4773∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
ROA -91.9835 -95.9905
(0.7527) (0.7471)
ROID 2,285.1510 2,374.9800
(0.1340) (0.1302)
GDPUSD -0.1578∗
(0.0441)
GDPGrowth 181.2602
(0.0759)
Inflation 6.8955
(0.8973)
C2GDP -2.7077
(0.6802)
Constant 6,767.5692∗∗∗ -20,148.3953∗∗ -21,356.4799∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0081) (0.0063)
N 756 756 756
R2w 0.1934 0.2467 0.2541
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Table 3.5: SRISK: Adjusted Formula with Winsorisation
The Table below shows the coefficients and p-values (in parenthesis) of regressions with bank and time
fixed effects. The dependent variable is SRISK measuring systemic risk, calculated by the adjusted
formula. The variables of interest are CoCoDebt and CoCoEquity, indicating the nominal amounts of
CoCo-bonds accounted for as debt, respectively as equity. All independent variables are one year
lagged in order to disperse simultaneity concerns. Our regressors are winsorised at the 1st and 99th
percentile. p-values in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Model Model Model
(1) (2) (3)
CoCoDebt -1.1424∗∗∗ -1.1313∗∗∗ -1.1295∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
CoCoEquity -0.7633∗∗∗ -0.7109∗∗∗ -0.7038∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Size 1,931.0300∗∗ 2,319.1990∗∗
(0.0117) (0.0070)
LR 360.9806∗∗∗ 343.2366∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0003)
ROA -237.0505 -214.1672
(0.4770) (0.5293)
ROID 1,982.3693 2,092.0286
(0.2546) (0.2436)
GDPUSD -0.1360
(0.1289)
GDPGrowth 171.1863
(0.1426)
Inflation 44.3529
(0.4680)
C2GDP 2.5344
(0.7359)
Constant 6,808.6952∗∗∗ -20,974.7265∗ -21,101.8953∗
(0.0000) (0.0138) (0.0150)
N 756 756 756
R2w 0.8179 0.8261 0.8272
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deliberations into account, we have re-evaluated Equations (3.2) and (3.3) using a k of 14.22 %.
This number was obtained by dividing the median value of equity by the median value of RWA
as observed in our sample. It constitutes a more severe scenario, as the likelihood of a funding
gap to occur has now grown, due to the larger k. The results are depicted in Figures (3.6) and
(3.7) in the appendix and show the same trend as described in Section (3.5). Our amended
SRISK measure continues to decline with new issuances of CoCo-capital. At the same time, the
old measure remains arguably static at a level of approximately 27 billion USD.
3.7 Conclusion
We start this paper by raising an important issue that has not received the attention of the
regulator, as need be. Since the 2008 financial crisis, the issuance of hybrid capital, with
CoCo-bonds being the most prominent source of it, has seen stellar growth. Given its rising
importance, it is only prudent to investigate, how this capital type impacts systemic risk.
Current measures of systemic risk, are mostly build around accounting measures, and fail to
differentiate between capital types except for debt and equity. As such, the widespread SRISK
measure is no exception to the rule. We believe, that this failure to acknowledge more granular
characteristics leads to a biased view on the actual systemic risk. Indeed, our analysis shows that
systemic risk is overestimated, when employing the SRISK measure, because the loss absorbing
capacity of debt-CoCos, which are the most prevalent CoCo-bonds in our sample, is omitted.
As a result, regulators might look to the wrong banks in times of crisis. Under the current
calculation, certain banks may show a funding gap, which suggests them to be instable, whereas
the opposite is true.
We remedy this short-coming by proposing an alternative calculation of SRISK in Equation (3.3)
in order to correctly grasp the de facto systemic risk of an individual bank. By employing the
trigger-assumption, we assume that all issued CoCo-bonds are converted on their issuance. In
this way, we eliminate the perverse disparities in SRISK, which are solely due to a different
accounting treatment. As a result, we derive a holistic framework in which both kinds of
CoCo-bonds provide additional loss absorbing capacity. This equal treatment is particularly
justified in light of the otherwise equal regulatory treatment of CoCo-bonds. We empirically
find that both, equity-CoCos as well as debt-CoCos reduce a bank’s contribution to systemic
risk. Moreover, our adjustments allow us to show that banks, which rely on debt-CoCos, are
less systemically risky than provided by the old calculation scheme, and do not necessarily have
a funding gap. Consequently, we prevent the regulator from deriving wrong conclusions due to
an inconsistent metric.
Future research should reinstate our findings for an even broader population of CoCo-bonds.
Likewise, it would be desirable to look at more frequent data if available. Moreover, the
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generalised assumption of the SRISK formula that all liabilities will be withdrawn in times of
crises might be partially unrealistic and hence should be revisited. In particular, the implicit
assumption of a homogeneous reaction of deposits and other types of short-term debt is
problematic. Deposit base theory motivates that even in times of financial distress a certain
volume of deposits remains permanently available. The regulatory ’Net Stable Funding Ratio’
accounts for these differences between various types of liabilities, considering 90 - 95 % of retail
deposits to be available as means of stable funding, whereas a maximum amount of 50 % of
other private short-term debt is considered stable. In this way, the SRISK formula should be
adjusted to account for differences in the availability of funding sources.
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3.8 Appendix
Table 3.6: Accounting of CoCo-Bonds by Accounting Standard
The Table below provides a breakdown of CoCo-bonds’ accounting treatment by the applied accounting
framework. In opposition to IFRS, GAAP denotes the multitude of local accounting standards.
GAAP IFRS Percentage
Liability 134.00 231.00 68.48 %
Equity 6.00 162.00 31.52 %
Percentage 26.27 % 73.73 % 100.00 %
Table 3.7: Accounting of CoCo-Bonds by Capital Tier
The Table provides a breakdown of CoCo-bonds’ accounting treatment by regulatory capital tier.
Though, the distribution between AT1 and T2 is nearly equal, we observe visible differences for the
accounting treatment. CoCo-bonds eligible as AT1 are rather classified as equity on the balance sheet.
The reason for this tendency is the more equity like features of the regulatory minimum requirements
to AT1-capital. On the other hand, CoCo-bonds which are only eligible as T2-capital are always
classified as debt in our sample.
AT1 T2 Percentage
Liability 107.00 258.00 68.48 %
Equity 168.00 0.00 31.52 %
Percentage 51.59 % 48.41 % 100.00 %
Table 3.8: Accounting of CoCo-Bonds by CoCo Characteristic
The Table provides a breakdown of CoCo-bonds’ accounting treatment by their loss absorption
mechanism. We find, that though both loss absorption mechanisms allow accounting classification as
debt and equity, PWD-bonds have a higher tendency to be accounted for as debt.
C2E PWD Percentage
Liability 124.00 241.00 68.48 %
Equity 79.00 89.00 31.52 %
Percentage 38.09 % 61.91 % 100.00 %
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Figure 3.5: Histograms of Different Return Definitions
The left graph shows a histogram of the distribution of simple stock returns. The right graph illustrates
the distribution of logarithmic stock returns.
Table 3.9: Summary Statistics of Returns
As can also be seen in Figure (3.5), simple returns yield slightly smaller negative values while positive
values are notably larger, compared to logarithmic returns. Generally speaking, simple returns appears
to be left-skewed, whereas the opposite is true for logarithmic returns. The standard deviations of
both measures are comparable in terms of size.
N Min Mean Max Std. Dev.
simple Returns 45,862 -0.4595 0.0013 0.9298 0.0400
logarithmic Returns 45,862 -0.6152 0.0005 0.6574 0.0398
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Figure 3.6: Comparison of SRISK with Simple and Logarithmic Returns at the 99th
Percentile Computed with an Alternative k
The Figure above reinstates the findings made in Figure (3.3). However, we have changed the capital
requirement k from 8.00 % as in the original paper to 14.22 % as we would obtain it from the data
in our sample. This adjustment constitutes a more severe scenario, as a higher value of k makes the
occurrence of a funding gap more likely (recall Equation (3.2)). We find that this alternation does
not lead to negative values in terms of SRISK in our new formula, it nevertheless correctly grasps the
reduction in systemic risk that can be attributed to the issuance of CoCo-bonds.
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Figure 3.7: Comparison of SRISK with Simple and Logarithmic Returns at the 95th
Percentile Computed with an Alternative k
The Figure above reinstates the findings made in Figure (3.6). Changing the severity of the market
downturn, as we have done between Figures (3.3) and (3.4) with the old k, does not drive our results,
as indicated by the absence of noteworthy differences.
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4.1 Introduction
Sustainability and mitigating climate change has become one of the most pressing issues for
society. Movements such as “Fridays for Future” have recently contributed to the publicly
perceived relevance of sustainability. From a business perspective, sustainability has also become
increasingly relevant, being enforced by specific policies and regulations on a multinational
level. By the adoption of the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda 2030 and the
signing of the Paris Agreement (2015), the international community commits itself to climate
protection and sustainability (United Nations (2015)). To meet the goals set in the Paris
Agreement, a transformation of the old “brown” economic system to a low-carbon circular
economy is necessary. Beyond the necessity to adjust to political requirements, sustainability
can also be seen as a marketing opportunity in light of increasingly conscious consumers (TCFD
(2017)). The actual meaning of sustainability remains, however, often unclear in the public
debate. A widely recognised definition of sustainability is a broad understanding, not only
limited to ecological issues. Instead, sustainability is often used synonymously with corporate
social responsibility (CSR). CSR is a well established term for a management concept which
integrates environmental, social, and ethical aspects of business operations into the firm’s
decision-making process (Sassen et al. (2016)). In practice, CSR is often operationalised on
the basis of environmental – social – governance (ESG) scores (Chollet & Sandwidi (2018),
Nofsinger et al. (2009)).
From an investors perspective, the key question of sustainable action is how it affects risk
and return. Extant literature identifies a negative relationship between CSR and firm risk
(Gramlich & Finster (2013)). Still, it remains unclear why risk is reduces and what determines
the risk-reduction. We investigate this very question, by analysing the impact of CSR on
idiosyncratic bank risk in detail. Our study is based on a data set of 2,452 banks from 115
countries in the period from 2002 to 2018. We use Thomson Reuters ESG-scores to measure
banks’ CSR. This granular data enables us to analyse the effects at different levels. In this way,
we contribute to the literature in two particular ways. First, we break down the risk-reducing
effect into the detailed CSR-components. More precisely, we conduct an in-depth analysis of the
relationship between CSR and bank risk by decomposing CSR into three pillars (environmental
- social - governance) and ten sub-components. Thus, we can identify the underlying specific
drivers of the risk-reduction. Second, we set a clear focus on banks, whose interdependencies of
CSR and idiosyncratic risk have been sparsely investigated so far (Gangi et al. (2019)). We
address banks’ specific characteristics by using different accounting-based risk measures. In
detail, we quantify a bank’s default risk as well as its portfolio risk. The focus on banks is highly
relevant, because the financial system plays a key role in the economic transformation process
to a resource-efficient economy. Financial institutions provide the economy with capital and
thus foster long-term economic growth (King & Levine (1993), Levine & Zervos (1998), Beck &
Levine (2004)). In this way, financial institutions contribute to the transformation process, for
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example, by allocating more capital into sustainable investment projects. The consideration
of banks is even more relevant in light of the current discussion about the so-called “Green
Supporting Factor” to foster investments in “green” assets, a regulatory privilege of sustainable
investment projects (European Commission (2018)).
Our analysis proves a significant risk-reducing effect for the overall CSR comprising all three
pillars. Further, we show empirical evidence that the environmental pillar significantly deter-
mines the risk-reduction. On a sub-component level, we investigate the driving factors in detail.
The social pillar and governance pillar do not show comparably significant effects. Therefore,
we conclude that not all three CSR-dimensions but in particular the environmental engagement
influences banks’ idiosyncratic risk.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The subsequent section presents bank-specific
CSR-literature. In this way, we highlight that the relationship between CSR and bank risk has
been a blank spot on the research map so far. Based thereon, we elaborate on the relevant
theory to explain the connection between CSR and idiosyncratic risk. Consequently, we develop
our research hypotheses. Section (4.3) provides a summary of the sample, the dataset, and the
methodology applied. Section (4.4) presents the results. The results of several robustness checks
are presented in section (4.5). Finally, section (4.6) summarises the main insights and aspects
of further research areas.
4.2 Literature and Hypotheses
4.2.1 Bank related literature
In times of globalisation and climate change, CSR attracts increasing public interest. However,
the term CSR is not universally defined.2 According to the United Nations, CSR is a “manage-
ment concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business
operations and interactions with their stakeholders. CSR is generally understood as being the
way through which a company achieves a balance of economic, environmental and social impera-
tives (“Triple-Bottom-Line-Approach”), while at the same time addressing the expectations
of shareholders and stakeholders.” (United Nations Industrial Development Organization (2020)).
For banks, CSR is even more important, first, because of their specific business activities and,
second, due to the loss of confidence in the wake of the global financial crisis in 2008 (Nandy &
Lodh (2012), Marie Lauesen (2013), Hurley et al. (2014)). In contrast to the manufacturing
2Related concepts such as e.g. corporate sustainability, corporate social performance, or social performance
are subsumed under the term CSR.
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industry, banks offer primarily services, i.e. intangible products. Given the fact, that the
majority of clients have no financial know-how, banks’ reputation and trust are valuable assets
(Soana (2011)). The grievances that emerged more than ten years ago in the wake of the
financial crisis play a crucial role in this context: Governments around the world rescued local
banks from bankruptcy with taxpayers’ money to avert further negative effects on the financial
stability, the real economy and the society (Bayazitova & Shivdasani (2012), Iannotta et al.
(2013), Hryckiewicz (2014)). In this light, the business practices of banks with an intention of
short-term profit maximisation were at the centre of criticism (Wu & Shen (2013)). Nevertheless,
even in the post-crisis years, large capital market-oriented banks attracted attention again by
scandals such as the Libor manipulation (Fouquau & Spieser (2015), Ko¨ster & Pelster (2017)).
Altogether, this resulted in a historical loss of reputation and trust for the banking sector
(Esteban-Sanchez et al. (2017)). For these reasons, there is a particular public interest in banks’
CSR.
Also in scientific research, CSR is a “hot topic”. A large number of studies examines the
manifold facets and implications of CSR for non-financial companies (Orlitzky & Benjamin
(2001), Margolis et al. (2007), Friede et al. (2015)). Meta- and survey studies state that research
on CSR in the financial sector is comparatively rare (Goyal et al. (2013), Gramlich & Finster
(2013), Wang et al. (2016)). The majority of these bank-specific CSR-studies focusses on
Financial Performance (FP).3 Wu & Shen (2013) examine the impact of CSR on banks’ FP
as well as the deeper motives of the underlying CSR-engagement. Based on the bank profit
function, which reflects both costs and possible benefits of CSR, they find a positive influence on
banks’ FP. In this context, strategic motives are seen as the primary driving force behind banks’
commitment to CSR, whereas CSR-activities motivated by greenwashing or altruistic motives
generate costs that are not offset by additional financial benefits. In line with these findings,
also Shen et al. (2016) report positive empirical evidence of CSR on FP for banks worldwide.
Taking up this research, Cornett et al. (2016) analyse the CSR-effects on FP for banks around
the financial crisis (2008) and report also a significant positive effect on FP. Their results are
robust to different CSR-definitions and performance measures. According to Scholtens & Dam
(2007), the FP of banks that apply the Equator Principles (EP)4 does not differ significantly
compared to non-adopters. Finger et al. (2018) study the EP-adoption effects on banks’ FP in
industrialised and developing countries. They find no significant improvement in FP for banks
in developed countries in the short and medium-term, but a decline in FP in the long run for
banks in developing countries. In addition, Chen et al. (2018) demonstrate that banks adopting
the EP are stronger in terms of liquidity than non-applying banks. Aside from the manifold
literature on FP, from a risk perspective, only Gangi et al. (2019) postulate that the bank’s
3FP can be measured in different ways. For example, return on assets, return on equity, net interest income,
and non-interest income are widely used as indicators of banks’ FP.
4The Equator Principles are a voluntary risk management framework that establishes a commitment of banks
to integrate environmental and social aspects into project finance decisions. Since the first application in 2003,
almost 100 financial institutions have implemented the EP.
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insolvency risk decreases as its environmental commitment increases. Obviously, the effects of
CSR on risk have so far been only sparsely investigated for banks.
4.2.2 Theoretical Framework
In general, the term “risk” denotes “uncertainty about outcomes or events, especially with
respect to the future.” (Orlitzky & Benjamin (2001)). Based thereon, firm risk is defined as
“risk inherent in a firm’s operations as a result of external or internal factors that can affect
a firm’s profitability.” (Jo & Na (2012)). Firm risk consists of systematic risk (market risk)
and unsystematic risk (idiosyncratic risk). Company parameters such as profitability (Wei
& Zhang (2006)), ownership structure (Xu & Malkiel (2003)), growth prospects (Cao et al.
(2006)), or corporate governance (Ferreira & Laux (2007)) are identified as relevant determinants
of idiosyncratic risk. CSR represents a specific company characteristic and affects, therefore,
idiosyncratic firm risk (Lee & Faff (2009)). This section provides an overview of the established
theories used to explain the relationship between CSR and idiosyncratic firm risk in principle.
The interaction of CSR and firm risk can be explained by risk management theory. Risk manage-
ment includes the identification, measurement, control, and reduction of risks related to business
activities. CSR includes the management of ecological, social, and ethical aspects and influences
idiosyncratic firm risk both directly and indirectly (Bouslah et al. (2013), Vishwanathan et al.
(2019)). CSR-components such as the reduction of emissions or environmental pollution, the
(voluntary) adaptation of guidelines (e.g. Fair Trade, EP), the compliance with human rights or
health and safety regulations directly reduce the risk of lawsuits, damages, or compensation
payments (strategic risk management) (Bouslah et al. (2018)). Furthermore, CSR creates moral
capital and goodwill (indirect risk-reduction). Particularly in times of crisis, moral capital
acts as a protection mechanism and alleviates the negative feedback effects of external events
(Godfrey et al. (2009)). Consequently, CSR reduces the vulnerability to financial, operating,
environmental, and social risks, and thus reduces idiosyncratic firm risk (McGuire et al. (1988),
Feldman et al. (1997), Sharfman & Fernando (2008)).
Reputation theory builds on the public opinion about the firm to explain the effect of CSR
on firm risk (Lins et al. (2017)). According to Fombrun (2002), “corporate reputation is the
collective representation of a company’s past actions and future prospects that describes how
key resource providers interpret a company’s initiatives and assess its ability to deliver valued
outcomes.”. Within this framework, CSR is seen as an investment that can enhance a company’s
reputation (Jiao (2010)). Empirical evidence indicates that companies benefit in various ways
from a high reputation (B. K. Boyd et al. (2010)). These firms are seen as very attractive to
employees and this helps in recruiting high-quality staff (Turban & Greening (1997), Greening &
Turban (2000)). Moreover, customers favour their products and are willing to pay a higher price
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(Homburg et al. (2005)). The higher implied earnings are associated with lower idiosyncratic
firm risk. Aside from customers, investors prefer companies with a good reputation as well (Arya
& Zhang (2009), Vishwanathan et al. (2019)). Nevertheless, it is important to remember that
reputation is a very fragile construct, based essentially on values, norms, and trust. Ignoring
or violating these values and norms can destroy reputation permanently. This means that
reputation creates a disciplining effect in terms of compliance with these norms in business
operations and lowers risk appetite (Delgado-Garc´ıa et al. (2013)). In short, reputation theory
assumes a negative impact of CSR on idiosyncratic firm risk.
Stakeholder theory represents a strategic management approach that calls for active management
of the relationship with stakeholders. The idea of this theory is to integrate and balance the
various stakeholder interests in the corporate management process. CSR is a relevant dimension
of high-quality management and serves as a protection of the various stakeholder interests
involved (Donaldson & Preston (1995), Waddock & Graves (1997), Frooman (1999), Freeman
(2010)). Assuming the relevant stakeholders benefit from CSR-actions, due to “stakeholder
reciprocity” the company itself profits. For example, a fair payment, qualifications, and secure
working conditions enhance the motivation of employees as well as their company commitment,
and finally the productivity (Jones (1995), Brammer et al. (2007), Verwijmeren & Derwall
(2010), De Roeck et al. (2016)). These examples illustrate directly that CSR improves FP and,
thus, reduces firm risk indirectly. CSR-reporting also reduces information asymmetries, and
this can lead to more attractive financing options and conditions (Dhaliwal et al. (2011), Cui et
al. (2018)). Also, CSR-companies fulfil upcoming regulations and requirements comparatively
easily (Vishwanathan et al. (2019)). In the long term, the partnership between a company and
its stakeholders deepens and becomes more intensive (El Akremi et al. (2018)). In short, this
approach indicates a mitigating effect of CSR on idiosyncratic firm risk.
CSR is often criticised as a marketing instrument that is used for image promotion or personal
benefits by the management itself (managerial opportunism theory) (Marquis & Qian (2013),
Wickert et al. (2016)). For example, there is an incentive for the management to reduce CSR-
investments in good times to improve FP and to benefit from performance-based remuneration.
In economically weaker times, CSR-expenses are even increased to ensure shareholder support
or as a justification for a lower FP (Bouslah et al. (2013)). The underlying problem here is that
CSR-activity is not associated with fundamental changes within the company (“Greenwashing”)
and CSR-costs are not matched by any additional benefits (Preston & O’bannon (1997)). In
this way, managerial opportunism theory motivates a positive relationship between CSR and
idiosyncratic firm risk, which is in contrast to the theories described above.
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4.2.3 Hypotheses
Central Banks, the European Commission, and supervisory authorities call for a better inte-
gration of ESG-risks by banks (European Commission (2018), Bank of England (2018), NGFS
(2019), EBA (2019)). Following up, we address the issue of ESG-risks and study the relationship
between CSR and idiosyncratic bank risk in detail. In this way, our study contributes to both
the bank-specific CSR-literature strand (e.g. Wu & Shen (2013), Cornett et al. (2016), Finger
et al. (2018)) and the literature on CSR and firm risk in general (e.g. Oikonomou et al. (2012),
Albuquerque et al. (2018)).
Especially for banks, climate change creates a number of risks. These so-called “sustainability
risks” can be divided into “environment-related” risks and “climate-related” risks. The former
is defined as risks arising from environmental degradation such as pollution, water scarcity, or
land contamination. In contrast, the latter include physical and transitory risks associated with
climate change (NGFS (2019)). Physical risks are subdivided into acute risks (e.g. extreme
weather events such as hurricanes) and chronic risks (i.e. long-term phenomena such as sea-level
rise). Transition risks occur as part of the transition to a resource-efficient circular economy. In
detail, they include “policy and legal risks”, i.e. the effects of political measures to mitigate
climate change (e.g. CO2-tax) or regulatory changes. As part of the transition, technological
progress is associated with an extremely disruptive potential that threatens the existence of
established technologies and industries. This development is also accompanied by demand and
supply changes as well as reputation risks (TCFD (2017), Mies & Menk (2019)). The influ-
ence of sustainability risks on the established bank risk types is steadily increasing (EBA (2019)).
Political requirements, technological progress, and changes in customer preferences threaten
“brown” business models (e.g. replacement of the combustion engine) or, in extreme cases,
investments lose their earnings-capacity before the end of their useful life (“stranded assets”, e.g.
nuclear power plants) (NGFS (2019)). This development jeopardises i.a. the business model
of automotive manufacturers, suppliers, or energy providers. Furthermore, the ability of these
companies to repay loans appears more than questionable and thus constitutes a credit risk and
market price risk for the bank. For specialised banks, this can, in extreme cases, pose a threat
to their business model. Additionally, natural disasters are an operational as well as a liquidity
risk for banks. For example, this could be the flooding of branches or computer centres or a
massive outflow of customer deposits as a result of a natural disaster (Bank of England (2018),
BaFin (2020)). Apart from the environmental risk factors, banks’ social as well as governance
aspects are also important. Specific action to reduce social risks could be e.g. the rejection of
funding for disreputable sectors such as the arms industry or companies that violate labour and
human rights standards. Moreover, the guarantee of data protection, anti-corruption programs,
and tax-compliance (e.g. cum-ex) contribute to the reduction of governance-specific risks in
banks.
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The examples above underline the interaction of ESG-risks and banks’ idiosyncratic default and
portfolio risk. Reputation theory assumes a restrictive and selective lending process (Nandy &
Lodh (2012)). Studies point out that banks with a high reputation in comparison to banks with
a low reputation are characterised by a more rigorous credit assessment (Chemmanur & Fulghieri
(1994)). As a result, these banks tend to have higher profitability and high-quality and less
risky assets than their competitors (Bushman & Wittenberg-Moerman (2012)). Other scientific
studies confirm this relationship. For example, Billett et al. (1995) and Ross (2010) illustrate
that stock returns of borrowers of banks with a high reputation showed a positive reaction at the
time of a credit announcement. Consequently, the reputation theory suggests that CSR reduces
idiosyncratic bank risk (Wu & Shen (2013)). Risk management theory indicates that banks
anticipate such risks at an early stage, also through CSR. Concerning non-financial companies,
Orlitzky & Benjamin (2001) postulate in their meta-study that higher CSR is associated with
lower financial risk. Also, Luo & Bhattacharya (2009) find empirical evidence for the risk
management hypothesis and confirm a negative relationship between CSR and firm risk.
Based on the empirical evidence described above, analogous to non-financial companies, as well
as the theoretical concepts like risk management theory, reputation theory, and stakeholder
theory, we assume that CSR and bank idiosyncratic risk are related as follows:
Hypothesis 1. Overall CSR reduces idiosyncratic bank risk.
Idiosyncratic risk interacts differently with each CSR-pillar (environmental – social – governance).
Therefore, a more granular analysis is warranted (Bouslah et al. (2013), Girerd-Potin et al.
(2014), Chollet & Sandwidi (2018)).
As previously described, environmental aspects impact idiosyncratic bank risk. The environ-
mental pillar is determined by the usage of exhaustible resources, the release of emissions in the
business process, and an innovative and sustainable product portfolio. For instance, banks can
link their lending practices to environmental criteria. By adjusting the bank’s portfolio early to
future environmental expectations by law-makers and society, banks can anticipate future needs
for adjustment and pre-empt associated costs. In line with risk management theory, we argue
that investing in sustainable technologies and businesses is comparatively less risky, especially
if they concern state-sponsored or highly subsidised businesses (Shane & Spicer (1983)). A
lower portfolio risk also implies a lower default risk of the bank, because of more stable income
streams. Moreover, reputation theory can explain higher and less volatile income streams and,
hence, lower default risk. Environmental engagement is particularly predestined to improve the
reputation of the bank. Stakeholder theory and reputation theory provide additional motivation
for banks to engage in policies that enhance the environmental performance. Therefore, we
expect sustainable banks to be less risky.
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Social aspects are similarly relevant, especially to improve the image and reputation of the bank.
Components of the social pillar such as working conditions or qualification measures indicate the
quality of the bank’s endeavours to promote and appreciate its employees and society. Because
banking is a servicing business, and therefore reliant on good relationships with the workforce
and customers, the social performance can have direct implications for the bank’s portfolio
management performance and risk. As an expression of social responsibility, banks in the United
States have deferred interest and principal payments for affected borrowers in the aftermath
of hurricane “Sandy”(BusinessWire (2012)). Similar to environmental engagement, reputation
theory and stakeholder theory explain why banks are keen to improve their social image. As a
result of a better reputation, we expect those banks with a higher social performance to have
higher and more stable income streams, which lead to a lower default risk.
Besides, governance practices are seen as particularly important in the context of bank risk
(John et al. (2008)). The governance pillar comprises effective management, efficient and
transparent decision-making processes, and the involvement of shareholders. Management and
shareholders are key actors in the implementation of a sustainability philosophy and strategy.
Therefore, consistent with risk management theory and stakeholder theory, we expect banks
with a good governance to be less failure-prone and behave more disciplined concerning their
portfolio compositions.
In sum, this raises the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Each single CSR-pillar (environmental – social – governance) has a reducing
effect on idiosyncratic bank risk.
Our third hypothesis is primarily motivated by reputation theory. Reputation is particularly
prone to controversies, misconduct, and scandals. For instance, the manipulation of the reference
interest rate Libor or the selling of supposedly sustainable financial products (“greenwashing”)
threatens banks’ reputation and results mostly in litigation and financial penalties (Wu & Shen
(2013), ECB (2016), BaFin (2020)). The majority of studies in this area analyses the effects
of controversies on profitability and stock performance (Koku & Qureshi (2006), Ko¨ster &
Pelster (2017)). Further studies investigate the extent to which shareholders have benefited from
corporate misconduct (Bhagat et al. (1998), Haslem (2005)). Beyond that, the implications of
controversies and fines for corporate policy and governance practices have been examined (Fich
& Shivdasani (2007), Nguyen et al. (2016)). Following on the empirical evidence (Murphy et al.
(2009)), we assess the effects of controversies on banks’ risk profiles. We assume that banks
with a better reputation show lower levels of idiosyncratic risk. In this way, we propose based
on reputation theory, risk management theory, and stakeholder theory:
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Hypothesis 3. Controversies enhance idiosyncratic bank risk.
4.3 Empirical Approach
4.3.1 Sample and data
We perform an empirical analysis in order to test the hypotheses stated above. Our sample
consists of 2,452 banks worldwide, provided by Thomson Reuters’ Eikon for the TRBC-sector
“Banking Services”. In total, the sample comprises banks from 115 countries around the world.
Nearly a third are headquartered in the United States. From the same data source, we collect
fundamental data as well as ESG-scores on an annual level. ESG-scores are used to quantify
banks’ CSR. The Thomson Reuters ESG-database offers data on 400 different ESG-metrics for
over 7,000 companies worldwide, including banks, since 2002. On an aggregate level, differenti-
ated scores for the three pillars (environmental – social – governance) of the total ESG-score
as well as scores on each sub-component of each pillar are provided. The composition of the
ESG-score is illustrated in Figure (4.1). In addition to the ESG-scores, a Controversies-score is
reported.
Figure 4.1: Composition of the Thomson Reuters ESG-Score
The graph shows the break-down of the ESG-score into its three pillars and its ten sub-components, as
well as their weightings in the total score.
The availability of the ESG-scores is the restricting factor of our time series, not being available
before 2002. In order to enable the calculation of metrics like the standard deviation of return
on assets (ROA), we collect additional fundamental data from 1997 to 2002. To control for
country-specific effects, we retrieve macroeconomic data from the WorldBank-database. Our
final dataset comprises longitudinal data on 582 banks from 2002 to 2018. Figure (4.2) in the
appendix provides information about the origin of the banks. To ensure that our results are not
driven by severe outliers and single erroneous data points, the data is winsorised at the 1st and
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the 99th percentile. Winsorisation is not applied to dummy variables and data on ESG-scores,
because they are subject to multiple checks and controls by Thomson Reuters.
4.3.2 Dependent variable and risk measures
In order to measure the impact of CSR on bank risk, we focus on accounting-based risk measures.
In particular, we consider both banks’ idiosyncratic default risk and portfolio risk.
We approximate default risk by different specifications of the z-score (J. H. Boyd et al. (1993),
Laeven & Levine (2009)). The z-score compares a bank’s ROA plus its capital adequacy ratio
(CAR) with the standard deviation of ROA. CAR is defined as the ratio of equity to total assets
(Houston et al. (2010)). We calculate the standard deviation of ROA for rolling windows of 5
years in our baseline scenario.5 Thus, the z-score is defined as the number of standard deviations
the ROA has to drop below its mean until equity is entirely depleted. In this way, the z-score
represents a measure of the risk that a bank becomes insolvent. The higher the z-score, the
more secure is the bank.
z-scorei,t =
(ROAi,t + CARi,t)
σ(ROAi,t)
(4.1)
Portfolio risk is approximated by the risk density (RD). RD is calculated as the amount of
risk-weighted assets (RWA) over total assets reported on the balance sheet (Le Lesle´ & Avramova
(2012), Baule & Tallau (2016)). RWA are reported by the banks as a key regulatory indicator
necessary to compute risk-sensitive regulatory capital adequacy ratios. In order to compute
RWA, banks multiply each asset with a regulatory risk-weight. RD is therefore supposed to
reflect the total riskiness of a banks’ assets.
RDi,t =
Risk-weighted-assetsi,t
Total-assetsi,t
(4.2)
Table (4.12) in the appendix summarises all the variables used in this study. Descriptive
statistics on the risk measures based on non-winsorised data are provided in Panel A of Table
(4.1).
4.3.3 ESG-Scores and control variables
We approximate the CSR of a bank by its Thomson Reuters ESG-scores. Thereby, we differen-
tiate the three pillars constituting the overall score, and for each sub-component within each
5There is no consensus about the adequate time frame of the rolling window in the literature (Schulte &
Winkler (2019)). Five years, however, is a widely recognised horizon. We apply a ten year time frame in the
robustness section as well.
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pillar. This enables us to perform an impact driver analysis for each of the ten sub-components,
in order to identify the roots of the effect on risk. Furthermore, the Controversies-score measures
a bank’s involvement in ESG-controversies, scandals, or negative media coverage.
Descriptive statistics on the ESG-score and its three pillars are provided in Panel B of Table
(4.1). All the scores, as well as its sub-components, are standardised between 0 and 100. A
visible and important insight for the statistical analysis is that the distributions of the scores
have variation and are not static. Table (4.13) in the appendix provides additional information
on the correlation of the three pillars and the risk measures.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Variables Included
This table provides summary statistics on the variables considered in the analysis. The statistics are
based on the original non-winsorised data. Panel A shows the statistics of the risk measures, Panel B
of the ESG-score and its pillars, and Panel C of the bank specific control variables included.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES N min 1% 50% mean 99% max sd
Panel A:
z-score 28,448 -1,643.14 -1.15 25.03 50.95 248.58 843,312.16 767.28
RD 12,214 0.00 5.10 64.97 79.05 109.95 593,103.43 904.21
Panel B:
ESG-score 4,189 12.30 18.22 48.02 50.78 88.95 93.53 18.93
EnvPillar 4,189 7.67 15.09 45.65 50.90 95.37 98.10 24.81
SocPillar 4,189 2.65 9.35 49.21 50.58 94.38 98.01 21.57
GovPillar 4,189 1.72 9.00 51.27 50.88 91.16 99.52 21.79
Controversies 4,189 0.08 0.88 59.00 49.47 66.67 69.05 20.66
Panel C:
logFTE 21,624 0.00 2.30 6.88 6.91 11.91 13.13 2.09
LR 31,362 -1,470,796.00 -120.63 834.00 1,162.91 3,631.48 3,579,500.00 29,061.10
LoanRatio 23,323 -20.34 2.21 63.10 62.92 89.52 60,528.52 396.32
DepRatio 23,435 0.00 7.54 77.98 77.09 93.18 81,571.68 532.62
ROE 31,489 -278,250.00 -108.56 11.94 9.43 82.89 56,620.89 1,708.63
In order to mitigate omitted variable bias, we use several bank and country-specific control
variables in the multivariate regression models. Bank specific are variables, which characterise a
particular bank. In contrast, macroeconomic variables are not specific to a particular bank, but
specific to a group of banks, e.g. country-specific. On the bank level, we control for size, capital
structure, profitability, and the business model of banks. We approximate size by the natural
logarithm of full-time employees (logFTE). We use full-time employees instead of total assets
in order to reduce issues with multicollinearity.6 The bank’s capital structure is approximated
by the leverage ratio (LR) calculated as liabilities over equity, profitability as return on equity
(ROE). Based on the differentiation of business models by Ayadi et al. (2016), we also consider
the loans to assets ratio (LoanRatio) and the deposits to assets ratio (DepRatio). On the
6The choice of the size proxy does not affect our results. The explanatory power of our model and the
significance of the variables included does not differ substantially compared to the use of log total assets.
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country level, we control for inflation, GDP-growth (GDPGrowthCap ), and GDP per capita (GDPCap).
4.3.4 Methodology
In order to study the effect of CSR on idiosyncratic bank risk, we apply a series of univariate
and multivariate linear fixed effects (FE) regression model. The model is specified as follows:
Riski,t+1 = αi + δ ∗ ESGi,t + β ∗Xi,t + γ ∗ Yj,t + μt + i,t, (4.3)
while X comprises the bank specific variables and Y comprises the macroeconomic variables.
The indices indicate: i = bank; j = country; t = fiscalyear.
Riski,t indicates the observation of one of the risk measures used at a time t at bank i. ESGi,t
approximates the CSR of bank i at time t, and is specified as the ESG-score, one of its three
pillars, one of the ten sub-components, or the Controversies-score. The baseline models con-
sider one year lagged independent variables in order to mitigate endogeneity by a potential
reverse causality or simultaneity bias. The robustness section 4.5 considers a two-year lag as well.
The regression model is specified with bank and time fixed effects, to account for unobserved
heterogeneity that may be correlated with the explanatory variables. The Hausman-Test sug-
gests that coefficient estimates in fixed and random effects model are not alike and, therefore,
suggests the rejection of random effects. Robust Huber-White-sandwich estimates of variance
are used for the statistical analysis to account for group-wise heteroscedasticity in the residuals
of the regression models (Froot (1989), R. L. Williams (2000)).
4.4 Results
Table (4.2) summarises the results of simple OLS-regressions of idiosyncratic bank risk on the
overall ESG-score as a measure for banks’ total CSR. Models (1-3) show the results for the
z-score as a measure for default risk. Models (4-6) illustrate the results for RD as a measure
for portfolio risk. Models (1) and (4) depict univariate regression results, without any control
variables. The coefficient in Model (1) is positive and statistically significant on the 1 % level.
This indicates that the ESG-score in the previous year increases the z-score and therefore lowers
the default risk of the bank. Model (2) includes additionally bank specific control variables,
Model (3) includes country-specific control variables as well. Both coefficients remain positive
and highly statistically significant, supporting the result that the ESG-score increases the
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Table 4.2: Multivariate Robust FE Regressions of Risk on the ESG-Score
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of multivariate robust FE-
regressions. The dependent variables are the bank risk measures z-score and RD. The independent
variables are the ESG-score and bank and country specific control variables. The independent variables
are 1 year lagged. Significance is denoted at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), and 1% (∗∗∗) significance level. Data
is winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentile.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
z-score z-score z-score RD RD RD
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
L.ESG-score 0.8061∗∗∗ 0.7749∗∗∗ 0.6176∗∗∗ -0.1598∗∗∗ -0.1368∗ -0.1572∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
L.logFTE 0.1783 2.2885 -3.9859 -3.2291
(4.19) (4.12) (5.57) (5.74)
L.LR -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0000∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.LoanRatio 0.1448 0.1201 0.2757∗∗ 0.2782∗∗
(0.16) (0.16) (0.12) (0.12)
L.DepRatio 0.3383∗∗∗ 0.2507∗∗ -0.0977 -0.1013
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14)
L.ROE -0.0010∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗ -0.0001 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.Inflation -0.0277 0.0333
(0.35) (0.10)
L.GDPGrowthCap 1.2607
∗∗∗ 0.3616∗
(0.36) (0.19)
L.GDPCap 0.0016 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 6.3560 -24.7530 -91.1087∗ 70.3927∗∗∗ 96.1081 87.9577
(4.75) (39.97) (47.32) (2.78) (60.31) (61.69)
N 3,949 3,200 3,117 2,904 2,674 2,635
R2adj 0.0413 0.0450 0.0611 0.0059 0.0107 0.0119
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z-score, thereby reducing banks’ default risk. The coefficients in Model (4-6) for the effect
on RD are all negative and statistically significant. This indicates that CSR reduces the RD,
i.e. the portfolio risk of a bank. Model (4) for the univariate results implies significance on
the 1 % level. The results remain negative and statistically significant if bank specific control
variables are included (Model (5)) and if country-specific variables are included (Model (6)).
In general, the regression results are in line with risk management theory, reputation theory,
and stakeholder theory and support our first hypothesis that CSR reduces idiosyncratic bank risk.
Table 4.3: Multivariate Robust FE Regressions of Risk on the Environmental-Score
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of multivariate robust FE-
regressions. The dependent variables are the bank risk measures z-score and RD. The independent
variables are the ESG-environmental-pillar-score (EnvPillar) and bank and country specific control
variables. The independent variables are 1 year lagged. Significance is denoted at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗),
and 1% (∗∗∗) significance level. Data is winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentile.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
z-score z-score z-score RD RD RD
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
L.EnvPillar 0.5589∗∗∗ 0.5415∗∗∗ 0.4393∗∗∗ -0.1359∗∗∗ -0.1296∗∗∗ -0.1436∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
L.logFTE 0.8016 2.5585 -3.5049 -2.7782
(4.23) (4.13) (5.29) (5.43)
L.LR -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0000∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.LoanRatio 0.1412 0.1150 0.2854∗∗ 0.2880∗∗
(0.16) (0.16) (0.12) (0.12)
L.DepRatio 0.3986∗∗∗ 0.2990∗∗∗ -0.1142 -0.1204
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13)
L.ROE -0.0010∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗ -0.0000 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.Inflation -0.0440 0.0220
(0.35) (0.10)
L.GDPGrowthCap 1.2126
∗∗∗ 0.3633∗
(0.36) (0.19)
L.GDPCap 0.0016 0.0001
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 18.7935∗∗∗ -22.5995 -88.3094∗ 69.2300∗∗∗ 91.9350 83.2806
(3.52) (41.21) (47.69) (1.94) (58.49) (59.38)
N 3,949 3,200 3,117 2,904 2,674 2,635
R2adj 0.0402 0.0451 0.0622 0.0088 0.0138 0.0153
Tables (4.3–4.6) summarise the results for the breakdown analysis of the risk-reducing effect
of the total ESG-score for the three pillars it consists of. Tables (4.3–4.5) provide the results
of multivariate regressions for each of the three pillars. In each table, Models (1-3) depict
regression results for the z-score, whereas Models (4-6) show the results for RD. In Table
(4.3), we find highly significant effects for the environmental pillar in all six models. Not only
for the univariate results in Model (1) and Model (4) we find highly statistically significant
results in line with our expectation of hypothesis 2 that the environmental pillar should have a
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risk-reducing effect on a stand-alone basis. The coefficients remain statistically significant on the
1 % level and in line with expectation if bank specific control variables are included in Model (2)
and Model (5) and if country-specific control variables are considered in Model (3) and Model (6).
Table 4.4: Multivariate Robust FE Regressions of Risk on the Social-Score
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of multivariate robust FE-
regressions. The dependent variables are the bank risk measures z-score and RD. The independent
variables are the ESG-social-pillar-score (SocPillar) and bank and country specific control variables.
The independent variables are 1 year lagged. Significance is denoted at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), and 1%
(∗∗∗) significance level. Data is winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentile.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
z-score z-score z-score RD RD RD
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
L.SocPillar 0.5181∗∗∗ 0.4579∗∗∗ 0.2958∗∗∗ -0.0549 -0.0342 -0.0441
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
L.logFTE 4.1909 6.2426 -5.3885 -4.7190
(4.48) (4.43) (5.37) (5.53)
L.LR -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0000∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.LoanRatio 0.1876 0.1566 0.2643∗∗ 0.2680∗∗
(0.16) (0.17) (0.12) (0.12)
L.DepRatio 0.3390∗∗∗ 0.2475∗∗ -0.1040 -0.1070
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
L.ROE -0.0009∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗ -0.0001 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.Inflation -0.2096 0.0802
(0.35) (0.11)
L.GDPGrowthCap 1.1619
∗∗∗ 0.3823∗∗
(0.36) (0.19)
L.GDPCap 0.0018
∗ -0.0000
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 21.2068∗∗∗ -48.0482 -119.3424∗∗ 64.8943∗∗∗ 104.8033∗ 99.2207∗
(3.81) (43.38) (50.89) (1.87) (58.73) (59.85)
N 3,949 3,200 3,117 2,904 2,674 2,635
R2adj 0.0236 0.0278 0.0480 0.0006 0.0073 0.0079
Table (4.4) illustrates the results of the social pillar of the ESG-score. For the social pillar, the
results are not as unanimous as for the environmental pillar. Instead, the results depend on the
proxy of idiosyncratic risk. As for the environmental pillar, we find highly significant coefficients
in Models (1-3) for the social pillar on the z-score which approximates the banks’ default risk.
For the coefficients for RD in Models (4-6) approximating portfolio risk, however, we cannot
find statistical significance, even though the direction of the coefficients is in line with expectation.
Table (4.5) provides the results for the governance pillar of the ESG-score. Again, we find highly
significant coefficients in Models (1-3) for the governance pillar of the ESG-score. For the RD,
we only find statistical significance in the univariate Model (4). The results in Models (5-6)
including also bank-specific, respectively country-specific control variables show no statistical sig-
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nificance. Therefore, the environmental pillar is the only pillar with clear and unequivocal effects.
Table 4.5: Multivariate Robust FE Regressions of Risk on the Governance-Score
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of multivariate robust FE-
regressions. The dependent variables are the bank risk measures z-score and RD. The independent
variables are the ESG-governance-pillar-score (GovPillar) and bank and country specific control
variables. The independent variables are 1 year lagged. Significance is denoted at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗),
and 1% (∗∗∗) significance level. Data is winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentile.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
z-score z-score z-score RD RD RD
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
L.GovPillar 0.2886∗∗∗ 0.2710∗∗∗ 0.2264∗∗∗ -0.0727∗ -0.0474 -0.0502
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
L.logFTE 8.9838∗ 8.8121∗∗ -5.4582 -4.9101
(4.57) (4.40) (5.15) (5.30)
L.LR -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗ 0.0000 0.0000∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.LoanRatio 0.2188 0.1741 0.2614∗∗ 0.2638∗∗
(0.16) (0.17) (0.12) (0.12)
L.DepRatio 0.3234∗∗∗ 0.2268∗ -0.0936 -0.0959
(0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14)
L.ROE -0.0007∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗ -0.0001 -0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.Inflation -0.2330 0.0768
(0.36) (0.11)
L.GDPGrowthCap 1.2033
∗∗∗ 0.3689∗∗
(0.36) (0.19)
L.GDPCap 0.0019
∗ -0.0000
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 32.8002∗∗∗ -83.2546∗ -141.8616∗∗∗ 65.7275∗∗∗ 105.5128∗ 100.7562∗
(3.14) (45.56) (48.49) (2.00) (57.35) (58.12)
N 3,949 3,200 3,117 2,904 2,674 2,635
R2adj 0.0098 0.0203 0.0476 0.0021 0.0079 0.0084
So far, we found that the risk-reducing effect differs between the pillars. The environmental
pillar shows the strongest effects in magnitude and significance. All pillars reduce default risk
measured by the z-score. In addition, the environmental pillar also affects the portfolio risk with
statistical significance, in line with ex-ante expectations. In the next step, we analyse the effects
of the ten sub-components of the total ESG-score. Considering the different weights of the ten
sub-components, this procedure contributes to the validity of our results and provides insights
about the roots of the effects of the three pillars. The findings for multivariate regressions are
depicted in Table (4.6).
The environmental pillar consists the sub-components Emissions, Environmental Innovation,
and Resource Use. The Emissions-score reflects a banks’ commitment to emissions reduction.
Also, Environmental Innovation reflects a banks’ capacity to develop and support eco-friendly
products and processes and thereby reduce the ecological costs for its customers. In the case
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of banks, this can be the integration of ecological factors into their lending policy, e.g. EP.
The Resource Use measures the efficiency of a firm’s resource usage. All three sub-components
have highly significant effects in line with ex-ante expectations in all six models. Therefore,
all three sub-components have a risk-reducing effect, considering the z-score and the RD. The
results are in line with risk management theory, reputation theory, and stakeholder theory. All
three variables can be interpreted as indicators of managerial sophistication to reduce operative
costs, contributing to higher and more stable income. They are also related to lower operational
transformation risk and reputation risk. Environmental Innovation has additionally the potential
to create new value for customers. In this way, the sub-components of the environmental pillar
reflect aspects of a forward-looking holistic risk management approach which also takes into
account ecological aspects in a sustainable way of doing business and acknowledges its meaning
for the reputation of the bank. This also confirms our superior result that the environmental
pillar as a whole has a risk-reducing effect on idiosyncratic bank risk.
Table 4.6: Multivariate Robust FE Regressions of Risk Measures on the Ten ESG-
sub-components
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of multivariate robust FE-
regressions of risk on the ten different sub-components of the ESG-score. Column (1) and (4) provide
univariate results. The regression coefficients in column (2) and (5) account for bank specific control
variables. Those in column (3) and (6) account for bank and country specific controls. The table shows
only the coefficients of the variables of interest. Those of the control variables are not depicted. The
independent variables are 1 year lagged. Significance is denoted at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), and 1% (∗∗∗)
significance level. Data is winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentile.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
z-score z-score z-score RD RD RD
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
L.Env. Innovation 0.3282∗∗∗ 0.3296∗∗∗ 0.2310∗∗∗ -0.1302∗∗∗ -0.1315∗∗∗ -0.1465∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
L.Emissions 0.4007∗∗∗ 0.3618∗∗∗ 0.2880∗∗∗ -0.0839∗∗∗ -0.0733∗∗ -0.0800∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
L.Resource Use 0.4639∗∗∗ 0.4279∗∗∗ 0.3644∗∗∗ -0.0816∗∗∗ -0.0688∗∗ -0.0726∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
L.Community 0.0808 0.0322 -0.0391 -0.0202 -0.0131 -0.0157
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
L.Human Rights 0.3037∗∗∗ 0.2674∗∗∗ 0.1602∗∗∗ -0.1269∗∗∗ -0.1165∗∗∗ -0.1227∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
L.Product Respon. 0.1749∗∗∗ 0.1294∗∗ 0.0385 0.0360 0.0509∗∗ 0.0510∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
L.Workforce 0.3435∗∗∗ 0.3182∗∗∗ 0.2486∗∗∗ -0.0396 -0.0310 -0.0374
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
L.CSR-strategy 0.2440∗∗∗ 0.1742∗∗∗ 0.0890∗ -0.0624∗∗ -0.0482∗ -0.0557∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
L.Management 0.1859∗∗∗ 0.1853∗∗∗ 0.1615∗∗∗ -0.0307 -0.0164 -0.0178
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
L.Shareholders 0.0150 0.0096 0.0116 -0.0423∗ -0.0326 -0.0031
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Bank controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country controls No No Yes No No Yes
N 3,949 3,200 3,117 2,904 2,674 2,635
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The sub-components Community, Human Rights, Product Responsibility, and Workforce are
part of the social pillar. The Community-score is a proxy of companies’ ethical behaviour and
involvement with the society. However, we find no significance in any model. This means, that
the sub-component does not affect idiosyncratic bank risk. Instead, we find high statistical sig-
nificance in line with expectation for Human Rights in all six models. Human Rights, therefore,
reduce both default risk as well as portfolio risk. It reflects the compliance with human rights
and labour protection requirements. By renouncing the financing of e.g. the arms industry
or companies with doubtful working standards (e.g. child labour), banks in particular can
contribute to the worldwide compliance with human rights. Otherwise, disregard potentially
causes lawsuits constituting operational risk and severe reputation damage. The interaction is
in line with reputation theory, risk management theory, and stakeholder theory. For Product
Responsibility, we find statistical significance in four of six models. Product Responsibility is
determined by product quality control programs, a high-quality complaint management service,
and the protection of sensitive customer data. Especially in banks, these aspects are important.
Furthermore, this finding is in line with the reputation theory, as well as risk management
theory, and stakeholder theory. The Workforce-score only affects the z-score with high statistical
significance. This underlines the value of good working conditions as well as ongoing employee
qualification training. Nonetheless, it has no significance for RD. In conclusion, we find a strong
dependence on the specific sub-components considered in the social pillar, even though we
do not find any contradicting and significant effects neither. The inconclusive results for the
Workforce-score determine the effect of the aggregate social-score. Workforce accounts for 16
of 35.5 percentage points, while the unambiguously significant sub-component Human Rights
accounts for only 4.5 percentage points.
The governance pillar consists of the sub-components for CSR-strategy, Management, and
Shareholders. The CSR-strategy is the only sub-component within the governance pillar which
has statistical significance in all six models in line with expectation. The CSR-strategy-score
measures the extent to which a bank communicates that it considers social and environmental
aspects in its day-to-day decision-making processes. To the extent that talk corresponds with
action, the effect can be interpreted as a holistic risk management approach, considering also
environmental and social risks in day-to-day business. For the Management-score, we observe
high statistical significance in Models (1-3) for the z-score. This result is in line with our
theoretical expectations. However, we cannot find any statistical significance for the RD. The
Management-score measures the extent to which banks’ corporate governance follows best
practices. Our results indicate that such compliance affects default risk significantly but not
portfolio risk. Moreover, the Shareholders-score does not have statistical significance in Models
(1-3) concerning the effects on the z-score. Also, it has no statistical significance on RD in
Models (5-6), only in the univariate Model (4) we observe a low significance on the 10% level.
This sub-component identifies the degree of fair treatment and protection of shareholders by
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the bank, including anti-takeover action. In particular, anti-takeover actions can serve as
an intuitive explanation that this sub-component does not have a clear risk-reducing effect.
Considering extreme actions like so-called “poison pills” explains how such action can indeed
lead to an increase in portfolio risk as well as default risk. In conclusion, we find mixed
results for the sub-components of the governance pillar. While the CSR-strategy has a high
statistical significance in all models, Shareholder has nearly no statistical significance. The
positive effect of the CSR-strategy supports the risk management hypothesis. Shareholders
are certainly the most important stakeholders. Though, they are only one of many groups of
stakeholders with very different and conflicting interests. Therefore, the insignificant effect of
the Shareholder does not provide evidence of the stakeholder theory. It should, however, neither
be misunderstood as the opposite. The aggregate effect of the governance pillar is, however,
dominated by the Management-score which accounts for 19 of 30.5 percentage points. In this
way, the Management-score explains why the effect of the aggregate governance-score is not
unambiguously risk-reducing.
Table (4.7) provides results for the Controversies-score. Models (1-3) provide the results for
effects on the z-score. The univariate regression coefficient for the Controversies-score on the
z-score in Model (1) is negative and statistically significant. This indicates that higher extents
to which banks are involved in scandals and controversial media coverage lead to higher default
risk, measured by the z-score. This result can be explained by lower earnings in the years after
controversies and higher volatility of returns and equity during this time of stress. The effect
remains statistically significant at the 5 % level if bank-specific control variables are considered
in Model (2). Surprisingly, in Model (3) which additionally considers country-specific control
variables the coefficient is not significant anymore. Models (4-6) provide the results for the
effects of the Controversies-score on banks’ RD. All the coefficients are positive and statistically
significant at the 1 % level. In line with ex-ante expectations based on reputation theory and risk
management theory, this means that lower Controversies-scores lead to lower portfolio risk. This
indicates that those banks which are characterised by little controversies are concerned about
their good reputation and reduce the riskiness of their portfolios. In general, the results provide
empirical support to our third hypothesis stating that more controversial banks have a higher
idiosyncratic bank risk. Our findings are in line with earlier research i.a. by Murphy et al. (2009).
4.5 Robustness
In order to test the robustness of the results provided above, we perform a battery of additional
tests. First, we re-estimate our results provided above substituting all the variables of interest
by the same variables with a two years lag, respectively without any time lag. This should
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Table 4.7: Multivariate Robust FE Regressions of Bank Risk on the Controversies-
Score
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of multivariate robust FE-
regressions. The dependent variables are the bank risk measures z-score and RD. The independent
variables are the Controversies-score and bank and country specific control variables. The independent
variables are 1 year lagged. Significance is denoted at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), and 1% (∗∗∗) significance
level. Data is winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentile.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
z-score z-score z-score RD RD RD
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
L.Controversies -0.0999∗∗∗ -0.0907∗∗ -0.0620 0.0599∗∗∗ 0.0490∗∗∗ 0.0473∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
L.logFTE 10.0989∗∗ 9.7704∗∗ -5.3123 -4.8038
(4.64) (4.47) (5.02) (5.17)
L.LR -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗ 0.0000 0.0000∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.LoanRatio 0.2359 0.1866 0.2582∗∗ 0.2608∗∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.12) (0.12)
L.DepRatio 0.3543∗∗∗ 0.2520∗∗ -0.1032 -0.1062
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
L.ROE -0.0007∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗ -0.0000 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.Inflation -0.3003 0.0812
(0.36) (0.12)
L.GDPGrowthCap 1.1399
∗∗∗ 0.3694∗
(0.36) (0.19)
L.GDPCap 0.0019
∗ -0.0000
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 52.4499∗∗∗ -78.4168∗ -140.5514∗∗∗ 59.0874∗∗∗ 100.2436∗ 95.9554∗
(1.75) (47.10) (50.62) (0.62) (57.35) (57.81)
N 3,949 3,200 3,117 2,904 2,674 2,635
R2adj 0.0016 0.0134 0.0425 0.0024 0.0087 0.0090
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ensure that the effects measured do not depend on the specific time lag considered. Table (4.8)
provides the results for the ESG-score and its three pillars. As illustrated, the results do not
significantly change. The ESG-score remains highly significant for the z-score. For the RD,
the ESG-score has an even higher significance considering a two years lag, the significance for
the ESG-score without a time lag is slightly lower. The environmental pillar remains signifi-
cant in all models, independent of the time lag considered. The social pillar remains highly
significant for the z-score. For the RD, the social pillar has no significance considering one
year lagged variables, it is however surprisingly weakly significant on the 10% level in two of
three models if the variables are considered without time lag. The governance pillar remains
highly significant for the z-score. For RD it remains insignificant, except for the univariate model.
Table 4.8: Multivariate Robust FE Regressions of Risk on CSR. Robustness Tests
for Different Time Lags
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of multivariate robust FE-
regressions of risk on the ESG-score, respectively its three pillars, as well as the Controversies-score.
Column (1) and (4) provide univariate results. The regression coefficients in column (2) and (5) account
for bank specific control variables, in column (3) and (6) account for bank and country specific controls.
The first panel provides results for variables of interest without time lag. The second panel provides
results for variables of interest with a 2 years time lag. Significance is denoted at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗),
and 1% (∗∗∗) significance level. Data is winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentile.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
z-score z-score z-score RD RD RD
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
Without lag
ESG-score 0.7169∗∗∗ 0.6900∗∗∗ 0.5526∗∗∗ -0.1211∗∗∗ -0.0838 -0.1020∗
(0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
EnvPillar 0.5274∗∗∗ 0.5015∗∗∗ 0.4175∗∗∗ -0.1100∗∗∗ -0.1224∗∗∗ -0.1341∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
SocPillar 0.4465∗∗∗ 0.3495∗∗∗ 0.2013∗∗ -0.0685∗ -0.0695 -0.0813∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
GovPillar 0.2366∗∗∗ 0.2235∗∗∗ 0.1798∗∗∗ -0.0242 -0.0089 -0.0092
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Controversies -0.0913∗∗ -0.0672∗ -0.0374 0.0579∗∗∗ 0.0584∗∗∗ 0.0570∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
2 years lagged
L2.ESG-score 0.7421∗∗∗ 0.6945∗∗∗ 0.5589∗∗∗ -0.1700∗∗∗ -0.1359∗∗ -0.1544∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
L2.EnvPillar 0.5214∗∗∗ 0.4962∗∗∗ 0.4041∗∗∗ -0.1292∗∗∗ -0.1082∗∗∗ -0.1180∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
L2.SocPillar 0.4971∗∗∗ 0.4472∗∗∗ 0.3208∗∗∗ -0.0817∗ -0.0576 -0.0661
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
L2.GovPillar 0.2217∗∗∗ 0.2067∗∗∗ 0.1588∗∗ -0.0705∗∗∗ -0.0402 -0.0388
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
L2.Controversies -0.0920∗∗∗ -0.0908∗∗ -0.0456 0.0676∗∗∗ 0.0614∗∗∗ 0.0592∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bank controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country controls No No Yes No No Yes
N 4,143 3,365 3,282 3,001 2,776 2,733
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Results for the Controversies-score without a time lag, respectively considering a two years
time lag yield comparable results. Both alternative calculations underscore the previous results.
Except for Model (3), in all other five models, the coefficients of the Controversies-score are sta-
tistically significant and suggest that higher Controversies-scores increase idiosyncratic bank risk.
Second, for the regression models performed throughout the study, we used panel OLS-regression
models with bank and time fixed effects following the Hausman-test. However, the results hold
as well if a random effects estimation model or a maximum likelihood estimation model is applied.
Third, we apply different levels of winsorisation to the data. We use winsorisation on the 5th
and the 95th percentile to account for a broader definition of outliers. Alternatively, we abandon
winsorisation and use the original data. These alternative procedures have no material effect on
the coefficients of the variables of interest. As Tables (4.14–4.18) in the appendix show, however,
the explanatory power of the models is higher considering a winsorisation on the 5th and the
95th percentile. Some control variables gain additional significance as well.
Fourth, we perform specific robustness checks for the measurement of the z-score. In partic-
ular, we calculate the z-score using standard deviations of ROA for rolling windows of ten,
instead of only five years. Even though five years is a widely appreciated window, ten years
should yield more reliable inputs. The results are robust to such an alternative calculation as well.
Fifth, we perform sub-sample analysis in order to investigate whether the effects depend on
invariate differences between the banks considered. Our original sample is worldwide. Following
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt & Levine (1999), we analyse sub-samples of banks from bank versus market-
based economies. Furthermore, we investigate whether a sub-sample of civil law countries yields
different results compared to common law countries, motivated by the results of Miralles-Quiro´s
et al. (2019). In both cases, we do not find elementary differences. These results which are not
depicted here are available on demand. The risk-mitigating effect on default risk is strongly
significant, while the effects on portfolio risk are not as unambiguous.
Sixth, analogous to Schulte & Winkler (2019), we decompose the z-score into changes associated
with ROA and changes associated with the CAR. Such a decomposition yields a measure of the
z-score which relates only the ROA to the standard deviation of ROA. This can be interpreted
as a risk-adjusted ROA.
z-scoreROAi,t =
ROAi,t
σ(ROAi,t)
(4.4)
On the other hand, the decomposition yields a z-score measure relating only the CAR to the
standard deviation of ROA. This can be interpreted as a risk-adjusted CAR.
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z-scoreCARi,t =
CARi,t
σ(ROAi,t)
(4.5)
Table (4.9) illustrates the results for the separate regressions of the risk-adjusted ROA on
the overall ESG-score in Model (1-3) and for the risk-adjusted CAR in Model (4-6). The
effect of the ESG-score remains significant in all models. This implies that CSR affects bank
default risk through both channels. Table (4.10) provides the coefficients of regressions of the
risk-adjusted ROA in Model (1-3), respectively of the risk-adjusted CAR in Model (4-6), on
the three pillars of the ESG-score and its ten sub-components. Control variables are not depicted.
Table 4.9: Multivariate Robust FE Regressions of the Two Channels of the z-Score
on the ESG-Score
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of multivariate robust FE-
regressions. The dependent variables are the different sub-components of the z-score, i.e. the risk-
weighted ROA and the risk-weighted CAR. The independent variables are the ESG-score and bank
and country specific control variables. The independent variables are 1 year lagged. Significance is
denoted at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), and 1% (∗∗∗) significance level. Data is winsorised at the 1st and the
99th percentile.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
z-score z-score z-score z-score z-score z-score
(ROA) (ROA) (ROA) (CAR) (CAR) (CAR)
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
L.ESG-score 0.0866∗∗∗ 0.0888∗∗∗ 0.0744∗∗∗ 0.7193∗∗∗ 0.6860∗∗∗ 0.5431∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
L.logFTE -0.0743 0.1626 0.2593 2.1525
(0.77) (0.78) (3.53) (3.46)
L.LR -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000∗ -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.LoanRatio 0.0207 0.0176 0.1224 0.1013
(0.02) (0.02) (0.13) (0.14)
L.DepRatio 0.0397∗∗ 0.0283 0.3004∗∗∗ 0.2234∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.09)
L.ROE -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0000 -0.0009∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.Inflation -0.0217 -0.0056
(0.05) (0.31)
L.GDPGrowthCap 0.2431
∗∗∗ 1.0090∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.31)
L.GDPCap 0.0002 0.0014
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 2.6238∗∗∗ -0.6165 -7.884 3.7116 -24.2422 -83.4566∗∗
(0.70) (6.95) (7.57) (4.13) (33.98) (40.96)
N 3,949 3,200 3,117 3,953 3,203 3,120
R2adj 0.0231 0.0283 0.0427 0.0432 0.0466 0.0626
Table (4.11) illustrates the decomposed results for the Controversies-score. It can be inferred
that the risk-increasing effect of the Controversies-score is only statistically significant for
CHAPTER 4. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND BANK RISK 97
Table 4.10: Multivariate Robust FE Regressions of the Two Channels of the z-Score
on the Pillars and Sub-Components of the ESG-Score
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of multivariate robust FE-
regressions. The dependent variables are the different sub-components of the z-score, i.e. the risk-
weighted ROA and the risk-weighted CAR. The independent variables are the ESG-score, its three
pillars, and ten sub-components. Control variables are not depicted. Column (1) and (4) provide
univariate results. The regression coefficients in column (2) and (5) account for bank specific control
variables. Those in column (3) and (6) account for bank and country specific controls. The independent
variables are 1 year lagged. Significance is denoted at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), and 1% (∗∗∗) significance
level. Data is winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentile.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
z-score z-score z-score z-score z-score z-score
(ROA) (ROA) (ROA) (CAR) (CAR) (CAR)
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
L.EnvPillar 0.0629∗∗∗ 0.0649∗∗∗ 0.0555∗∗∗ 0.4958∗∗∗ 0.4766∗∗∗ 0.3837∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
L.SocPillar 0.0530∗∗∗ 0.0517∗∗∗ 0.0356∗∗∗ 0.4654∗∗∗ 0.4061∗∗∗ 0.2602∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
L.GovPillar 0.0300∗∗∗ 0.0286∗∗∗ 0.0247∗∗∗ 0.2581∗∗∗ 0.2420∗∗∗ 0.2016∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
L.Env. Innovation 0.0379∗∗∗ 0.0405∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗ 0.2900∗∗∗ 0.2894∗∗∗ 0.2000∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
L.Emissions 0.0460∗∗∗ 0.0441∗∗∗ 0.0370∗∗∗ 0.3544∗∗∗ 0.3177∗∗∗ 0.2511∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
L.Resource Use 0.0500∗∗∗ 0.0495∗∗∗ 0.0437∗∗∗ 0.4138∗∗∗ 0.3782∗∗∗ 0.3205∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
L.Community 0.0009 -0.0037 -0.0114 0.0798∗ 0.0360 -0.0275
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
L.Human Rights 0.0347∗∗∗ 0.0343∗∗∗ 0.0240∗∗∗ 0.2690∗∗∗ 0.2332∗∗∗ 0.1361∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
L.Product Respon. 0.0182∗∗ 0.0164∗∗ 0.0064 0.1564∗∗∗ 0.1129∗ 0.0320
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
L.Workforce 0.0371∗∗∗ 0.0374∗∗∗ 0.0310∗∗∗ 0.3069∗∗∗ 0.2809∗∗∗ 0.2176∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
L.CSR-strategy 0.0303∗∗∗ 0.0248∗∗∗ 0.0167∗∗ 0.2127∗∗∗ 0.1495∗∗∗ 0.0723∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
L.Management 0.0202∗∗∗ 0.0205∗∗∗ 0.0184∗∗∗ 0.1653∗∗∗ 0.1644∗∗∗ 0.1430∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
L.Shareholders -0.0025 -0.0037 -0.0031 0.0176 0.0134 0.0145
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Bank controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country controls No No Yes No No Yes
N 3,949 3,200 3,117 3,953 3,203 3,120
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the risk-adjusted CAR illustrated in Formula (4.5). The coefficients in Models (1-3) for the
risk-adjusted ROA illustrated in Formula (4.4) are not statistically significant, however, they
point in the right direction.
Table 4.11: Multivariate Robust FE Regressions of the Two Channels of the z-Score
on the Controversies-Score
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of multivariate robust FE-
regressions. The dependent variables are the different sub-components of the z-score, i.e. the risk-
weighted ROA and the risk-weighted CAR. The independent variables are the Controversies-score and
bank and country specific control variables. The independent variables are 1 year lagged. Significance
is denoted at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), and 1% (∗∗∗) significance level. Data is winsorised at the 1st and
the 99th percentile.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
z-score z-score z-score z-score z-score z-score
(ROA) (ROA) (ROA) (CAR) (CAR) (CAR)
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
L.Controversies -0.0035 -0.0030 -0.0002 -0.0962∗∗∗ -0.0875∗∗∗ -0.0614∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
L.logFTE 1.1372 1.1339 8.9690∗∗ 8.6650∗∗
(0.79) (0.78) (3.94) (3.79)
L.LR -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000 -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.LoanRatio 0.0312 0.0256 0.2026 0.1596
(0.03) (0.03) (0.15) (0.15)
L.DepRatio 0.0417∗∗ 0.0284 0.3151∗∗∗ 0.2252∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.10)
L.ROE -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0000 -0.0007∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.Inflation -0.0576 -0.2421
(0.05) (0.32)
L.GDPGrowthCap 0.2266
∗∗∗ 0.9042∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.32)
L.GDPCap 0.0002
∗ 0.0017∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 7.2223∗∗∗ -7.8273 -14.9412∗ 45.1960∗∗∗ -70.7366∗ -125.9049∗∗∗
(0.31) (7.62) (7.92) (1.47) (40.27) (43.69)
N 3,949 3,200 3,117 3,953 3,203 3,120
R2adj -0.0001 0.0070 0.0291 0.0021 0.01437 0.0438
4.6 Conclusions
In general, corporate social responsibility gained a lot of attention in recent years. Our study
examines the relationship between CSR and idiosyncratic bank risk. We contribute to the
literature in the following ways. Whereas the majority of studies explore the effects of CSR on
risk for non-financial companies, our focus is specifically on banks. For this purpose we use a
data set of 2,452 banks from 115 countries, covering the period from 2002 to 2018. Confirming
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the validity of our results, we specify our multivariate regression models with bank-specific
and macroeconomic factors. In order to address the bank specifics, we analyse the CSR-effect
on both default risk and portfolio risk. Namely, we use the z-score as a proxy for default risk
and RD to measure portfolio risk. We examine the effect of CSR on bank risk at an aggregate
CSR-level, individually for the three CSR-pillars, as well as for the pillars’ ten sub-components.
In this way, we identify the specific drivers of the risk-reduction in detail and explore its origins.
Starting on the aggregate level, our first hypothesis addresses the impact of overall CSR on
banks’ idiosyncratic default risk and portfolio risk. We find strongly significant risk-reducing
effects for both risk measures. The breakdown of the default risk measure z-score into indivi-
dual components indicates that CSR has a positive impact on both risk-adjusted ROA and
risk-adjusted CAR.
On this basis, our second research question analyses the isolated effects of the environmental,
social, and governance pillar on a bank’s risk. In contrast to the overall results, the analysis of
the individual pillars presents a slightly different picture. In concrete terms, the risk-reducing
effect of the environmental pillar still applies to both risk measures. Conversely, for the social
and the governance pillar, there is only a statistically significant risk-reducing effect on default
risk, but not on portfolio risk. In order to understand the reasons for these results, we conduct
an analysis at the pillars’ sub-components. The observed effects of all the sub-components
of the environmental pillar are consistent with previous results. Thereby, it appears that all
sub-components of this pillar (Emissions, Environmental Innovation, Resource Use) have a
strongly significant impact on z-score and RD. This implies that the environmental pillar and
its sub-components are the origin and determinant drivers of the risk-reduction. Considering
the social pillar and the governance pillar, this is different. We do not find unambiguous
results here. Only the sub-components Human Rights and CSR-strategy have unequivocally
risk-reducing effects for both risk measures. To conclude, our empirical analysis supports
our second hypothesis entirely as concerns the environmental pillar. For the social and the
governance pillar, we do not find unambiguous results. Only for specific sub-components of
the social and the governance pillar, it can be unambiguously inferred that they reduce both
idiosyncratic bank risk measures.
In addition, our third hypothesis investigates the impact of controversies on idiosyncratic bank
risk. Thereby, we find a risk-enhancing effect of controversies. This is in line with the theoretical
framework. In particular, it gives empirical support to the reputation theory.
Our results have relevant theoretical and practical implications. From a scientific and analytical
point of view, we contribute additional insights into the identification of the drivers of banks’
idiosyncratic default and portfolio risk. From a bank management’s perspective, we provide
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additional rationale to consider in particular environmental aspects. The association with
lower idiosyncratic risk should serve as encouragement and additional argument in internal
decision-making processes. Because of the identified association, it is in the bank’s very own
interest to improve its environmental CSR. From a regulator’s and law maker’s perspective, our
results support attempts to foster CSR-compliant behaviour. In this way, the associated lower
idiosyncratic risk is a positive side effect of the promotion of better CSR.
We are aware of the limitations of our study. Certainly, one issue is the unbalanced panel
structure. In addition, the unique use of the Thomson Reuters database carries the inherent
risk of selection bias. Moreover, the use of additional risk measures could be interesting to
enhance the validity of the results. However, due to a lack of data availability, e.g. CDS-spreads
or non-performing loans, this is not feasible. Also, we are aware that we are not in a position to
draw final conclusions about the suitability of a “Green Supporting Factor”, because we only
have evidence on the relationship between environmental engagement and risk, but not on the
average risk-weight of a “green” investment.
The following aspects could be interesting for further investigation: First, the validity of our
results could be verified by using other risk measures, in particular market-based measures. In
the same way, natural disasters like Fukushima or Hurricane Sandy can be used as a reference
for natural experiments to investigate the relationship and test our results. These would,
furthermore, provide evidence on the perceived risk of market participants. Second, it is
reasonable to abstract the share of systematic risk from idiosyncratic risk. Third, it would be a
promising undertaking to perform a detailed analysis of banks’ asset structures. In this way, we
could further analyse the effect on the risk density. Fourth, our study provides first exploratory
insights into relevant determinates of the effects of CSR on bank risk. Further research should
focus on the specific cause-effect relations between bank risk and the sub-components that were
identified as significant drivers.
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4.7 Appendix
Figure 4.2: Origin of the Banks
The graph above provides information on the regional origin of the banks. Depicted are the absolute
numbers of banks per continent. The total number of banks with available ESG-scores in the sample is
582.
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Table 4.13: Correlation Metrics
The table shows pairwise correlation coefficients of the risk measures, the ESG-score, its pillars, and
the Controversies-score.
z-score RD ESG-score EnvPillar SocPillar GovPillar Controversies
z-score 1.00
RD -0.01 1.00
ESG-score -0.11 -0.29 1.00
EnvPillar -0.13 -0.33 0.88 1.00
SocPillar -0.12 -0.23 0.88 0.72 1.00
GovPillar -0.03 -0.14 0.72 0.42 0.44 1.00
Controversies 0.09 0.17 -0.41 -0.38 -0.39 -0.24 1.00
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Table 4.14: Robustness: Winsorisation Level. Multivariate Robust FE Regressions
of Risk on the ESG-Score
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of multivariate robust FE-
regressions. The dependent variables are the bank risk measures z-score and RD. The independent
variables are the ESG-score and bank and country specific control variables. The independent variables
are 1 year lagged. Significance is denoted at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), and 1% (∗∗∗) significance level. Data
is winsorised at the 5st and the 95th percentile.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
z-score z-score z-score RD RD RD
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
L.ESG-score 1.2470∗∗∗ 0.9437∗∗∗ 0.7554∗∗∗ -0.3249∗∗∗ -0.1711∗∗ -0.1977∗∗
(0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)
L.logFTE -13.3226∗ -10.5866 14.1429 15.5211
(7.81) (7.79) (10.95) (10.82)
L.LR 0.0000 0.0000∗ 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.LoanRatio 0.2007 0.1580 -0.2862∗ -0.2791∗
(0.18) (0.21) (0.17) (0.15)
L.DepRatio 1.5239∗∗∗ 1.3797∗∗∗ -0.6572∗∗∗ -0.6790∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.25) (0.13) (0.13)
L.ROE 0.2869∗∗ 0.2178∗∗ 0.1798 0.1603
(0.13) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13)
L.Inflation 0.9130 0.5084∗
(0.57) (0.27)
L.GDPGrowthCap 2.4507
∗∗∗ 0.4935∗
(0.52) (0.29)
L.GDPCap 0.0034
∗∗ 0.0004
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant -6.5554 -6.1129 -135.8365∗ 101.7768∗∗∗ 36.8341 12.04271
(6.19) (67.25) (75.47) (5.49) (95.11) (94.01)
N 3,949 3,200 3,117 2,904 2,674 2,635
R2adj 0.03863 0.1217 0.1485 0.01910 0.1321 0.1381
CHAPTER 4. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND BANK RISK 105
Table 4.15: Robustness: Winsorisation Level. Multivariate Robust FE Regressions
of Risk on the Environmental-Score
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of multivariate robust FE-
regressions. The dependent variables are the bank risk measures z-score and RD. The independent
variables are the ESG-environment-pillar-score and bank and country specific control variables. The
independent variables are 1 year lagged. Significance is denoted at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), and 1% (∗∗∗)
significance level. Data is winsorised at the 5st and the 95th percentile.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
z-score z-score z-score RD RD RD
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
L.EnvPillar 0.8414∗∗∗ 0.6674∗∗∗ 0.5480∗∗∗ -0.2973∗∗∗ -0.2166∗∗∗ -0.2390∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
L.logFTE -13.1616∗ -10.8003 15.5576 16.9864
(7.61) (7.58) (11.00) (10.90)
L.LR 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.LoanRatio 0.1798 0.1303 -0.2520 -0.2475
(0.18) (0.21) (0.17) (0.15)
L.DepRatio 1.5579∗∗∗ 1.4059∗∗∗ -0.6669∗∗∗ -0.6930∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.25) (0.13) (0.13)
L.ROE 0.2916∗∗ 0.2241∗∗ 0.1648 0.14435
(0.13) (0.10) (0.14) (0.12)
L.Inflation 0.8935 0.45077∗
(0.58) (0.26)
L.GDPGrowthCap 2.3539
∗∗∗ 0.5154∗
(0.53) (0.29)
L.GDPCap 0.0035
∗∗ 0.0005
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 13.8755∗∗∗ 5.1654 -126.9003∗ 100.534∗∗∗ 25.1409 -2.3088
(4.61) (66.73) (74.30) (3.67) (95.61) (94.68)
N 3,949 3,200 3,117 2,904 2,674 2,635
R2adj 0.0356 0.1220 0.1498 0.0326 0.1418 0.1486
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Table 4.16: Robustness: Winsorisation Level. Multivariate Robust FE Regressions
of Risk on the Social-Score
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of multivariate robust FE-
regressions. The dependent variables are the bank risk measures z-score and RD. The independent
variables are the ESG-social-pillar-score and bank and country specific control variables. The inde-
pendent variables are 1 year lagged. Significance is denoted at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), and 1% (∗∗∗)
significance level. Data is winsorised at the 5st and the 95th percentile.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
z-score z-score z-score RD RD RD
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
L.SocPillar 0.8381∗∗∗ 0.5875∗∗∗ 0.4035∗∗∗ -0.1452∗ -0.0340 -0.0504
(0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
L.logFTE -10.0831 -7.3860 12.7165 13.9480
(8.00) (7.96) (10.93) (10.78)
L.LR 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.LoanRatio 0.2696 0.2013 -0.3070∗ -0.2920∗
(0.19) (0.22) (0.17) (0.15)
L.DepRatio 1.5414∗∗∗ 1.3856∗∗∗ -0.6658∗∗∗ -0.6853∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.25) (0.13) (0.13)
L.ROE 0.2699∗∗ 0.2023∗∗ 0.1861 0.1663
(0.12) (0.09) (0.15) (0.14)
L.Inflation 0.6410 0.5933∗∗
(0.56) (0.27)
L.GDPGrowthCap 2.3818
∗∗∗ 0.5064∗
(0.53) (0.29)
L.GDPCap 0.0037
∗∗ 0.0002
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 14.5633∗∗∗ -22.9463 -160.6256∗∗ 92.3738∗∗∗ 44.9294 24.7033
(4.93) (69.05) (77.25) (4.20) (94.87) (93.62)
N 3,949 3,200 3,117 2,904 2,674 2,635
R2adj 0.0242 0.1113 0.1408 0.0047 0.1281 0.1333
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Table 4.17: Robustness: Winsorisation Level. Multivariate Robust FE Regressions
of Risk on the Governance-Score
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of multivariate robust FE-
regressions. The dependent variables are the bank risk measures z-score and RD. The independent
variables are the ESG-governance-pillar-score and bank and country specific control variables. The
independent variables are 1 year lagged. Significance is denoted at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), and 1% (∗∗∗)
significance level. Data is winsorised at the 5st and the 95th percentile.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
z-score z-score z-score RD RD RD
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
L.GovPillar 0.4429∗∗∗ 0.2986∗∗∗ 0.2331∗∗∗ -0.0948 -0.0046 -0.0067
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
L.logFTE -3.8763 -3.5309 12.2327 13.3483
(8.01) (7.85) (10.83) (10.70)
L.LR 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.LoanRatio 0.3397∗ 0.2430 -0.3129∗ -0.2971∗
(0.19) (0.22) (0.17) (0.15)
L.DepRatio 1.5292∗∗∗ 1.3678∗∗∗ -0.6648∗∗∗ -0.6828∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.25) (0.13) (0.13)
L.ROE 0.2328∗∗ 0.1768∗∗ 0.1885 0.1694
(0.10) (0.08) (0.15) (0.14)
L.Inflation 0.5368 0.6159∗∗
(0.57) (0.27)
L.GDPGrowthCap 2.4503
∗∗∗ 0.4994∗
(0.54) (0.29)
L.GDPCap 0.0039
∗∗ 0.0002
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 34.5381∗∗∗ -67.3896 -192.8314∗∗∗ 89.5592∗∗∗ 47.7339 29.0979
(4.20) (70.68) (74.38) (3.72) (94.54) (93.01)
N 3,949 3,200 3,117 2,904 2,674 2,635
R2adj 0.0090 0.1040 0.1384 0.0027 .1278047 0.1328
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Table 4.18: Robustness: Winsorisation Level. Multivariate Robust FE Regressions
of Risk on the Controversies-Score
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of multivariate robust FE-
regressions. The dependent variables are the bank risk measures z-score and RD. The independent
variables are the ESG-Controversies-score and bank and country specific control variables. The
independent variables are 1 year lagged. Significance is denoted at the 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), and 1% (∗∗∗)
significance level. Data is winsorised at the 5st and the 95th percentile.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
z-score z-score z-score RD RD RD
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
L.Controversies -0.4047∗∗∗ -0.2629∗∗∗ -0.2357∗∗∗ 0.2325∗∗∗ 0.1566∗∗∗ 0.1569∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
L.logFTE -3.7850 -3.6540 13.1669 14.2524
(7.96) (7.86) (10.89) (10.79)
L.LR 0.0000 0.0000∗ 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.LoanRatio 0.3263∗ 0.2239 -0.2931∗ -0.2828∗
(0.19) (0.22) (0.17) (0.15)
L.DepRatio 1.5122∗∗∗ 1.3501∗∗∗ -0.6390∗∗∗ -0.6588∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.25) (0.13) (0.13)
L.ROE 0.2610∗∗ 0.2033∗∗ 0.1634 0.1449
(0.11) (0.09) (0.14) (0.13)
L.Inflation 0.5186 0.5769∗∗
(0.56) (0.26)
L.GDPGrowthCap 2.4020
∗∗∗ 0.4760
(0.54) (0.29)
L.GDPCap 0.0039
∗∗ 0.0003
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 77.0923∗∗∗ -38.2658 -167.6103∗∗ 73.4273∗∗∗ 28.3925 8.0485
(3.76) (71.85) (75.95) (1.98) (94.80) (93.46)
N 3,949 3,200 3,117 2,904 2,674 2,635
R2adj 0.0119 0.1053 0.1404 0.0304 0.1406 0.1456
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